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Abstract
This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter examines
the strategic choices of the targets and the intensity of violence by rebel groups.
The chapter presents a theoretical framework that links a rebel group’s targeting
decisions to income shocks. It highlights that this relationship depends on the
structure of the rebels’ tax base. The hypotheses from the model are tested in
the context of India’s Naxalite conflict. The second chapter estimates the impact
of military recruitment on human capital accumulation in colonial Punjab. In
this context, I find that higher military recruitment was associated with increased
literacy at the district-religion level. The final chapter presents a model that
describes the optimal design of civil-military institutions in a setting where some
control of the military over domestic politics is deemed desirable.
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Preface
The chapters in this thesis reflect my broad interest in the political economy of
developing countries. While the literature in this area has grown exponentially
over the last decade, the list of questions that are still unanswered remains very
long. My thesis attempts to contribute to the understanding of some of these
outstanding questions.
In the first chapter, I try to shed light on the targeting strategies of rebel groups.
Insurgents in civil conflict typically target both government forces and civilians.
However, evidence on the causes of targeted violence against civilians is scarce.
This chapter examines the strategic choices of the targets and the intensity of vio-
lence by rebel groups. In a simple theoretical framework, negative labour income
shocks are predicted to: (i) increase violence against civilians to prevent them
from being recruited as police informers; (ii) increase the number of rebel attacks
against the government, but only if the rebels’ tax base is sufficiently independent
from local labour productivity. These theoretical predictions are confirmed in the
context of India’s Naxalite conflict between 2005 and 2010. Exploiting variation
in annual rainfall in a panel of district level casualty numbers, I find that negative
rainfall shocks: (i) increase Maoist violence against civilians; (ii) increase Maoist
violence against security forces, but only in those districts in which the Maoists
have access to key mineral resources.
In the second chapter, I study the importance of voluntary military service for
human development outcomes. Voluntary military service in professional armies
could provide rare educational opportunities to recruits from disadvantaged groups.
While the military is one of the most important economic actors in many deve-
loping countries, its role has received very little attention from development eco-
nomists. In particular, there is almost no evidence on the relationship between
military recruitment and educational outcomes in in this context. My second chap-
ter explores a historical example of large scale military recruitment: it estimates
the impact of military recruitment on human capital accumulation in colonial Pun-
jab. The empirical strategy exploits the exogenous increase in recruitment by the
Indian Army during the First World War. Higher military recruitment is found
to be associated with increased literacy at the district-religion level. The direct
acquisition of literacy skills by illiterate serving soldiers appears to be driving
this impact. Limited evidence is found of inter-generational spill-overs. Finally,
a political economy mechanism is not supported in this context: military recruit-
ment was not associated with increased investments of district boards in public
education.
The final chapter addresses a theoretical problem. Military coups often attract po-
pular support and, historically, several constitutions even contained clauses that
allowed the military to intervene in domestic politics. Also, the punishments for
leaders of failed coups tend to be surprisingly mild. However, even in settings with
coup-friendly institutions, military officers are and were typically not allowed to
participate in political debates. Hence, the institutions that govern civil-military
relations seem to simultaneously encourage and discourage military influence over
politics. This paper offers a theoretical model that rationalises these seemingly
paradoxical institutions by highlighting the role of factionalisation within the mi-
litary. Under the assumption that some control of the military over domestic po-
litics may be desirable, the paper discusses how civil-military institutions should
be designed to generate “optimal” political control by the military.
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1 Targets of Violence
Evidence from India’s Naxalite Conflict
1.1 Introduction
The cost of civil war is to a large extent borne by the non-combatant population.
The civilian population does not just suffer from the indirect or unintentional
consequences of war. In most conflicts, insurgents devote considerable effort to
targeted attacks on civilians. Understanding the specific logic of different types of
violence is crucial for the design of effective conflict resolution policies. A parti-
cular concern is that policies that aim to weaken the insurgents’ fighting capacity
against the government could come at the cost of inciting targeted violence against
civilians. This paper tries to uncover the drivers of targeted violence against civi-
lians. To this end, I develop a simple theoretical framework that links the targeting
decisions of a rebel group to labour income shocks. I subsequently exploit exoge-
nous variation in rainfall to test the predictions of this framework in the context
of India’s Naxalite conflict. My findings suggest that rebels strategically choose
the intensity of violence against civilians in order to deter civilian collaboration
with the government. Moreover, I argue that the structure of the rebels’ tax base
determines whether a rebel group can exploit negative income shocks to boost its
fighting capacity against the government.
Violence against civilians could serve many purposes. This paper highlights the
role of civilian collaboration. I develop a theoretical framework that describes a
rebel group’s strategic choice of how to allocate its fighters. In the short run,
1
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the key objective of the rebels is to challenge the government. This enables them
to promote their long term goals of control over territory and future economic
rents. However, rebels must also confront the reality that civilians may act as
police informants, thus restraining their capacity to attack the government. By
staging targeted attacks against informers, the rebels can limit the incentive of
civilians to help the government. As the rebel group manages a limited number
of fighters, it needs to allocate its cadres strategically between either of these two
activities: (i) direct assaults on government troops, (ii) or the exercise of control
over the civilian population. How a rebel group manages its personnel depends on
the economic environment. I assume that the rebels need to tax the local economy
to compensate their recruits. In contrast, the government does not rely on local
economic conditions to fund its payments to informers. In this sense, the conflict
is characterised by asymmetric taxation capacity.
What happens to rebel violence if a negative labour income shock hits a local
conflict zone? As the government’s tax base and the corresponding budget for
paying informants is independent from local economic conditions, the negative la-
bour income shock increases the willingness of the population to share information
with the government. In response, the rebel group finds it optimal to boost the
number of rebels devoted to targeting informants in order to deter collaboration.
However, the rebel group’s need to shift resources towards controlling the popula-
tion comes at the expense of reducing its fighting capacity against the government.
The extent to which the rebels can maintain direct fighting capacity now depends
on the rebels’ local tax base. If the rebels mainly rely on taxation of the local la-
bour market, a negative income shock will hurt their tax base and they will not be
able to boost recruitment. Only if the rebel group has access to sources of funding
that are not correlated with local labour productivity, will it be able to exploit a
negative labour income shock to boost its recruitment and thus stage more attacks
against security forces. My paper tests these predictions for a conflict that is of
major concern to policy makers: India’s Naxalite conflict.
India’s Naxalite movement has been described by the Indian Prime Minister Man-
mohan Singh as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our
country”.1 The conflict claimed at least 4,800 lives over the 2005-2010 period.
India’s Naxalite conflict provides an ideal testing ground for the theoretical pre-
dictions of this paper for a number of reasons. First, the Naxalite conflict has
1Economist, 25 Feb 2010, “Ending the Red Terror”.
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seen high levels of targeted violence against civilians, who account for more than
one third of the total number of casualties. Second, due to the reliance of the
Naxalite-affected areas on rain-fed agriculture, exogenous variation in rainfall can
be exploited to identify the impact of labour productivity shocks on the intensity
of violence. Third, the Naxalite conflict affects a large number of districts and
its actors have asymmetric financial capacities. Observers indicate that the rebels
heavily rely on taxation of the local economy, whereas the government relies on
a much broader tax base. Interestingly, the Naxalites operate in areas that in-
clude (but are not limited to) districts that produce key mineral resources. These
mineral resources should make the rebels’ local tax base more independent from
local agricultural labour market conditions. Hence, variation in mineral resource
wealth can be used to identify the differential impact of labour income shocks on
violence, as required by the theoretical framework.
To test the predictions of the theoretical framework, I collect a data set of annual
casualty numbers at the district level between 2005 and 2010. These conflict out-
comes are combined with Kharif season rainfall data, data on mineral resource
wealth, and key socio-economic and environmental controls. Importantly, the
data set allows for casualties to be attributed to three categories: civilians, se-
curity forces, and Maoists. In support of the subsequent reduced form approach,
I first confirm that negative rainfall shocks lead to lower rice production in the
region under study. This finding supports the interpretation of rainfall shocks as
determinants of agricultural income in this context.
The key result of this paper is that lower Kharif rainfall boosts Naxalite violence
against civilians, regardless of the resource environment. This finding is consistent
with the idea that rebels use violence against civilians to counterbalance the in-
creased appeal of collaboration after scanty rainfall. For the number of security
force casualties and the number of deadly attacks on security forces, I find that
violence only increases in response to negative rainfall shocks in those areas that
produce key minerals. This finding is consistent with the idea that the rebels can
only use a negative income shock to boost recruitment (and thus their fighting
capacity against the government), if their tax base does not depend too much on
local labour productivity. To shed further light on the mechanism that underlies
these results, I use detailed incident information to break down civilian casualties
into three groups: civilian collaborators; other civilian targets; and civilians who
were not the intended target of the attack. In support of the mechanism high-
3
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lighted by this paper, I confirm that my results are driven by targeted attacks
on civilian collaborators. Strikingly, the results on untargeted civilian casualties
follow exactly the same pattern as those for security force casualties: a negative
rainfall shock boosts violence, but only in mining districts. Furthermore, the main
results survive a variety of robustness checks, including (a) controlling for other
variables that could explain the differential impact of income shocks in mineral rich
areas; (b) relying on alternative measures of mineral resource wealth and rainfall
shocks; (c) comparing the baseline results from a Poisson model to OLS results.
The results of this paper shed light on the drivers of targeted violence, by highligh-
ting both the role of civilian collaboration and the importance of the rebels’ tax
base. These insights matter for the design of conflict resolution strategies. By of-
fering rewards that are conditional on collaboration, the government may want to
exploit negative income shocks to boost collaboration and weaken insurgents. My
results suggest that this strategy could mainly put civilians at risk of retaliation,
as the rebels can strategically respond by boosting violence against civilians.
This paper brings together recent work on the role of income shocks in conflict
and research on the logic of violence against civilians. A growing body of research
explores the targeting of the non-combatant population in civil conflict. The me-
chanism highlighted in this paper is close to the work of Kalyvas (2006), who
analyses in detail how civilian collaboration relates to selective violence.2 Berman,
Felter and Shapiro (2011) also consider the strategic interaction between govern-
ments, civilians, and rebels. These authors develop a model of retaliatory violence
that is close to the framework presented in this paper, but they do not provide
empirical evidence on such violence. The existing empirical evidence on targeted
violence against civilians is mainly based on case studies and cross-sectional re-
gressions.3 This paper is one of the first empirical contributions to explore the
2Kalyvas (2006) argues that selective violence against civilians is highest in areas with asym-
metric, but incomplete control by the rivalling parties.
3Weinstein (2007) also highlights the role of selective violence against civilian collaborators.
Ballcels (2010) considers direct violence against civilians in conventional civil wars. She finds
a positive relationship between selective killings of civilians in the Spanish Civil War and
pre-war political competition. In an alternative approach, Azam (2006) argues that violence
against civilians could be driven by strategic looting that aims at lowering the opportunity
cost of participation in conflict. Azam and Hoeﬄer (2002) highlight that violence against
civilians could also be motivated by military objectives. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006)
argue that rebels who are driven by material incentives are more likely to abuse civilians in
comparison to units which share common goals and have a strong command structure. The
role of mineral resources is developed in more detail by Weinstein (2005), who argues that
mineral resource wealth leads to opportunistic rebellions. Further empirical work on violence
4
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causes of variation in targeted violence against civilians versus the government in
a subnational panel. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper explicitly
links targeted violence against civilians to labour income shocks. This approach
enables me to overcome key endogeneity concerns.
Several key contributions in the conflict literature share the focus of my paper on
labour income shocks. Dube and Vargas (2011) show that a fall in coffee prices led
to increased violence in the Colombian civil war. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti
(2004) find that negative GDP shocks, as instrumented by rainfall growth, explain
the onset of civil wars in Sub Saharan Africa.4 Most of the theoretical arguments
that link labour income shocks to violence rely on the idea that negative shocks
reduce the opportunity cost of joining armed conflict.5 However, this view has
been challenged in recent work by Berman, Callen, Felter and Shapiro (2011).
These authors find that high unemployment is associated with reduced violence
in the context of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. They argue that high
unemployment could mainly facilitate information gathering by counterinsurgency
forces. My paper suggests that the relationship between labour income shocks
and violence against the government crucially depends on the structure of the
rebels’ tax base. For the opportunity cost channel to dominate in response to a
negative labour income shock, the rebels need access to external sources of funding.
Therefore, my analysis can account for the conflicting findings on the relationship
between income shocks and violence in the existing literature.
Finally, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of India’s Naxalite in-
surgency. It is well established that civil conflict hampers economic development,
and previous work has suggested that the Naxalite conflict has indeed reduced eco-
nomic growth in the affected states.6 This consideration gains even more relevance
because the districts affected by Naxalism are among India’s poorest regions.7 Gi-
against civilians includes Eck and Hultman (2007) and Restrepo and Spagat (2004).
4Besley and Persson (2010) confirm these findings for a wider range of income shocks and for
a larger set of countries. Iyengar, Monten, and Hanson (2011) find that higher spending
on employment programmes by the US military reduced labour-intensive insurgent violence
in Iraq. Blattman and Miguel (2010) survey the broader conflict literature. Ross (2004)
provides a survey of the literature on the relationship between civil war and natural resources
(e.g. Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2000; and Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).
5See for example Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2009); Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011).
6Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007), and Blattman and Miguel (2010) survey the extensive empirical
literature on the consequences of conflict. Nilakantan and Singhal (2011) put the economic
cost of India’s Naxalite conflict at 12% of the state level economic output.
7Borooah (2008). Banerjee and Iyer (2005) argue that the so-called “Red Corridor” of severely
affected districts suffers from a colonial legacy of underinvestment in agriculture. Gomes
5
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ven the particular developmental challenges faced by India’s so-called “Red Cor-
ridor”, the importance of understanding the logic of Naxalite violence can hardly
be overstated. While most of the existing work points to factors that explain the
susceptibility of districts to Naxalite activity in the long run, these studies cannot
account for the variation in the intensity of different types of conflict over time.
However, understanding the dynamics of conflict and the strategic behaviour of its
parties is crucial for the design of effective conflict resolution strategies. In a recent
working paper, Gawende, Kapur, and Satyanath (2012) find that a decrease in the
“greenness” of vegetation, which they instrument by rainfall shocks and interpret
as a proxy for rural incomes, appears to increase Naxalite violence.8 Their results
suggest that there is a negative relationship between Naxalite violence and labour
income. However, the sign of this empirical relationship could be context-specific
and it could stem from a large set of mechanisms. In an attempt to shed more
light on the rebels’ targeting strategies and to reconcile the conflicting findings in
the broader conflict literature, this paper tests a more qualified hypothesis. I argue
that the relationship between income shocks and Naxalite violence depends both
on the targets of violence and the nature of the Naxalites’ tax base. This paper
is also the first contribution to focus on the drivers of targeted Naxalite violence
against civilians.
The paper is organised as follows. First, I present a simple model that generates
predictions regarding the impact of labour productivity shocks on different types
of violence. Second, I discuss the background of the Naxalite conflict. Third,
I describe the data used in this study. Fourth, I discuss the empirical strategy.
Fifth, I discuss the main findings and I present key robustness checks. In the final
section, I offer concluding remarks.
(2012) provides empirical evidence that suggests that Naxalite violence is spurred by these
historical inequalities. In the context of Nepal’s Maoist rebellion, the intensity of violence has
also been linked to poverty and historical inequality (Murshed and Gates, 2007; Do and Iyer,
2008). Focusing on the same conflict, Macours (2008) finds that rebel recruitment through
abduction was more intensive in Nepalese districts that experienced fast growth in income
inequality.
8These authors rely on a different dataset (spanning a different time period and including only
a subset of districts affected by the conflict).
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1.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I present a simple, reduced form model that links labour produc-
tivity shocks to the strategic deployment of rebels against civilian or government
targets.9 The model presented here combines key elements from four recent mo-
dels in the insurgency literature. It includes (1) a rebel group budget constraint
(as in Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2011), (2) information provision by civilians and the
possibility of retaliation by the rebel group (as in Berman et al., 2011b), (3) asym-
metric taxation capacity (as in Besley and Persson, 2011), and (4) the strategic
allocation of rebels (as in Azam, 2006).
First, the model describes the market for rebels. Rebels tax the economy and their
income is given by:
B = p[θ(L− F ) +R]
This revenue function assumes that a fixed fraction p of economic output is col-
lected as a “tax” (or looted) by the rebels. Total agricultural output is given by
θ(L−F ), in which F indicates the number of people fighting for the rebels, and L
stands for the total labour endowment in the economy. θ denotes labour produc-
tivity in a linear production function, while R stands for an alternative source of
funding that does not depend on agricultural productivity, e.g. mineral resources.
The rebel group uses its income to pay fighters. It is assumed that their total
income is divided equally among the rebels, so that the rebel wage equals B
F
. As
fighters are drawn from the agricultural sector, their reservation wage is equal to
the agricultural output they forgo: (1− p)θ. The participation constraint requires
that the wage paid by the rebel group is higher than the reservation wage. In the
labour market equilibrium, this condition holds with equality:
p
F
[θ(L− F ) +R] = (1− p)θ (1.1)
The above condition implies that the returns to agricultural work equal the returns
9The appendix discusses a re-interpretation and extension of the simple model presented here.
This extension further microfounds the use of violence against civilians.
7
Chapter 1 Targets of Violence
to becoming a rebel.10 This equilibrium condition can be rewritten as:
F = pL+ pR
θ
(1.2)
The second market considered by the theoretical framework is the market for in-
formants. It is assumed that a certain share of the population, which could include
both fighters and civilians, exogenously receives valuable information. Therefore,
they can be hired to act as informants for the government. Informants receive
payments X that are not responsive to labour productivity.11 This assumption re-
flects the asymmetric nature of the conflict: the government’s tax base is assumed
to be independent from local economic conditions. Moreover, the government is
non-strategic in this simplified model.12 In contrast, informed individuals face a
cost if they decide to collaborate with the government. Importantly, the cost is
assumed to be increasing in labour productivity. There are two main justifications
for this assumption. First, citizens must devote time to inform the government,
which may hamper their productive capacity. Second, the rebel group may destroy
the economic output of citizens in retaliation for passing on information.13 These
two channels could reinforce each other: the threat of retaliation may force infor-
10The condition corresponds to a simplified version of the appropriation model proposed by
Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011). However, I do not directly equate appropriation to violence.
The assumption that p is a fixed fraction of output simplifies the analysis. The model can
incorporate a general appropriation function p(F ) without changing the results qualitatively.
However, additional assumptions on the form of the cost function C(τF, θ(1− p)) are needed
to guarantee the existence of a fixed point in proposition 3.
11Counter-insurgency methods can be brutal (Weinstein, 2007, p.6). To capture this idea, X
could also include non-punishment by the government. Similarly, the rebels could offer re-
wards for collaboration. The crucial assumption of the model is that the appeal of collabo-
ration with the government is decreasing in θ. This assumption is credible if the government
has access to a budget that is independent from local economic conditions or if the rebels are
less constrained in their capacity to destroy the output of informers.
12There are multiple justifications for this assumption. In line with the asymmetric setting
of my framework, the government could take strategic decisions (i.e. the choice of X) at
a level that is higher than the local conflict zone considered by the model. Lack of local
information or economies of scale may make if hard for the government to tailor its strategy
to local conditions. Alternatively, if the government and the rebel group move simultaneously,
there could be competition over informers (in which rebels match higher rewards with higher
intimidation). In the equilibrium, the rewards offered by government could be limited by
its budgetary capacity or its willingness to pay for information (which are assumed to be
independent from θ).
13The timing of the game, which will be introduced below, is only fully consistent with the second
interpretation. The timing can be altered to incorporate the first interpretation without
changing the results.
8
1.2 Theoretical framework
mants to hide and to give up economic production. Higher retaliation capacity
may also increase the share of output destroyed by rebels. These relationships
are captured by the cost function C(τF, θ(1− p)). The cost function includes the
retaliation capacity τF as its first argument. τ stands for the fraction of rebels
who are employed to control and monitor the population (0 6 τ 6 1).14 In this
function, it is assumed that C1 > 0, C2 > 0, C1,2 > 0. The timing of the game
is such that the potential informants move after the rebel group. The decision
to provide information is based on observed τF and θ. The returns to providing
information to the government can now be described as follows:
i[X − C(τF, θ(1− p))] (1.3)
The decision of the informed population to collaborate with the government is
denoted by i = 1, i ∈ {0, 1}. The optimal decision rule of the informed population
is now given by:15
i∗ = 1⇔ X > C(τF, θ(1− p))
Finally, the rebel group strategically chooses how to allocate its fighters. The
objective function is increasing in the number of fighters who are not involved in
controlling the population. These are the fighters whom the rebel group can use
to achieve its long-term goals, such as the control of territory or future sources
of income.16 These rebels have the capacity to carry out direct attacks on the
government (i.e. the security forces). However, it is assumed that the capacity of
the rebels to attack the government disappears if the informed population decides
to share its information with the government. This is captured by the following
14In the appendix (1.8.1), I discuss a model in which the population does not directly observe
the investment in retaliation capacity, τF . Instead, it observes the number of non-security
force killings by the rebel group, which is a monotonically increasing function of τF : K(τF ).
K(τF ) reveals the minimum investment in retaliation capacity. This extension microfounds
the targeting of civilians.
15In principle, the returns to becoming an informant should enter the labour market condition
in (Equation 1.1). The appendix provides a justification for this omission.
16The idea that the rebel group has long term goals for which it needs to recruit fighters is also
central to Berman et al. (2009 and 2011) and Azam (2006).
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objective function:
W (τ) = (1− i∗(τF ))(1− τ)F (1.4)
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Production and appropriation take place according to Equation 1.1.
2. The rebel group chooses τF .
3. The informed population decides whether to provide information: i ∈ {0, 1}.
4. The pay-offs are realised:
• For the rebel group: W = (1− i)(1− τ)F
• For the informed population: U i = (1− p)θ+i(X − C(τF, θ(1− p)))
• For all other individuals: U = (1− p)θ
The model is solved by backward induction. The rebels maximise their objective
function with respect to τ in anticipation of the informers’ reaction. It can be
seen immediately from the discontinuous objective function that the rebel group
optimally chooses τ such that the returns to becoming an informant (expression
Equation 1.3) equal zero.
Proposition 1: In the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the rebel group sets τ ∗ such
that individuals are indifferent between working as informants or not. The
informants choose i∗ = 1 if τ < τ ∗ and i∗ = 0 if τ > τ ∗.
The following propositions describe the comparative statics of the allocation of
fighters with respect to productivity shocks.
Proposition 2: For R = 0, a productivity shock does not affect the size of the rebel
group. A negative productivity shock increases the number of rebels engaged
in controlling civilians (∂τ∗F
∂θ
< 0). A negative productivity shock decreases
the number of rebels engaged in conflict with the government (∂(1−τ∗)F
∂θ
> 0).
Proposition 3: For R > 0, a negative productivity shock increases the size of the
rebel group. A negative productivity shock increases the number of rebels
engaged in controlling civilians (∂τ∗F
∂θ
< 0). A negative productivity shock
can lead either to an increase or a decrease in the number of recruits fighting
the government. There exists an R such that for R < R, ∂(1−τ∗)F
∂θ
> 0 and
for R > R, ∂(1−τ∗)F
∂θ
< 0.
10
1.3 Background
Proof See Appendix.
It seems reasonable to assume that violence against civilians is increasing in the
number of rebels who control the civilian population (τ ∗F ), whereas violence
against the government is increasing to the number of rebels who can focus on
insurgency activities, (1− τ ∗)F . Under these assumptions, the model yields easily
testable predictions. First, violence against civilians is negatively associated with
productivity shocks, regardless of the resource environment. Violence against the
government should be increasing in productivity, unless the rebel group has access
to fixed sources of funding that do not depend on local labour market economic
conditions (e.g., mineral wealth). In that case, the rebel group can exploit a ne-
gative productivity shock to boost recruitment and stage more attacks. These
predictions are tested in the context of India’s Naxalite conflict.17
1.3 Background
This section briefly sketches the background of India’s Naxalite conflict. First, I
will offer a brief history of this conflict. Second, I put forward arguments for why
India’s Naxalite conflict provides an interesting testing ground for the hypotheses
that were derived from the theoretical framework.
1.3.1 Brief history
India’s Naxalites owe their name to a small village in rural West Bengal, “Naxal-
bari”, from which the movement has steadily spread since 1967. The Naxalbari
uprising was triggered by the attack on a tribal villager by local landlords. The re-
sulting movement gained the support from key members of the Communist Party
of India (Marxist), which did not prevent the CPI(M) from brutally repressing
the peasant revolt in Naxalbari. The sympathisers of the uprising formed the All
India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), which
promoted the “Allegiance to the armed struggle and non-participation in elec-
tions”. Until today, these elements remain the corner stones of the Naxalite mo-
vement. The 1970-2000 period was marked by a high level of conflict between
different Naxalite groups. However, in 2003, the two major Naxalite outlets that
17The fact that F does not depend on θ in the absence of R is also a reformulation of Fearon’s
findings (Fearon, 2005).
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were committed to violent struggle merged to form the Communist Party of India
(Maoist). This merger is believed to be one of the drivers of the recent growth in
Naxalite violence (Kujur, 2009). The declared goal of the present CPI (Maoist)
is to overthrow the Indian state through armed struggle and to establish a libera-
ted zone in the centre of India.18 In 2006, the Naxalite movement was famously
described by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as “the single biggest
internal security challenge ever faced by our country”.19 The number of districts
that were “severely affected” by Naxalite activity increased from 51 districts to
62 districts over the period 2005-2007.20 The continuing popularity and strength
of the Naxalite movement is perceived to stem from chronic underdevelopment in
the affected communities (Borooah, 2008). The Naxalites are also thought to be
banking on the grievances of the tribal population against mining activity, which
has led to large-scale displacement in certain Maoist strongholds (Kujur, 2009).
Over the 2005-2010 period, the Naxalite’s activities included the sabotage of go-
vernment infrastructure (e.g. schools that can be used as polling booths, Gram
Panchayat buildings, telecommunication towers) in efforts to increase their politi-
cal control. The Maoists also staged highly visible attacks against the government’s
security forces. On 15 February 2010, a group of Naxalite rebels killed 24 Bengali
policemen. A surprisingly large number of attacks also affect the civilian popu-
lation, which accounts for more than one third of the total number of casualties
(including Maoist and police deaths) in the 2005-2010 period (SATP Timelines).
The Government’s response to the Naxalite conflict has been characterised by a
lack of coherent strategy between successive governments and different levels of
administration (Kujur, 2009). While most states could not stop the recent surge
in Maoist activity, Andhra Pradesh is often credited for pursuing a successful
combination of targeted development policies and the deployment of a specialised
police force (“Greyhounds”).21 Other states rely on a combination of state police
forces and Central Reserve Forces (which are raised at the national level) to contain
Naxalite activity.22 Certain states are also thought to support semi-legal militant
groups (such as Salwa Judum) in response to the Naxalite threat. While the Indian
Government has historically treated the Naxalite insurgency as a “Law and Order”
18This section is based on Kujur (2008) who provides a detailed overview of the organisational
history of India’s Maoist organisations.
19Economist, 25 Feb 2010, “Ending the Red Terror”.
20http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmap.htm.
21Nilakantan and Singhal (2011).
22The Economist, 2010 (http://www.economist.com/node/15869400).
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issue, it has not completely ignored the economic conditions that are thought to
constitute the basis of the conflict. Naxalite affected districts qualify for several
sources of central Government funding for development purposes, some of which
are specific to Naxalite regions and some of which (including NREGA)23 were
rolled out at a national level. However, the extent to which districts make use of
these funds depends on the political capability of the state Governments (Kujur,
2009).
1.3.2 Key characteristics
There are several reasons for why the Naxalite conflict provides an ideal testing
ground for the theoretical arguments set out in the theoretical framework.
First, information is important in this conflict. Maoists and the Government
clearly compete for civilian collaboration. While certain officials deny the exis-
tence of informers24 (possibly in an attempt to protect civilians from reprisals),
the Government openly offers substantial rewards for tip-offs that lead to the death
or arrest of Maoists.25 Certain state governments (possibly with the support of
the Centre) are thought to have encouraged civilians to join militant groups that
help the police to collect information and assist them in operations. Finally, the
state governments have also rolled out several programmes to encourage low ran-
king Maoists to surrender and provide information.26 In line with the theoretical
framework, the Naxalite groups react to these attempts to elicit collaboration (or
desertion) by explicitly threatening to kill or destroy the property of police infor-
mers:
“The CPI-Maoist reportedly issued a press release at Chintapalli village
in the Visakhapatnam District, blaming the Police for turning the Giri-
jans (local tribals) into informers by spending huge amounts of money
23“The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act aims at enhancing the
livelihood security of people in rural areas by guaranteeing hundred days of wage-employment
in a financial year to a rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual
work.” (NREGA, 2011, http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx)
24Director General of Police, quoted in SATP Timelines, Orissa (2009).
25“Times of India reported that the Andhra Pradesh Police have included 650 new names to its
hit-list of 1,200 Maoists. [...] The State has increased the reward amount on all these wanted
Maoists and their leaders by nearly INR 162 million.” (SATP Timelines, Andhra Pradesh,
2007)
26“Maharashtra Government announces an amnesty scheme for the Maoists. Those surrendering
will be given a ’cash prize’ immediately [...].” (SATP Timelines, Maharashtra, 2005)
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and warned that the properties acquired by the surrendered Maoists,
after taking up the job of Home Guard, would be destroyed.[...]” (SATP
Timelines, Andhra Pradesh, 2007)
When the Maoists resort to violence against civilians, their punishments tend to
be highly visible and brutal:
“CPI-Maoist cadres killed two people, including a village head, at a
[kangaroo court] in Jamui District after finding them "guilty" of helping
the Police. Reports said that a group of armed Maoists killed Babuli
village head Ashok Das and his close associate [...]. "Their throat was
slit by Maoists to send a message of harsh punishment to others,"
informed the Police.” (SATP Timelines, Bihar, 2008)
A second key characteristic of the Naxalite conflict is its asymmetric nature. The
theoretical framework clearly assumes asymmetric reliance on local labour pro-
ductivity. This assumption seems reasonable for a large number of intra-state
conflicts, including the Naxalite insurgency. The last quote (referring to “huge
amounts spent on informers”) reflects the fact that the Government (both at the
state and the Union level) can draw from a large and stable tax base to fund anti-
Maoist operations. In contrast, the Naxalites need to tax local economic activity
(and agricultural output in particular) to fund their activities:27
“ANI reports that the CPI-Maoist is collecting INR 10,000 from each
farmer as ‘tax’ in the Jamatara District. The farmers are being forced
either to pay up or to stop tilling their fields.” (SATP Timeline, Bihar,
2005)
The asymmetric nature of the conflict also requires that different Maoists groups
operate independently. At first sight, this assumption could be too strong, as the
main Maoist outlet (CPI Maoist) is in theory an integrated party movement that
is led by a secretary general. However, the reality of guerrilla warfare does not
allow for significant organisational integration, as the CPI (Maoist) Central Com-
mittee highlights: “[t]he essential principle forming the basis of our Party structure
is political centralisation combined with organisational decentralisation.”28 Thus,
the key military units operate at a lower level, in so-called the “Sub-Zonal, Zo-
27Srivastava (2009), and Times of India, 2011, (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
Extortnomics-Maoists-raise-Rs-2000-crore-every-year/articleshow/7498493.cms).
28“Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution”, Central Committee (P) CPI (Maoist), Fe-
bruary 2005. Accessed on www.satp.org.
14
1.4 Data
nal/District Commands”.29 These units can independently stage attacks and they
focus on geographic areas that broadly correspond to districts analysed in this
paper. Moreover, these local command units are closely linked to the local party
organisations that play an important role in gathering financial support for the
Naxalites.
A third characteristic of the Naxalite conflict is that mineral resources are an
important component of the Naxalite’s tax base in certain districts. On 20 May
2010, the Maharashtra State Home Minister R. R. Patil openly accused the mining
industry of funding Left Wing Extremists (LWEs).30 Newspaper reports provide
anecdotal evidence on the modus operandi of the Naxals:
“Early last year, the Maoists blasted pipelines of a leading steel com-
pany cutting through Chitrakonda in Malkangiri district. Within a
month, the company’s infrastructure in the same place was targeted
again. A guest house was set ablaze. A pump house, control room and
property worth several lakhs of rupees were damaged. Then the at-
tacks stopped. Police sources said this happened only after Rs 2 crore
went into the Maoist purse. Illegal mining in states such as Orissa and
Jharkhand is a rich source of revenue for the Maoists.” (Times of India,
2011)
In conclusion, civilian collaboration is important in this conflict, the tax bases of
the government and the rebels are asymmetric, the rebels need to tax agricultural
activity, but mineral resources provide variation in the structure of the rebels’ tax
base within this conflict. Hence, this setting offers an ideal testing ground for the
hypotheses that were set out in the theoretical framework.
1.4 Data
This paper relies on violence data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).31
The SATP combines newspaper reports on Naxalite activity into daily incident
summaries. These summaries typically provide the district (and sometimes vil-
lage) in which the incident took place and the number of casualties on each side
29“Resolutions of the 2nd Meeting of Central Regional Board”, February 2005. Accessed on
www.satp.org.
30Source: SATP 2010 Timeline. See also Srivastava (2009) and The Economist (25 February
2010) for similar claims (http://www.economist.com/node/15580130).
31www.satp.org, accessed in January 2011.
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of the conflict (civilians, Maoists and security forces). Based on this information,
I construct variables for the number of casualties, for three categories (civilian,
security forces and Maoists) at the district-year level.32 The analysis will be res-
tricted to those states that are confronted with significant Naxalite activity over
the period under study.33
The dataset used by this paper has several limitations. One limitation is that
the dataset does not systematically include casualties who do not immediately
succumb to their injuries. An additional limitation is that the number of Maoists
casualties is hard to verify and the reports often highlight that these numbers
are based on unverifiable police sources.34 One can imagine that security forces
have an incentive to overstate the number of Maoists they killed or to include
innocent civilians who are wrongfully targeted in police actions. These concerns
are addressed to some extent by the police policy of disclosing the names and the
ranks of any killed Maoists to add credibility to its reports.35 Unfortunately, the
dataset does not include state violence directed towards civilians, in spite of wide-
spread claims of atrocities being committed by state forces. Of the three types of
violence reported in the dataset, Violence against Maoists is probably the
most prone to (systematic) errors. However, none of the key results are based on
this variable. With regards to civilian casualties, it is possible that news on Maoist
violence does not reach newspapers if it occurs in isolated communities. However,
the empirical strategy will be sufficiently flexible to account for the most plausible
sources of such reporting bias. Moreover, as the theory considers “visible” violence
against civilians, it is not unreasonable to focus on violence that is observed by the
press. Another concern is that civilian casualties only include deaths thought to
be inflicted by Maoists, although it cannot be ruled out that some casualties are
wrongfully attributed to the Maoists. The type of casualties which is probably the
least prone to misreporting are government casualties, as these are highly visible.
32The data are drawn from three sources which partially overlap: “Fatalities and Incidents of
Landmine Explosion by Maoists: 2005-2010”; State Incident Timelines (2005-2010); Major
Incidents. To code the large volume of entries in these timelines, key words (death, killed,
injured, etc.) were used to identify relevant entries. The reliance on three different data
sources further limits the risk of failing to identify incidents that involve casualties.
33Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisghar, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa and West
Bengal. These states are located on a map of India in Figure 1.1.
34Reports often indicate that Maoists drag bodies of killed fighters away to prevent the police
from capturing the body.
35Also, Maoist casualties include certain casualties that are inflicted by Maoist groups among
themselves or by civilian groups, even though such events appear to account for a small
fraction of the entries.
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Again, these casualties only include deaths inflicted by Maoist groups. Given that
the number of security force casualties in a given attack varies considerably, I will
present the main results for a less noisy outcome measure: the number of fatal
attacks inflicted by the Maoists.
Data on mineral output are obtained from the ministry of Labour and Employ-
ment.36 I focus on three minerals which are linked to Maoist activity in the SATP
incident lists: iron, bauxite and coal. For iron and bauxite, I rely on production
data from 2005-2006. For coal, production data from 2003 are used. The construc-
ted mineral output measure does not vary over time to lessen concerns about the
endogeneity of mining activity to the observed violence. To further reduce en-
dogeneity, the mineral output is evaluated at India-wide prices for 2004-2005.37
Naxalite extortion is often linked to illegal mining activity, which could depress
the official output data in affected districts. These concerns are addressed by re-
porting key results for mineral production dummies (which should not capture
any endogenous output responses on the intensive margin) and for an alternative
measure of mineral production.38
36These data are available from www.indiastat.com.
37Prices per tonne were calculated from the value of Indian mineral production, as repor-
ted in: Ministry of Mines, 2010, "Annual Report 2009-2010", Annexure 3.1; Ministry of
Mines, 2009, "Annual Report 2008-2009", Annexure 3.1. Prices are deflated using the CPI
(http://india.gov.in/outerwin.php?id=http://eaindustry.nic.in/).
38This alternative measure is based on the US geological survey, which restricts itself to major
producers and does not provide district-level production data for coal.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A (district-year level)
Mean Observations
Civilian casualties 1.90 1002
(12.2)
Maoist casualties 1.52 1002
(7.46)
Security force casualties 1.30 1002
(7.12)
Attacks on Security Forces 0.35 1002
(number of incidents with at least one SF casualty) (1.37)
Kharif season rainfall (mm) 1053 1169
(639)
Kharif season rainfall (mm, logarithmic) 6.81 1169
(0.54)
Rice production (tonnes) 287,411 285
(310,809)
Panel B (district level)
Mineral wealth dummy 0.25 167
(0.44)
Mineral value (10 Million Rs) 184 167
(551)
Log(Mineral value +1) 5.33 42
(conditional on positive production value) (2.13)
Population density (pop/km2) 419 167
(381)
Scheduled tribe population (fraction of population) 0.14 167
(0.17)
Forest area (fraction of district area) 0.20 164
(0.19)
Scheduled caste population (fraction of population) 0.15 167
(0.07)
Literate population (percentage) 62 167
(13)
Notes: See text for a detailed data description. Table A includes observations for 167
(merged) districts between 2005 and 2010. Rainfall data are from the Indian Meteorological
Institute. Violence data are from the South Asia Terrorism Portal. Table B includes mineral
data are for bauxite, iron and coal. Physical output data are based on various government
publications between 2003 and 2005-2006, as described in the text. Output is evaluated at
2004-2005 prices. Forest cover data are from Government publications. Population data are
from the 2001 census.
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Rainfall data were collected from the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD),
for the years 2004-2010. For several districts, rainfall data is not available, in
particular for non-monsoon months. To address this problem I restrict my analysis
to rainfall in the main monsoon season (June-September). This approach has
the additional advantage of focusing on rainfall shocks that are directly linked
to the main crop growing season, while rainfall outside of this season could have
more ambiguous effects on agricultural productivity. Monsoon rice (Kharif rice)
accounts for the bulk of the rice production in the region under study (Prasad,
2006). To deal with missing rainfall data in the Kharif months, I will merge
districts as described below.
To confirm the validity of the use of rainfall as a proxy for rural incomes, an-
nual rice production data were collected for the period 2003-2007 from the Indian
Department of Agriculture.39 These production data correspond to fiscal years
(e.g. 1 April 2003- 1 March 2004) and are assigned to the earliest calendar year.
This creates the maximum overlap with the fiscal year and it ensures that the
main harvesting season during any given fiscal year is assigned to the calendar
year in which the crops were fed. Due to missing observations, the resulting rice
production panel is unbalanced and incomplete.
As additional controls, I collect 2001 census data at the district level on population,
the size of the tribal population, the size of the scheduled caste population and
literacy. Furthermore, I also collect forest cover and area data from the Ministry
of Environment and Forest.40
As rainfall information is missing for several districts (even for monsoon months)
and as certain districts were split over the 2001-2010 period, I merge districts
to create a balanced panel of violence outcomes and explanatory variables. 207
districts are merged into 167 districts based on four criteria. First, 2001 census
districts that were split during the 2001-2010 period are merged to their 2001
boundaries. Second, districts with missing rainfall information are merged with
the closest district that has rainfall information available (based on the distance
39http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/AERC.htm, accessed in March 2011. Rice production data were
not available for three states (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and West Bengal).
40Ministry of Environment and Forest, Govt. of India., "District-Wise Forest Cover", accessed
through www.indiastat.com. While Gawande et al. (2012) cast some doubt over the relia-
bility of this measure, it should be noted that I only use this variable for additional control
interactions (all the results are robust to its omission) and, in contrast to these authors, I do
not use the variation in forest cover over time (which may be measured less accurately and
could be endogenous to the conflict).
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between district capitals).41 Third, the largest urban districts (Bangalore, Kol-
kota and Mumbai) are dropped from the analysis. Fourth, for a small number of
districts, rainfall is used of a district in a neighbouring state.42 To avoid merging
districts across state borders, these observations are treated independently. The
resulting data set contains a balanced panel of 167 (merged) districts.43
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for key variables. In appendix 1.8.2, maps
are provided for the districts that see at least 1 casualty related to the Naxalite
conflict (Figure 1.2). The empirical strategy will focus on these districts. Maps
are also presented for the number of civilian casualties over the 2005-2010 per-
iod (Figure 1.3), the number of security forces casualties over the same period
(Figure 1.4), and the logarithm of the mining output value (Figure 1.5).
1.5 Empirical strategy
This paper investigates how agricultural productivity shocks affect different vio-
lence outcomes. The paper employs rainfall shocks as exogenous determinants
of agricultural output (including from forest resources). While this approach has
successfully been employed for the study of violence in the context of Sub-Saharan
Africa (Miguel et al., 2004), the relationship between rainfall and economic activity
is not straightforward in less arid regions. Nevertheless, a wide range of papers
have confirmed the importance of rainfall shocks for agricultural wages and pro-
ductivity in the Indian context.44 To further confirm the validity of interpreting
41The mergers on the basis of the first two criteria are summarised in the form “original district
(merged district)”. Nalgonda (Hyderabad), Banka (Baghalpur), Arwal (Patna), Begusarai
(Khagaria), Gaya (Aurangabad), Gopalganj (Siwan), Jamui (Munger), Kaimur (Rohtas),
Jahanabad (Patna), Nalanda (Patna), Nawada (Patna), Saran (Bhojpur), Sheikhpura (Mun-
ger), Sheohar (Sitamarhi), Sapaul (Saharsa), Vaishali (Patna), Bokaro (Dhanbad), Chatra
(Hazaribagh), Dumka (Deoghar), Garhwa (Palamu), Godda (Deoghar), Jamtara (Deoghar),
Khuti (Ranchi), Kodarma (Hazaribagh), Latehar (Palamu), Lohardaga (Ranchi), Pakaur
(Maldah West-Bengal), Saraikela (Purbi Singhbhum), Simdega (Gumla), Barddhaman (Na-
dia), West-Midnapore (Medinipur), Bargarh (Sambalpur), Bhadrak (Jajapur), Baudh (Sona-
pur), Kendrapara (Jagatsinghapur), Nabarangapur (Koraput), Hingoli (Washim).
42This is the case for: Gumla Jharkhand (Jashpur, Chhattisgarh); Kishanganj Bihar (West
Dinajpur, West-Bengal); Pakaur Jharkhand (Maldah, West-Bengal).
43I confirmed that the main results go through in the unmerged data set (results not reported).
44See Burgess et al. (2011) for one example. Cole et al. (2011) estimate a crop yield production
function using historical Kharif season rainfall data and a wider set of crops. The authors
link deviations from optimal rainfall levels to disaster relief and voter preferences. In another
contribution that relies on the income effects of poor rainfall, Bholken and Sergenti (2010)
explain Hindu-Muslim violence by instrumenting income growth with rainfall growth at the
state level. Sekhri and Storeygard (2010) rely on the relationship between rainfall and income
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rainfall shocks as productivity/income shocks, I first estimate a rice production
function for the states that were selected in this paper:
Log(Riceist) = β1lograinist + µis + θst + φt ∗Mis + εist (1.5)
In this equation, β1 captures the elasticity of rice production with respect to rain-
fall. µis is a district fixed effect. θst and φMt respectively represent state-year fixed
effects and mineral wealth-year fixed effects, which are included to make this model
directly comparable to the models used in the main tables. The rice production
data set is not available after 2006 and incomplete during the years for which it is
available. These data limitations preclude a direct instrumentation approach or a
detailed analysis of local production patterns. Moreover, any agricultural income
measure at the district level is an imperfect proxy for the agricultural income of
the rural communities affected by the conflict. The affected communities are ex-
pected to rely much more on rain-fed subsistence agriculture and forest resources
than the average community in the district.45 Nevertheless, if β1 is estimated to
be positive and significant in Equation 1.5, this should add some credibility to the
subsequent reduced form approach.
The main specification explains the number of casualties in different categories.
To account for the large number of zeroes in the dependent variable, the vertical
outliers in the data set, and the fact that the number of casualties is a count
variable, I rely on a fixed effects Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood model with
robust standard errors at the district level.46 The estimated model will be based
on the following specification:
E(Cist) = µisexp(β1lograinis,t−1 + φt ∗Mis + νst) (1.6)
The dependent variable Cist is the number of casualties or attacks of a given type
(security forces, civilians, or Maoists) for a given district i in state s and in time
at the district level in their study of climate shocks and violence against women.
45Planning Commission (2008). Within-district heterogeneity of the impact of rainfall shocks
may explain why Sarsons (2011) finds that poor rainfall spurs riots in dam-irrigated districts
where rainfall does not affect the average district-level wages.
46See Hausman et al. (1984) and Wooldridge (2002) for an introduction to this model, and see
Burgess et al. (2011b) for a recent application.
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period t. The coefficient β1 represents the elasticity of the number of casualties
in district i and year t with respect to district rainfall in the previous year (the
Kharif harvesting season is at the end of each calendar year). It should be noted
that the district-level fixed effects (µis) are multiplicative to rainfall shocks, which
naturally makes districts with higher levels of violence more responsive to a given
rainfall shock. As a result, the fixed effects effectively explain all the variation
in districts that do not see any casualties and these districts do not contribute
towards the estimation of β1. These districts are dropped from the analysis (as
will be reflected in the number of observations).
The state-year effects νst can account for state-level policy variables that affect the
number of casualties. As both economic policy and counterinsurgency strategies
are devised at the state level and these policies vary widely between states (as
discussed in section 1.3), νst accounts for a wide range of potentially relevant but
unobserved determinants of violence. Similarly, the state-year effects could capture
time-varying changes in the reporting procedures of violence (the SATP collects
timelines per state).
Equation 1.6 includes the first lag of the logarithm of rainfall.47 Three factors
suggest that a delayed impact of rainfall shocks is appropriate for my study: (1) the
timing of the harvesting season, (2) the dynamics of the conflict, (3) and concerns
about direct impacts of rainfall on conflict. The harvesting season for Kharif rice is
during October-December. Hence, the consumption and investment opportunities
of rural households at the beginning of the calendar year will critically depend
on rainfall in the previous monsoon. Moreover, Rabi crop cultivation during the
dry season (November-May) is limited in the “Red Corridor”, mainly because
of underinvestment in irrigation facilities (Joshi et al., 2002). As a result, Rabi
production has only limited capacity to mitigate shocks to Kharif production in
this region. Moreover, successful Rabi cultivation still relies on sufficient residual
soil moisture from the monsoon season (Joshi et al., 2002). As a result, scanty
rainfall during the Kharif season is likely to depress both income and agricultural
productivity during the next calendar year, possibly right until the next Kharif
harvest.48 A second factor that suggests a delayed impact of rainfall is the conflict
process itself. Increased rebel recruitment may take some time to translate into
more attacks on the government, as attacks need to be planned and new recruits
47I include rainfall levels to account for the transitory nature of rainfall shocks (Ciccone, 2011).
48The impact on consumption could be even more persistent: Jharkhand’s rural population faces
a “hungry season” from June to October (PACS, 2009).
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need to undergo training. Similarly, actual information provision (and the need
for selective violence against civilians) could lag behind on the timing of becoming
an informant. Finally, it is possible that contemporaneous rainfall has a direct
impact on violence, apart from the income channel. In principle, rainfall shocks
could make it harder (or easier) for rebels to seek refuge or stage attacks (Miguel
et al., 2004). However, if the results are driven by lagged rainfall, then such a
direct impact is unlikely.
To test the hypothesis that the impact of rainfall depends on the availability of
mineral resources in the district, I add additional interaction terms to Equation 1.6.
This yields the following baseline specification:
E(Cist) = µisexp(β1lograinis,t−1 + β2lograinis,t−1 ∗Mis+
+β3lograinis,t−1 ∗ Zis + φt ∗Mis + νst) (1.7)
In this model, rainfall is interacted with a mineral resource wealth variable to test
the hypothesis that the marginal impact of rainfall shocks is decreasing in the
availability of resources. The inclusion of mineral wealth-year effects guarantees
that this regression is not just picking up other effects that stem from the presence
of minerals and that change over time (including changes to the past, current, and
anticipated value of mineral resources or changes in the government’s efforts to
protect mines). Two main measures of mineral wealth will be used in the analysis:
a dummy measure and a continuous variable, log(1 +mineralvalue).
A key endogeneity concern in equation (1.7) is the fact that the availability of
mineral resources is not exogenous to the process that drives violence. The district-
fixed effects and mineral-year fixed effects should address some of these concerns.
Nevertheless, it remains possible that β2 captures the differential effect of rainfall
by any other variable that is correlated with the presence of mining activity. To
account for this possibility, I also include interactions of rainfall with other key
socio-economic variables at the district level (summarized in Zis): the proportion
of the tribal population, the proportion of the scheduled caste population, the
proportion of literates, the percentage of the district area covered by forests and
population density.
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1.6 Results
1.6.1 Main findings
The first column in Table 1.3 confirms that rainfall shocks at the district level are
positively associated with rice production. This strong relationship could reflect
the limited investments in agriculture that these districts have received ever since
the colonial period.49 While the rice production data do not overlap perfectly with
the violence panel (cf. section 1.4), the positive relationship between rainfall and
rice output supports the hypothesis that rainfall affects agricultural incomes in the
region considered by this study.
Columns (2)-(7) allow for an evaluation of the hypothesis that the impact of agri-
cultural income shocks should differ by type of violence and by the structure of
the rebel’s tax base. The lagged rainfall variable is interacted with a dummy for
mineral production to test whether the impact of rainfall depends on the availabi-
lity of mineral resources. For civilian casualties, a negative rainfall shocks lead to
more violence. The additional impact in mineral-rich regions is negative but insi-
gnificant. In contrast, mining districts see a different pattern of violence against
security forces. These mining districts account for 40% of the 58 districts with
at least one security force death. Strikingly, the impact of rainfall shocks on the
number of fatal attacks against security forces is positive in non-mining districts,
but becomes negative in mining districts. The coefficient on the interaction term
is significant at the 1% level. These signs are consistent with the predictions from
the model. The results are robust to the addition of interactions with key (de-
meaned) covariates, as shown in the even columns. For Maoist deaths, none of
the coefficients gain significance. However, out of the three violence measures,
this is likely to be the measure that is most prone to errors. Nevertheless, the
insignificant effect is consistent with the hypothesis that the security forces are
less dependent on local economic conditions for their fighting capacity against the
Maoists. Moreover, the signs are consistent with an interpretation in which the
Maoists strengthen their position in response to negative productivity shocks, but
they suffer an increasing number of casualties as a result of increasing the number
of attacks they stage against the government.
49Survey evidence confirms the prevalence of rain-fed agriculture in Naxalite-affected districts
(Banerjee and Saha, 2010). In this region, British colonial policy awarded land titles to
landlords, resulting in lower agricultural investment (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005).
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Table 1.2: Baseline results
Log
(Ricet−1)
Civilian
Casualties
Attacks on
Security Forces
Maoist
Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.40*** -0.71** -1.26*** 0.77** 1.08** 0.48 0.04
(0.14) (0.32) (0.32) (0.39) (0.48) (0.52) (0.54)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.17 -0.33 -0.49 -2.13*** -1.77** -0.67 -0.46
* Mineral dummy (0.34) (0.59) (0.61) (0.71) (0.86) (0.88) (0.77)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.55 -0.26 2.67
* ST share (1.90) (2.94) (3.81)
Log(rainfallt−1) -3.55 0.83 2.63
* SC share (4.09) (5.20) (9.70)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.05*** 0.02 -0.04*
* Literacy share (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Log(rainfallt−1) 2.85* -3.01 -0.77
* Forest area share (1.68) (2.87) (3.23)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.002* -0.0013 0.003*
* Population (0.001) (0.0016) (0.001)
density
Observations 268 444 438 348 342 360 360
Districts 123 74 73 58 57 60 60
Estimation OLS Poisson
Notes: District-year level observations, covering 2005-2010 (2004-2006 in column 1). Districts
are merged as described in the text. With the exception of the mineral dummy, all interaction
variables are demeaned. All regressions include district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects
and mineral dummy-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.3: Rainfall shocks and violence
Civilian
Casualties
Security Force
Casualties
Attacks on
Security Forces
Maoist
Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(rainfallt) -0.15 -0.70 -0.39 0.58
(0.55) (0.66) (0.48) (0.62)
Log(rainfallt) -0.10 0.73 0.90 -1.35
* Mineral dummy (0.66) (1.07) (0.65) (0.89)
Log(rainfallt) -0.75** 0.45 0.76* 0.56
(0.35) (0.60) (0.40) (0.60)
Log(rainfallt) -0.28 -2.83*** -2.05*** -1.02
* Mineral dummy (0.61) (0.92) (0.70) (0.97)
Observations 444 348 348 360
Districts 74 58 58 60
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes: District-year level observations, covering 2005-2010. Districts are merged as described
in the text. All regressions include district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects and (log)
mineral-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.3 includes contemporaneous rainfall variables. The coefficients on these
contemporaneous rainfall variables are insignificant for all three types of violence.
Based on the methodological arguments put forward earlier and on the observed
delayed impact of rainfall in Table 1.3, I focus on lagged rainfall for the remain-
der of the analysis. Table 1.3 also shows results on the number of security force
casualties. The coefficients are less precisely estimated in this specification, which
could be due to the fact that the “success” of Naxalite attacks in terms of the
number casualties varies substantially. Nevertheless, the interaction term of rain-
fall and mineral resource wealth remains negative and significant for security force
casualties (and this finding carries holds for all subsequent robustness checks).
Table 1.4 repeats the analysis of Table 1.3 for a continuous measure of mineral
wealth, using Log(1+mineralvalue). This specification is closer to the theoretical
model and the key results are indeed strengthened. These results on a continuous
measure also suggests that the results on the interaction term are not driven by
districts with relatively small mining output. The coefficient of (-0.67) on civilian
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Table 1.4: Baseline results for a continuous mining measure
Log
(Ricet−1)
Civilian
Casualties
Attacks on
Security Forces
Maoist
Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.41*** -0.67** -1.18*** 1.12*** 1.39*** 0.68 0.28
(0.14) (0.29) (0.31) (0.36) (0.40) (0.50) (0.53)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.47*** -0.42*** -0.18 -0.17
* Log(Mineral (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
value)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.41 0.59 2.21
* ST share (1.86) (2.69) (3.80)
Log(rainfallt−1) -4.40 2.30 1.37
* SC share (3.87) (5.22) (9.71)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.04** 0.03 -0.05
* Literacy share (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Log(rainfallt−1) 3.87** -2.27 0.56
* Forest share (1.78) (2.87) (3.32)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.002** -0.0010 0.003*
* Population (0.001) (0.0016) (0.001)
density
Observations 74 73 60 58 57 62
Districts 268 444 438 348 342 360 360
Estimation 123 74 73 58 57 60 60
Notes: District-year level observations, covering 2005-2010 (2004-2006 in column 1). Districts
were merged as described in the text. Log(Mineral value) is calculated as Log(Mineral
value+1). With the exception of Log(Mineral value), all interaction variables are demeaned.
All regressions include district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects and Log(mineral
value)-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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casualties in Table 1.4 indicates that for a 20% decrease in log(rainfall),50 the
number of civilian casualties increases by 13%.51 The first column suggests that
the corresponding decrease in rice production is 9%. The coefficients on attacks
imply that a 20% negative rainfall shock in the average mining district increases
the number of deadly attacks on police forces by 28%.52 In non-mining districts,
a negative shock of the same magnitude decreases the number of deadly Naxalite
attacks significantly by 22%.
As a robustness check on the main specification, I investigate the sensitivity of
the main results to the choice of the econometric model. Table 1.9 (in appendix)
presents OLS results for the sub sample of districts that see at least one casualty
of the relevant type. While the OLS results are less precisely estimated, most
of the signs and magnitudes are consistent with the Poisson results. It appears
that the results are strongest in second and the third quartile, which should lessen
concerns that the Poisson results picked up small absolute changes in the outcome
variables. Moreover, a split-up of results by tertiles of the dependent variable
confirms that the impacts are proportional to the level of the dependent variable.
These results strongly suggest that a logarithmic model is appropriate. Table 1.10
(in appendix) confirms that the key results go through in an OLS estimation in
which the dependent variable is subject to a log(1 + x) transformation.53
1.6.2 Interpretation
The main results indicate that lower rainfall results in more violence directed
against civilians, regardless of the presence of mineral resources. This finding is
consistent with the theoretical model developed in section 1.2. Negative economic
shocks could boost the willingness of civilians to collaborate with the government.
50A 20% shock is approximately the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of
log(rainfall) district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects and mineral-year-fixed effects. Re-
lying on the unadjusted sample variation in log(rainfall), which is approximately 50%, the
estimated impact is even larger.
51This corresponds to 0.5 additional civilian casualties at the sample mean of 4.3 civilian casual-
ties (conditional on the district having any civilian casualties).
52(1.4 =(5.33 ∗ 0.47− 1.12)). The hypothesis that this elasticity is equal to zero can be rejected
at the 5% level. At the sample mean of mining districts that have at least one police force
casualty (6.3 attacks), this elasticity would imply that a 20% negative rainfall shock leads to
1.7 additional deadly attacks.
53Relying on the OLS specification, I confirm that the main results are robust to spatial clustering
of the standard errors (reported in square brackets). The main results also carry through if
the 2nd lag of rainfall is added to the model (results not reported).
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Hence, the rebel group may find it optimal to increase its punishments of civilian
collaborators or defectors in order to discourage civilians to pass on information
to the government. By killing civilians in targeted attacks, the Maoists show that
they have invested in sufficient retaliation capacity to locate and punish informers.
Table 1.5: Motives for violence against civilians
Civilian Casualties by Motive
Motive Number Percent Percent
(excluding
unspecified)
Collaboration
Suspected police
informers
389 20.58 28.23
Surrendered Maoists 23 1.20 1.65
Members of political
parties/ political activity
424 22.20 30.46
Members of vigilante
groups
101 5.29 7.26
(Collaboration total) 937 49.27 67.6
Other
Untargeted 366 19.16 26.29
Failure to pay levy 31 1.62 2.22
Punishment for crimes 25 1.31 1.80
Other motives 29 1.52 2.08
Unspectified 518 27.12 -
Total 1,924 100 100
Notes: Civilian Casualties, covering 2005-2010. Based on author’s coding of SATP incidents,
as described in text.
In line with this interpretation, the communication of the Maoists in the SATP
Timelines underlines the importance that the Maoists attach to motivating civilian
deaths. To justify attacks on civilians, the rebels often leave notes on the bodies of
victims, they hold public trials, or they even contact the press directly. Moreover,
they often rely on brutal execution methods to add further visibility to their attacks
against civilians.
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Table 1.6: Baseline results per type of civilian casualty
Civilian
Casualties
Civilian
Casualties
(Collaboration)
Civilian
Casualties
(Untargeted)
Attacks on
Security Forces
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.67** -1.11** 1.41 1.12***
(0.29) (0.46) (1.22) (0.36)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.06 0.09 -1.32*** -0.47***
* Log(Mineral (0.07) (0.10) (0.42) (0.11)
value)
Observations 372 366 192 192
Districts 62 61 32 32
Estimation Poisson
Notes: District-year level observations, covering 2005-2010. Districts were merged as
described in the text. See text and Table 1.5 for the coding of civilian casualties in columns
(1)-(4). With the exception of Log(Mineral value), the interaction variables are demeaned. All
regressions include district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects and (log) mineral-year effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 1.5 and Table 1.6, I provide further evidence on the importance of civilian
collaboration. Table 1.5 provides a break-down of civilian casualties by suspected
motive of the killing (based on the descriptions in the SATP Timeline). For ap-
proximately 30% of casualties, a motive is not explicitly referred to.54 Focusing
on casualties for whom a motive is recorded, a large majority is referred to as
(suspected) collaborators. Police informers (28%), members of mainstream poli-
tical parties that oppose the Naxalites (30%), surrendered Naxalites (2%), and
members of vigilante groups (7%) account for a total of 68% of the casualties for
which information on the motives of the attack is available. Strikingly, failure to
meet extortion demands only accounts for 2% of the civilian casualties. The bulk
of the remaining casualties fell victim to “untargeted attacks”. These are incidents
in which the civilians were not the intended target of the attack. In Table 1.6, the
main results are shown separately for killings of civilian collaborators and victims
54The break-down of casualty numbers is based on my own coding of incidents. Unfortunately,
it is unclear which factors determine the provision of more detailed background information
and there could be selection bias.
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of “untargeted attacks”. In support of the mechanism highlighted in this paper,
the main results appear to be driven by attacks on collaborators. In contrast,
untargeted civilian killings follow exactly the pattern of attacks on security forces.
The latter finding suggests that civilians suffer the indirect consequences of increa-
sed violence against the government. The fact that the main results are driven
by targeted attacks on civilian collaborators adds further credibility to the main
mechanism of this paper. Finally, there is also anecdotal evidence that illustrates
how droughts affect the alliances between Naxalites and the civilian population:
“After some 30 villages in Korchi area of Gadchiroli district defied
the Naxal boycott of government-run employment-generation schemes,
the revolt has spread to more drought-hit villages in the region, say
high-level police officials. Special Inspector General of Police (Nagpur
range) Pankaj Gupta told The Indian Express yesterday that clusters
of villages, gripped by a severe drought, had chosen to take on Naxalites
rather than let go of an option for alternate employment. Gupta,
however, didn’t divulge the location of the villages which number over
20. This, he said, may prompt Naxalites to upset their plan.” (Indian
Express, April, 2003)
For attacks on security forces, the main results are consistent with the idea that
the rebels’ tax base shapes the relationship between labour income shocks and
conflict. If the rebels’ tax base is sensitive to the rainfall shocks, the rebels may
not be able to exploit a negative shock to increase recruitment. Their strategy
to increase the intimidation of civilians could force them to shift personnel from
attacks against the government to the monitoring of civilians. This argument
could explain why negative rainfall shocks reduce the number of Maoist attacks
against government in non-mining districts. The fact that rebel groups respond to
negative shocks with increased violence against the government, but only in mining
districts, is consistent with the interpretation that the rebel group’s tax base is
less reliant on agricultural output in these districts. As a result, the rebels could
increase recruitment and they could boost violence both against the government
and against civilian collaborators.
Underlying these results is the implicit assumption that the fighting capacity of
the Maoists is increasing in the number of fighters. This assumption (which is
common to most “opportunity cost” models) seems reasonable in the context of
the Naxalite conflict. The SATP Timelines indicate that most Maoist attacks on
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the government involve a substantial number of fighters,55 and bombs are mainly
used to create initial confusion, after which the rebels attack the security forces
with guns. As for targeted violence against civilians, successful attacks require
information gathering to identify the target, a group that carries out the actual
attack, and in the case of public trials a larger group of fighters who control other
villagers.
1.6.3 Alternative explanations and robustness checks
The main results are consistent with the model developed in section 1.2 and the
anecdotal evidence presented in section 1.3. This subsection addresses the extent
to which alternative mechanisms can explain the observed patterns.
1.6.3.1 Violent appropriation
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 strongly suggest that the main results are driven by reta-
liation against civilian collaborators. However, the results could still be consistent
with appropriation theories (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2011) if
the true motive of targeted killings is not accurately recorded in the SATP reports.
A negative relationship between shocks and violence could be observed if Maoists
increase their appropriation activities in response to bad shocks and if violence
is proportional to appropriation.56 From a theoretical perspective, this interpre-
tation would require the civilian population to have assets that do not depend
too strongly on local economic conditions. However, these theories cannot explain
why violence against the government and violence against civilians would react
differently to income shocks in the absence of natural resources. In particular, if
the rebels strategically choose the extent to which they loot civilians (as in Azam,
2006), the presence of natural resources should mitigate the impact of negative
55“75 Central Reserve Police Force personnel and a State Policeman were killed in an attack by
about 1,000 CPI-Maoist cadres in Dantewada district.” (SATP Timelines, Chattisgarh, 2010)
56In the context of India, Sekhri and Storeygard (2010) rely on a similar argument to explain
why atrocities against scheduled castes increase in low-rainfall years. Hence, it is possible
that the observed increase in violence stems from the Maoists’ goal to protect vulnerable
populations against atrocities. This interpretation seems at odds with the fact that many
victims of Maoist violence are in fact tribals. Miguel (2005) finds that extreme rainfall shocks
lead to increased witch killings in Tanzania. While the author argues that income shocks are
at the heart of the underlying mechanism, it is unclear whether these murders are driven by
a desire to appropriate the possessions of witches.
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productivity shocks on violence against civilians. I find no evidence of such a mi-
tigation effect. While the Maoists clearly tax the local economy and they do this
under the threat of violence, the violence that results from appropriation may have
a different logic than the lethal violence that this paper investigates. The SATP
timelines provide ample anecdotal evidence on the importance of lethal violence
against informers. The Maoists communicate openly about civilian casualties and
they typically refer to their victims as police informers (as shown in Table 1.5).
Even if the victims of violence did in fact refuse to pay levies to the Maoists,
this open communication suggests that the intensity of violence against civilians
is driven by the rebels’ goal to optimally deter (and punish) collaboration.
1.6.3.2 Incapacitation and precision of attacks
Berman et al. (2011a) find that higher unemployment inhibits insurgent attacks
against security forces.57 These authors hypothesise that high unemployment
makes civilians more willing to share information with counterinsurgency forces.
They also argue that the resulting incapacitation effect might force rebels to switch
towards less precise attacks that inflict more “collateral damage”. In my analysis,
it is impossible to distinguish incapacitation from a strategic shift of fighters away
from attacking the government, as described in the model. Only in non-mining
districts, I find a positive impact of rainfall on the number of deadly attacks. Also,
there is no significant impact on the number of Maoist casualties. The theoretical
framework offers an explanation of why the incapacitation effect could be limited:
the rebels may effectively prevent collaboration by increasing violence against civi-
lians. Furthermore, the empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
any incapacitation effect could be outweighed by the opportunity cost channel if
the rebel group has access to external sources of funding.
In principle, the increase in civilian casualties that is observed in response to nega-
tive shocks could still be the result of a change in violence technology and decreased
attack precision. However, such a collateral damage interpretation cannot explain
the impact of rainfall on targeted civilian casualties (Table 1.6). The results on
57My paper complements the findings of this closely related study in three ways. First, it over-
comes reverse causality concerns by relying on an exogenous source of variation in labour
income (i.e. rainfall). Second, it presents evidence on retaliatory violence which further un-
derlines the crucial role of police informers. Third, my paper also suggests how the conflicting
findings in this strand of literature can be reconciled by taking the structure of the rebels’
tax base into account.
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untargeted civilian casualties suggest that indirect victims follow the pattern of at-
tacks against the government. This suggests that if there is decreased precision, it
is not the result of incapacitation (as in Berman et al., 2011a). While the elasticity
on untargeted casualties is larger than the one on government casualties (which
implies reduced precision), violence against the government goes up in response to
negative productivity shocks in mineral rich areas. Incapacitation would predict
that government casualties go down in response to negative income shocks.
1.6.3.3 Police activism
A third alternative explanation for the main results relies on the activities of the
police forces. Mining districts might have greater police presence, which offers more
opportunity for the rebels to respond to rainfall shocks with increased violence
against police forces. Hence, negative rainfall shocks could lead to more violence
against civilians in any district and to violence against the security forces in those
districts with a large security force presence. This explanation seems unlikely to
drive the results, as higher police activity in mining district would mainly lead to
higher levels of violence against the security forces in any given year. In an extreme
version of this argument, violence against the police should be zero in non-mining
districts. However, mining districts only account for 40% of the districts that see
any police casualties.58 Furthermore, the proportionality of the impact of rainfall
shocks to the average levels of violence against the police is already accounted for
by the multiplicative fixed effects in the Poisson model. This argument can also
help to address concerns that Maoist violence against the police is purely driven
by the aspiration to control mineral resources.59 Again, one would expect this
channel to operate through higher levels of violence, which are accounted for by
the fixed effects. Nevertheless, it remains possible that mining regions face types
of police activity which are not captured by average levels of violence against
the police but do shape the incentives for rebels to attack the security forces in
response to a productivity shock. Column (7) in Table 1.7 (in appendix) presents
one way to account for the possibility that mining regions would be more prone
58The correlation between mining activity and violence is positive but not robustly significant
in the cross-section (results not reported).
59Similarly, it is unclear whether higher extortion would increase police activity in mining regions,
especially because the Maoists are suspected of having cosy ties with the industrialists they
tax. “You will not find any businessman who has been attacked,’ says Ajit Doval, a former
head of India’s Intelligence Bureau, “only poor tribals and policemen.” (The Economist, 25
February 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/15580130).
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to police activism. I measure the salience of police activity by the number of
incidents in which the Maoists suffered casualties in the baseline year (2005). If
my results are driven by the differential impact of rainfall in districts with higher
police activity, the coefficient on the interaction term of rainfall and baseline Maoist
casualties could pick up the differential effect of mineral resource wealth. However,
the coefficient on the interaction of rainfall and mineral wealth retains both its
magnitude and significance.
1.6.3.4 Mining activity
The current analysis cannot provide direct evidence on taxation by rebel groups,
which is the key mechanism within my framework that explains the differential im-
pact of rainfall shocks in mining regions. The Maoists publicly campaign against
mining activity on the grounds that mines lead to pollution and the displacement
of the tribal population. Rebel groups in mining regions are thought to bank
on the wide-spread resentment against mining activity (Kujur, 2009), although
certain authors emphasise that only small number of communities were directly
affected by displacement (Kennedy and King, 2009). The first order effect of grie-
vances against mines should operate through average levels of violence, which are
accounted for by the fixed effects. However, the adverse impact of mining activity
on rural communities could suggest alternative explanations of the observed dif-
ferential impact of rainfall in mining regions. In particular, rebel groups could be
more effective in recruiting from mining regions because of two reasons. First, it
may be that a given rainfall shock has a larger impact on agricultural producti-
vity of potential recruits as a result of environmental degradation or displacement.
This channel could even be strengthened through political economy factors. If
districts that produce minerals have weaker political institutions, this could exa-
cerbate the impact of a given rainfall shock (as suggested in the ordered conflict
model of Besley and Persson, 2010). While the analysis cannot fully rule out this
possibility, the estimated rice production function in Table 1.2 and Table 1.4 failed
to pick up any differential effect of rain on agricultural output in mining regions.
Furthermore, a political resource curse interpretation is undermined by the fact
that policies are set at the state level and all selected states (with the exception of
Bihar) produce key minerals.60 A second channel that relies on the environmental
60The results are robust to the inclusion of state-specific effects of rainfall and year effects instead
of state-year fixed effects. State specific effects of rainfall could capture state-specific political
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impact of mining activity is the possibility that grievances against mines create an
additional incentive for individuals to join the Maoists. While these channels are
different from the pure budget constraint mechanism as presented in the theory,
the main difference could be one of interpretation. First, if the impact of rainfall
shocks is more severe in mining regions, this could affect the communities who are
considered for recruitment (for instance, the tribal population) more than the tax
base of the rebel group. Hence, this channel could formally be equivalent to the
mechanism proposed earlier. Similarly, the grievance against mines could create
an additional pull factor which makes the rebel group’s budget constraint less
dependent on local economic conditions. In this sense, the grievance mechanism
could be understood within my theoretical framework.
It is possible to test the importance of the tribal population explicitly. If the
conflict between mines and rural communities mainly affects tribal groups (as
suggested by Kujur, 2009), one could expect the grievance effect of mines to be
stronger in tribal areas. To test this hypothesis, I include a triple interaction of mi-
neral wealth, the share of the tribal population, and rainfall in the baseline model.
The coefficient on the triple interaction term should be negative and significant
(for deadly attacks on security forces), if the effect of rainfall shocks in mining
districts is larger for tribal districts. This should be the case if the impact of
mining mainly operates through the grievances of the tribal population. However,
the coefficient on the triple interaction is insignificant (see Table 1.7 in appendix,
columns 2 and 5, for civilian and attacks on security forces respectively).
1.6.3.5 Accounting for floods and alternative rainfall measures
While rainfall was found to be positively related to rice production, the impact of
rain on agricultural output is theoretically ambiguous: higher rainfall could boost
productivity but it could also spur floods and cause crop damage.61 One concern
is that my analysis captures the incapacitation effect of floods. Floods could
destroy output and capital used by rebel groups, which subsequently leads to a
decrease in violence. Yet, this interpretation cannot fully account for the observed
heterogeneity in impacts between mining and non-mining regions. In an attempt
to further confirm that my findings result from the impact of rainfall shocks on the
institutions (not reported).
61In my dataset, I find no convincing evidence of a negative impact of excess rainfall on agri-
cultural output. However, the logarithmic specification already accounts for the decreasing
returns to rainfall levels, which are clearly present.
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opportunity cost of conflict (rather than the destruction of conflict capital), I allow
for the impact of rainfall to be different in flood-prone areas (Table 1.7 in appendix,
columns 1 and 4).62 The results confirm that these districts are not driving the
results. Strikingly, the negative impact on violence against civilians is mitigated
in these districts, which is consistent with the idea that positive rainfall shocks in
flood prone areas do not necessarily result in an increase in the opportunity cost of
engaging in conflict. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the main results are driven
by the impact of floods.
As an additional robustness check, I define dry district-years as observations that
see Kharif season rainfall below 20% of the district average between 2004 and
2010.63 Using this dry year dummy as the relevant rainfall shock yields results
that are very close in magnitude to those obtained earlier, although the coefficients
are less precisely estimated.
1.6.3.6 Alternative mineral definitions
The mineral variable employed in the main analysis was constructed using various
sources. To assess if any bias was induced by using 2005-2006 production data for
bauxite and iron, Table 1.7 (in appendix, columns 3 and 6) presents the key results
for an alternative measure of district-level production of bauxite and iron mining,
which was published by the US Geological Survey.64 This survey does not provide
district-level information on coal mining. Therefore, a dummy for coal mining
activity (which is based on 2003 data and does not suffer from severe endogeneity
concerns) is added in a separate interaction term. The key results go through in
this alternative specification. The coefficient on bauxite and iron on the one hand
and coal on the other hand remain negative and significant. The fact that the
negative coefficient on the interaction term is not driven by a particular type of
minerals provides additional support of the main results.
1.7 Conclusion
In line with the asymmetric nature of the Naxalite conflict, this paper hypothesi-
sed that income shocks should have different impacts on violence depending on the
62As defined by the Indian Vulnerability Atlas (2006).
6322% of all district-years are categorised as “dry years” according to this definition.
64U.S. Geological Survey, 2007, "2005 Minerals Yearbook India", p.13.
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resource environment. In the absence of external sources of revenue, the Naxalites
may not be able to exploit a negative labour income shock to boost recruitment.
However, the centrally funded government forces are not bound by this constraint.
Therefore, collaboration between the government and the civilian population be-
comes more attractive in response to a negative labour income shock, which is
expected to spark violence against civilians by the Naxalites in an attempt to de-
ter collaboration. The Naxalites can only exploit negative labour income shocks to
increase attacks against the government if they have access to external sources of
funding. My empirical analysis supported these hypotheses. Exploiting exogenous
variation in rainfall in a panel of annual casualty numbers, negative rainfall shocks
were found to increase Maoist violence against civilians. Importantly, this result
was found to be driven by violence against civilian collaborators. Negative shocks
were only associated with increased violence against the security forces in those
districts that produce key minerals.
The results of this paper shed new light on the conflicting results in the literature
that links labour income shocks to violence. In particular, the analysis suggests
that the combination of the relative financial capacity of the parties involved in
the conflict and the structures of the underlying tax bases could play an important
role in determining the sign of the relationship between labour income shocks and
conflict.
The findings of this paper have important implications for the design of conflict
resolution policies and counter-insurgency strategies. A first set of policies could
aim to mitigate negative income shocks, in an attempt to block rebel recruit-
ment through the opportunity cost channel. Such policies could include targeted
employment programmes, investments in agriculture, and subsidised rainfall insu-
rance. However, this paper suggests that these policies may only be effective at
restraining rebel’s fighting capacity against the government in mineral-rich areas.
In mineral-poor areas, the structure of the rebels’ tax base already prevents the
rebels from benefiting from negative income shocks in the absence of mitigation
policies. If the policy goal is to prevent targeted attacks on civilians, mitigation
policies could be effective regardless of the resource environment. However, a po-
tential drawback of mitigation policies is that they could make it harder for the
security forces to recruit informers. In line with the latter idea, a second set of
counter-insurgency policies could in fact exploit negative income shocks to attract
civilian collaboration with the government. By offering rewards or services that
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are conditional on collaboration, the government could benefit from negative in-
come shocks to gather more information and to undermine the rebels’ fighting
capacity (as suggested by Berman et al., 2011a). This paper qualifies the lat-
ter policy prescription in two ways. First, a collaboration strategy may be less
effective in mineral-rich areas, where negative income shocks could benefit both
the government (through increased collaboration) and the insurgents (through in-
creased rebel recruitment). Second, this paper points at an important danger of
collaboration strategies. My findings suggest that the rebels may use targeted
violence against civilians to match the increased appeal from collaboration due to
negative income shocks. In India’s Naxalite conflict, various government agencies
already encourage civilian collaboration through a variety of policies, including
monetary rewards for information, conditional services, and recruitment into vigi-
lante groups. However, the observed retaliatory violence reflects the fact that the
civilian population is not sufficiently protected against increased reprisals. It could
also be that the rewards from collaboration in the Naxalite conflict are too limited
to outweigh the risk of retaliation by the Naxalites. In such an environment, a real
danger of policies that aim to attract civilian collaboration is that they mainly
increase the vulnerability of the population to attacks by insurgents. The logic of
such targeted violence against civilians deserves more attention from both policy
makers and researchers, in India’s Naxalite conflict and beyond.
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1.8 Appendix to Chapter 1
1.8.1 Theoretical Framework
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
From expression 1.3, it can easily be derived that:
∂(τ ∗F )
∂θ
= −C2
C1
[(1− p)]
The relationship between the total number of fighters and labour pro-
ductivity is given by:
∂F
∂θ
= −pR
θ2
6 0
If R = 0, it follows that:
∂(τ ∗F )
∂θ
= −C2
C1
[(1− p)] < 0
∂(1− τ ∗)F
∂θ
= C2
C1
[(1− p)] > 0
If R > 0,it can be seen that:
∂(τ ∗F )
∂θ
= −C2
C1
(1− p)
This effect does not depend on R. While changes in R change both τ ∗
and F , (τ ∗F ) remains constant as the indifference condition does not
depend on R. However, the impact on the number of fighters employed
against the government depends on R:
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∂(1− τ ∗)F
∂θ
= −pR
θ2
+ C2
C1
(1− p)
Hence, we can find an R such that:
p
R
θ2
= C2
C1
(1− p)
∂(1− τ ∗)F
∂θ
< 0⇔ R > R¯
The comparative statics results described above require interior solu-
tions. In particular, L needs to be sufficiently large to rule out a corner
solution in which the entire population has joined the rebel group (and
the derivative of interest is not defined). In particular, let L˜ = pL˜+pR
θ
.
If L > L˜, we know that F (R) < L. Similarly, the comparative statics
may not be defined if τ = 1. This corner solution can be ruled out by
choosing X sufficiently small.
A Microfoundation of Violence against Civilians
In this section, I present an extension of the baseline model that links violence
against civilians more explicitly to the retaliation capacity of the rebel group. It
is assumed a fraction α1 + α2 of the population receives valuable information.
Implicitly, the model in the main body already incorporated this assumption.
Fraction α1 of the population is non-strategic and always provides information to
the government. Fraction α2 receives valuable information and chooses to pass on
this information, depending on the costs and benefits associated with this action.
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A fraction 1 − α1 − α2 does not receive any information. These informer types
are hidden. It is assumed the government pays X for valuable information that
is provided by the “opportunistic informants” α2. The collaboration of the α2
population is assumed to be critical. The rebel group will lose its fighting capacity
if and only if the α2 population passes on information to the government.
In contrast to the earlier model, the population does not directly observe τF . Ins-
tead, it observes the number of non-security force killings by the rebel group among
the α1 informers, which is a monotonically increasing function of τF , K(φτF ),
with 0 6 φ 6 1. For φ = 1, K(φτF ) perfectly reveals the minimum investment
in retaliation capacity. This extension microfounds the targeting of civilians. In
particular, the rebel group now kills non-strategic informers to show that they
have fighters devoted to retaliation activities. The ability to target α1 informers
also reflects monitoring capacity. Without investments in monitoring capacity, the
rebel group may be able to kill civilians, but it will fail to target only informers.
It is assumed that the types are revealed after the killing, so that the population
can derive both the strength of the rebels devoted to controlling civilians and their
monitoring capacity.65
The timing of the altered game is as follows:
1. Nature draws:
• The informant types in the population, with probabilities α1 for uncon-
ditional informers, α2 for opportunistic informers, and 1 − α1 − α2 for
the remaining population.
2. Production, rebel recruitment, and appropriation take place according to
Equation 1.1.66
65It seems reasonable to assume that investments in retaliation capacity coincides with an in-
vestments in (1 − τ)F . Therefore, in principle, the rebel group could show its retaliation
capacity based on (1− τ)F . Nevertheless, an increasing function H(ϕ(1− τ)F )), which could
correspond to attacks against the government, would not work. While high retaliation capa-
city could imply a low value of H, an arbitrarily low H can also be achieved at no cost by
just reducing ϕ.
66In principle, the collaboration decision should enter the labour market condition derived in
(Equation 1.1) for opportunistic informers. However, there are two justifications for treating
this market separately. First, under the assumption that the costs to becoming an informant
do not depend on rebel status, the same returns to becoming an informant would be added to
both the rebel wage and the agricultural wage and would not affect the equilibrium condition.
Second, there are no opportunistic informants in equilibrium as long as X is sufficiently small
(which guarantees that there exists a τF that makes the returns to collaboration equal to
zero). Therefore, the functions describing the rebel market can depend on the returns to
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3. α1 informers provide information to the government.
4. The rebel group chooses τF and φ.
5. The α2 population:
• Observes the number of killings of α1 informers: k= K(φτF )
• Decides to provide information i ∈ (0, 1).
6. The pay-offs are realised:
• The rebel group’s pay-off: W (τ) = (1− i∗)(1− τ)F
• The pay-off of the α2 population is given by: (1−p)θ+i(X−C(τF, θ(1−
p)))
This game is essentially a simultaneous game that is preceded by a stage in which
the rebel group shows its minimum retaliation capacity φτF . The subgame per-
fect equilibrium will specify optimal strategies in the simultaneous game and the
optimal revelation of minimum capacity, φτF , in the first stage.
Proposition A.1: In the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the rebel group sets τ ∗F
so that 1.3 holds with equality. It sets φ∗ = 1, killing K(τ ∗F ) civilians. The
informants choose i∗ = 1 if k < K(τ ∗F ) and i∗ = 0 if k > K(τ ∗F ).
Proof The existence of the equilibrium is a corollary of proposition 1. Consider a
strategy in which i = 0 for at least one k˜ such that k˜ < K(τ ∗F ). It is clear
that the rebel group will optimally set τ˜ < τ ∗ in response to this strategy. It
will make sure that k˜ = K(τ˜F ). However, for τ < τ ∗, the optimal strategy
for the population is to set i = 1. A strategy whereby i = 0 for k˜ = K(τ ∗F )
cannot be optimal, as the technology of killings is such that k˜ can only be
achieved for τ> τ ∗. Given that τ> τ ∗, it is optimal to choose i = 1.
The comparative statics are identical to the results in section 1.2.
collaboration without altering the equilibrium results. However, if X is large, there could
be an equilibrium with opportunistic collaborators and a break-down of the rebels’ fighting
capacity. The analysis does not consider this parameter range.
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1.8.2 Maps
Figure 1.1: Districts Included in Data Set
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Figure 1.2: Affected Districts
Notes: Affected (merged) districts see at least one casualty of any type between
2005 and 2010.
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Figure 1.3: Civilian casualties
Notes: Total number of civilian casualties (per merged district) between 2005 and
2010.
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Figure 1.4: Security force casualties
Notes: Total number of security force casualties (per merged district) between
2005 and 2010.
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Figure 1.5: Mineral production
Notes: Logarithm of mineral production value (plus 1), measured at baseline as
described in the text.
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1.8.3 Tables for robustness checks
Table 1.8: Robustness checks (an alternative shock measure)
Civilian Casualties Security Forces Casualties
Dry yeart−1 0.31 -0.49**
(0.20) (0.22)
Dry yeart−1 0.02 0.15**
* Log(Mineral value) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 444 348
Districts 74 58
Estimation Poisson
P-value on β1 =β2 = 0 0.08* 0.03**
Notes: District-year level observations observations, covering 2005-2010. Districts were
merged as described in the text. Dry years are district-years that see less than 20% of the
average district-level rainfall (2004-2010). The regressions include district fixed effects,
state-year fixed effects and (log) mineral-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Robustness checks (interactions with rainfall)
Civilian Casualties Attacks on Security Forces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.84*** -0.80** -0.98*** 0.98** 1.17*** 0.51 1.69***
(0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.43) (0.35) (0.38) (0.36)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.04 -0.13* -0.45*** -0.40*** -0.46***
*Log(Mineral (0.07) (0.8) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10)
value)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.19 -0.36
*Log(Mineral (0.20) (0.29)
value)*ST share
Log(rainfallt−1) 1.10 1.37
*ST Share (1.28) (1.85)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.31 0.32
*Flood prone (0.44) (0.66)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.53 -2.22***
*Mineral USGS (0.72) (0.73)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.11 -1.40**
*Coal dummy (0.47) (0.69)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.40***
*(2005 incidents (0.12)
with Maoist
fatalities)
Observations 444 444 444 348 348 348 348
Districts 74 74 74 58 58 58 58
Estimation Poisson
Notes: District-year level observations observations, covering 2005-2010. Districts were
merged as described in the text. Interaction variables are demeaned (except for mineral
wealth and 2005 incidents). All regressions include district fixed effects, state-year fixed
effects and (log) mineral-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.9: OLS reference (results per tertile)
Panel A
Civilian Casualties (per 100,000 of the population)
Mean 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.74 0.32 0.18
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.31** -0.01 -0.09 -1.94 -0.52* -0.20**
(0.15) (0.03) (0.05) (1.27) (0.28) (0.10)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.01 -0.00
* Log(Mineral
value) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.05) (0.02)
Outliers omitted No No No No Yes Yes
Tertiles All 1st 2nd 3rd 3rd 2nd & 3rd
Observations 444 150 150 150 126 276
Districts 74 25 25 25 21 46
Estimation OLS
Panel B
Attacks on Security Forces (per 100,000 of the population)
Mean 0.078 0.007 0.021 0.198 0.104 0.060
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.005 0.004 0.017 -0.021 0.14 0.048
(0.04) (0.007) (0.020) (0.208) (0.13) (0.029)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.016 0.004 -0.007 -0.036 -0.047* -0.026*
* Log(Mineral
value) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.047) (0.0243) (0.13)
Outliers omitted No No No No Yes Yes
Tertiles All 1st 2nd 3rd 3rd 2nd& 3rd
Observations 342 120 114 114 102 216
Districts 57 20 19 19 18 36
Estimation OLS
Notes: District-year level observations, 2005-2010. Districts were merged as described in the
text. Included districts have at least one non-zero observation for the dependent variable.
Tertiles are based on the distribution of the total number of casualties over the sample period
divided by the district population and conditional on the district total exceeding zero.
Outliers are above the 95th percentile of the distribution of the district casualty total.
Reported means are for the dependent variable of relevant sub-sample. All regressions include
district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects and
(log) mineral-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.10: OLS reference (baseline results)
Log(Civilian
Casualties+1)
Log(Attacks on
Security Forces+1)
Log(Maoist
Casualties+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.34* -0.39* 0.30** 0.41*** -0.02 -0.35
(0.20)
[0.20]
(0.21)
[0.19]
(0.14)
[0.13]
(0.15)
[0.14]
(0.33)
[0.35]
(0.32)
[0.31]
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.03 -0.03 -0.14** -0.14*** -0.10 -0.08
* Log(Mineral
value) (0.05)
[0.04]
(0.05)
[0.05]
(0)
[0.04]
(0.05)
[0.05]
(0.07)
[0.06]
(0.06)
[0.05]
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.23 -0.53 -0.20
* ST share (1.25) (0.98) (2.01)
Log(rainfallt−1) -3.05 -1.24 -0.41
* SC share (2.80) (1.83) (4.00)
Log(rainfallt−1) -0.01 0.01 -0.04*
* Literacy share (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.99 -0.70 1.13
* Forest share (1.02) (0.96) (1.77)
Log(rainfallt−1) 0.00 -0.00 0.00
* Pop. density (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 440 438 348 342 360 360
Districts 74 73 58 57 60 60
Estimation OLS
Notes: District-year level observations, covering 2005-2010. Districts were merged as
described in the text. Included districts have at least one non-zero observation for the
dependent variable. With the exception of the mineral dummy, the interaction variables are
demeaned. All regressions include district fixed effects, state-year fixed effects and (log)
mineral-year effects. Standard errors (s.e.) are clustered at the district level, standard errors
[s.e.] are spatially clustered with linearly decreasing weights within a 250km radius. For (s.e.):
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2 Military Service and Human
Capital Accumulation
Evidence from Colonial Punjab
2.1 Introduction
Voluntary military service in professional armed forces is often thought to offer
rare educational opportunities to disadvantaged groups (Khalidi, 2001; Moskos
and Butler, 1996). The risk premium on military wages could force the military
to hire low-skilled recruits and to provide training on the job, rather than to pay
the market wage for skilled labour. The claim that disadvantaged groups benefit
disproportionally from military service gains additional policy relevance because
the military is one of the largest employers in most countries (WDI, 2006). In
the context of the US armed forces, evidence suggests that disadvantaged groups
benefit mildly from voluntary service (Angrist, 1998). However, very little evi-
dence is available on how this finding translates to a developing country context.
Nevertheless, the returns to military service in professional armies could be higher
in developing countries, as the average human capital in their populations tends
to be lower.1 In spite of the central importance of military support and training to
1Benoit (1978) argues that defense expenditures could spur growth in developing countries.
Stroup and Heckelman (2001) find a positive relationship between military spending and
growth in countries with low levels human capital. Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel (2006)
survey the extensive related literature on military expenditures and growth.
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the relations between developing countries and the developed world, not much is
known about the role that military service could play in economic development.2
Research into this topic faces two key challenges.3 First, the confidentiality of
military data restricts subnational work on this topic. Second, selection into vo-
luntary military service is typically non-random, which could bias the estimated
returns to military service. This paper addresses these challenges by focusing on
the recruitment surge in colonial Punjab during the First World War (WWI). This
setting is unique in that recruitment patterns can be reconstructed and exogenous
factors determined the extent to which communities were exposed to a demand
shock for military labour. The size of this demand shock enables an analysis at the
aggregate level: out of a total population of approximately 20 million, more than
362,000 Punjabi men (1.8% of the population) served in the Indian Army during
the First World War. Two key questions will be explored. First, did military
recruitment during the First World War boost the literacy rate of recruited com-
munities? Second, through which of three possible channels did military service
affect literacy: (i) direct skill acquisition by serving soldiers, (ii) increased demand
for the education due to higher earnings, or (iii) preferential public spending on
primary education?
For information on the recruitment patterns of the Indian Army, this paper relies
on the “Debt of Honour Register”, which is administered by the Commonwealth
War Graves Commission (CWGC). Using individual records of Indian casualties
in the Register, information on the place of origin of soldiers who died in WWI
can be aggregated at the district level. A name-based algorithm enables a further
split-up of war casualty estimates into two religious communities: Hindu-Sikhs and
Muslims. These data on military war deaths at the district-religion level are used
as a proxy for military recruitment. I present historical evidence that supports the
use of casualty numbers as proxies for recruitment. My main results are derived
from a panel of literacy outcomes at the district-religion level in colonial Punjab
for the period 1901-31.
2Observers indicate that 80 per cent of recruits in the Afghan army are illiterate (BBC News,
“Afghanistan and Pakistan face decisive year”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8424289.stm, last
accessed 4 January 2011). Hence, the scope of large-scale military recruitment to contribute to
human capital development seems substantial. The recent 25 January revolution in Egypt also
illustrates the importance of military training in shaping the views of soldiers (BBC News,
“Egypt unrest: Military at heart of Egyptian state”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-12368711, last accessed 11 February 2011).
3See also Annan and Blattman (2010).
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The identification strategy used in this paper corresponds to a continuous difference-
in-difference approach: I compare male literacy rates in years before and after
WWI, between communities with different ratios of military war casualties. This
approach relies on the fact that recruitment into the British army was restricted to
certain groups from specific geographical areas. Historical sources suggest that the
recruitment patterns of the Indian Army during the First World War were mainly
based on the recruitment grounds that had been identified by British recruitment
officers at the end of the 19th century. This initial selection favoured the recruit-
ment of so-called ’martial races’. It can be assumed that the martial qualities of
communities were not linked to their potential for literacy improvements during
WWI. An analysis of the baseline characteristics of recruited communities and
their literacy trends before the war is consistent with this hypothesis. Therefore,
the intensity of the WWI recruitment surge, as proxied by the ratio of military
war deaths, is considered as an exogenous treatment in the main analysis. Ho-
wever, this analysis cannot fully address certain endogeneity concerns, including
the possibility that the proxying approach leads to systematic errors. To address
these remaining concerns, I also present IV results for a restricted sample. In this
robustness check, I instrument the observed recruitment patterns with an indica-
tor of “recruitment suitability” that is based on the assessments of the fighting
potential of Hindu-Sikh communities by British recruitment officers at the end of
the 19th century.
The results indicate that an increase in war casualties is associated with a signifi-
cant increase in the number of male literates. On average, ten additional recruits
per thousand of the 1901 male population are associated with an increase in the
ratio of male literates by three per thousand in 1931. A further split-up of the
baseline results per age group indicates that the positive impact on literacy is
strongest for the group of men aged over 20. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that direct skill acquisition during military service was a key channel
through which military recruitment influenced literacy outcomes. Historical evi-
dence confirms that recruits were typically illiterate but often acquired literacy
skills on service. These sources also suggest that the observed effect is likely to
result from informal learning and skill transfers rather than from formal literacy
training. Further analysis confirms that the positive impact of military recruitment
is not driven by a supply shock of education or by a political economy channel:
heavily recruited districts did not attract more investments in education by the
Punjabi District Boards. The latter finding points at constraints on the long-run
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distributional impact of military recruitment in this context.
This paper adds to previous work on the economic impact of military recruit-
ment.4 It is one of the first contributions to exploit largely exogenous variation
in military recruitment to provide evidence on the relationship between military
recruitment and human capital formation in a developing economy. One exception
is a recent contribution by Annan and Blattman (2010), who examine the labour
market impact of forced child soldiering in Uganda. They conclude that military
service is a poor substitute for schooling in this context.5 However, it is not clear
whether these results would carry through to the volunteer forces of professional
armies. One contribution that shares my focus on human capital accumulation in
the Indian Army, is the recent work of Jha and Wilkinson (2010). Their analy-
sis indicates that the combat experience of Indian World War II veterans helped
these ex-soldiers to organise violence against minorities. They find that the ave-
rage duration of combat assignment at the district level can explain the observed
patterns of ethnic cleansing across the subcontinent during the Partition in 1947.
This paper complements their study and suggests that the human capital impact
of military service could also have more benign aspects: improving the literacy
skills of recruits and their families.
The second strand of literature to which this paper contributes is the fast growing
body of research on the effects of colonial institutions on economic growth. In
their seminal contribution, Acemoglu et al. (2001) assert that settler mortality
had a persistent impact on economic growth through institutions. In contrast,
Glaeser et al. (2004) emphasise that colonisers exported human capital along-
side institutions. These authors point out that there is very little evidence on
which specific colonial policies promoted institutional development and/or human
capital accumulation. Bridging this gap in our understanding of colonial econo-
mic history, a large literature has recently emerged on the economic impact of
specific colonial institutions in specific regions.6 Chaudhary (2009; 2010) shares
4Key contributions on the individual returns to military service include Angrist (1990 and 1998),
Angrist and Krueger (1994), Bedard and Deschenes (2006), Imbens and van der Klaauw
(2005), Grenet, Hart and Roberts (2011).
5These findings are consistent with earlier survey evidence from the Sierra Leonean civil war
(Humphrey and Weinstein, 2007). Costa and Khan (2010) find that US civil war veterans
faced higher mortality due to war time stress. See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review
of the literature on the role of veterans in post-war reconstruction.
6Key contributions include Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Banerjee and Iyer (2003),
Cassan (2009), Cogneau (2008), Dell (2010), Donaldson (2009), Huillery (2009), Moradi
(2008) and Nunn (2008 and 2009).
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my focus on human capital accumulation in colonial India. She finds that public
spending on primary education is positively associated with male literacy and that
private investment in education was more limited in districts with high religious
diversity. This paper complements these findings by exploring if military service
could promote human capital development in this context of severe private and
public underinvestment in education. More broadly, it is striking that, in the large
literature on colonial institutions, the role of colonial armies has received little at-
tention.7 Nevertheless, one could argue that no other colonial institution required
as much close collaboration and interdependency between local non-elite groups
and their colonisers. This paper provides one of the first attempts at assessing the
developmental effects of recruitment into the colonial armies.
Finally, this paper relates to the large literature on literacy and education. While
public education reaches an ever growing number of students in the developing
world, educational attainment remains low.8 Recent work highlights how non-
traditional and informal learning environments could play an important role in
improving educational outcomes, in particular for adult learners.9 In the context
of the Indian Army, the historical evidence discussed in this paper suggests that
the military service dramatically boosted the personal returns to literacy skills.
As a mail service was provided to soldiers, being literate facilitated the soldier’s
correspondence with his family. Moreover, the Indian Army provided literature
(including religious books and pedagogical material) to entertain soldiers. Hence,
the direct acquisition of literacy skills by Punjabi soldiers could reflect the ef-
fectiveness of non-traditional learning environments that offer increased personal
returns to literacy in combination with decreased learning costs.
This paper is organised as follows. First, I outline the historical background of
military recruitment in colonial Punjab. Second, I discuss the mechanisms through
which military recruitment could affect literacy. Third, I introduce the data set I
use in this study. Fourth, I present the empirical strategy. Fifth, I interpret the
7Moradi (2008, 2009) uses information on recruits in the African colonial armies to assess the
impact of colonisation on nutritional status, but he does not assess the developmental impact
of military recruitment in itself. Fafchamps and Moradi (2010) find that soldiers entering the
British Colonial Army in Ghana based on referrals performed worse than their non-referred
colleagues. Echenberg (1975) argues that conscription in French West Africa during the First
World War contributed to the subsequent economic stagnation of this region.
8UNESCO (2008). See also Glewwe and Kremer (2006), and Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2009).
9For example, Aker, Ksoll and Lybbert (2011) evaluate a programme that teaches adults literacy
skills by using mobile phones. Given the low cost of text messages sent by mobile phones,
the personal returns of acquiring literacy skills are very large in this programme.
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empirical results. Sixth, I discuss the robustness of my findings. Finally, I offer
concluding remarks.
2.2 Historical background
In this brief historical overview, I sketch the context in which military recruitment
took place in colonial India. In the seventeenth century, the Indian Army was
conceived by the East India Company as just a small irregular force that would
draw recruits from the local population. However, the importance of this so-called
“native army” grew steadily and, by 1856, the British Raj relied on the Indian
Army for most of its security needs.10 Throughout the 19th century, the Indian
army remained of central importance to the Raj to counter the advances of Russian
forces in Afghanistan.
When WWI broke out in 1914, the Government of India had more troops at its
disposal than it strictly needed for its internal security. For this reason, the Indian
Army entered the war in 1914.11 As the war developed, the Indian Army kept
on providing ever more troops. Raw figures illustrate the enormous scale of the
war-time recruitment effort in colonial India: out of a population of approximately
20 million, the number of Punjabi troops increased from 69,458 to 362,027 over
the period 1910-19. The underlying recruitment efforts had to rise even more to
keep up the size of the army in the face of casualties. During the war, India sent
138,000 men to France, 675,000 men to Mesopotamia and 144,000 men to Egypt.
Of these 957,000 recruits, at least 74,260 men died, of whom approximately 19,000
had been recruited in Punjab.12 The Indian army kept on playing an important
role in the Middle East and on the Indian-Afghan border until 1921 (i.e., after
Armistice). Therefore, the full demobilisation of WWI recruits was not reached
until the mid-twenties.
Historians argue that the First World War was crucial for the industrialisation
of India and that large-scale recruitment and the foreign experience of soldiers
10The potential dangers of this strong dependence on native troops became apparent when the
so-called Sepoy mutiny broke out in 1857. The mutiny was initiated by native soldiers and
shook the British interests to their core. The Sepoy mutiny marked a clear shift in the
regional composition of the military, which will be discussed in more detail later.
11See Mason (1974, p. 410) on the motives of the Indian Government to assist mainland Britain
in the war.
12Figures drawn from Mazumder (2003, p.18) and the CWGC Debt of Honour Register.
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contributed to the emerging independence movement (Lawrence, 1997).13 An as-
sessment of the economic impacts of the first World War is well beyond the scope
of this paper. Similarly, this paper is not able to identify the general equilibrium
impact of military recruitment. For instance, the fact that the Indian Army was
financed by taxes raised by the Raj would have to be taken into account to make
any assessment about the net impact of military recruitment. However, this paper
illustrates a specific result of the outbreak of the Great War: the distributional
impact of First World War recruitment on human capital development.
2.3 Mechanisms and conceptual framework
The key focus of this paper is on the impact of military recruitment on literacy
rates. There are multiple channels through which military recruitment could affect
literacy outcomes at the district-religion level, three of which are discussed here: (i)
direct skill acquisition by serving soldiers, (ii) increased demand for the education
due to higher earnings, or (iii) preferential public spending on primary education.
First, soldiers could acquire literacy skills on service. While most military canton-
ments provided some schooling in peace time, extensive schooling cannot have been
an important part of the standard training of the large numbers of new recruits
who were set to serve abroad in WWI. However, historical accounts highlight the
strength of the personal relationships between British officers, Indian sub-officers
and the soldiers under their command. They point at the extent to which skills
were shared during the many hours that soldiers had “to kill” in their small com-
panies.14 Such a direct learning channel appears to be referred to by the census
report of 1931, as one of the reasons why heavily recruited districts saw an increase
in literacy rates (Khan, 1932, p216):
"[...] Ludhiana and Shahpur, and most of the district with the next
highest percentage of increase, namely Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat
and Mianwali, also owe the increase in literacy to the return home of
demobilised soldiers, who very often pick up reading and writing in
13The relationship between large-scale war-time military service and the demand for political
and economic reforms is explored by Prezworski (2007), Scheve and Stasavage (2010), and
Ticchi and Vindigni (2008).
14Mazumder (2003). In WWI, all Indian soldiers and low-ranking officers were under direct
command of British officers, as native soldiers were not deemed capable of fulfilling officer
roles.
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Roman or any other of the vernaculars in the course of their military
career."
Similar statements can be found in the reports of the Censor of letters from soldiers
serving abroad (Censor of Indian Mail, 1915):
"Under stress of necessity many Indian soldiers during their stay
in Europe have learned to read and write their own languages, and
primers and spelling books come in large quantities from India to the
army."
The latter quote suggests that the main channel through which soldiers acquired
literacy was not formal training, but the boost in the personal returns to becoming
literate. Unfortunately, the report does not explicitly identify the factors that
contribute to the “stress of necessity” it refers to. In other sections the Censor
Reports mention several contributing factors. First, the Indian Army maintained
a postal service. Hence, literacy skills could facilitate the communication between
soldiers and their families enormously. Interestingly, this channel could operate
both within the army and in their home region. Given that this study identifies
the impact on aggregate literacy, the results could capture both the impact on
serving soldiers and on their families who remained in India. Second, acquiring
literacy skills could have been particularly important for soldiers who were heavily
wounded in the fighting, as this could allow them to take on relatively well paid jobs
that did not require hard physical labour. Third, literacy could have facilitated
communication at the battlefield. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, military
life outside of the battlefield was often uneventful and the demand for leisure
activities of any sort was strong. In response to this demand, the Indian Army
published magazines that brought soldiers news from India and from the front line.
Similarly, the army provided soldiers with a steady supply of religious literature
(Censor of Indian Mail, 1915). In brief, the military could have offered a unique
environment, in which the costs of acquiring literacy skills were reduced and the
returns were boosted.
A second broad channel through which military recruitment could affect literacy
is through an income effect. The inflow of military income could have fuelled a
demand shock for education, both in formal schools and informally through lear-
ning from relatives or friends. The recruited communities were most likely to be
affected by the remittances of soldiers who were on duty and by pensions for ex-
soldiers. Mazumder (2003) provides descriptive evidence of the impact of military
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incomes on a large number of outcome variables, including clothing, housing, die-
tary choices and education. Mazumder notes that "[t]he education of children was
another investment soldiers willingly made" (2003, p.42). While primary education
was free, books, stationary, and uniforms made education expensive in rural areas
(Darling, 1934, p.173). The income effect could potentially be further boosted by
changes in preferences that were induced by military service. The following Jat
soldier writing from France is quoted in Mazumder (2003): "What we have to do
is educate our children, and if we do not we are fools and our children will be fools
also". While demand for education (as a normal good) should increase in response
to an inflow of income, the loss of male labour forces in the home communities
due to the mobilisation of men for military service can counteract this effect. In
the presence of credit and labour market imperfections, the opportunity cost of
sending children to school may increase substantially if households have less la-
bour available to work on the land held by the household. Hence, the opportunity
cost effect could outweigh the income effect and the impact of large-scale military
recruitment on the demand for education remains theoretically ambiguous.
A third channel through which military recruitment may influence literacy is the
supply side of education. It is possible that heavily recruited communities attrac-
ted more public spending on education. While public spending on education could
be exogenously driven by the preferences of the colonial authorities, it is also pos-
sible that the public spending reflects increased demand from certain communities.
The remarkable success of the military in securing favours for their personnel, of-
ten under an implicit threat of rebellion, is indeed a central element in the political
economy literature on the military (Collier, 2007). However, the Government of
India faced an important trade-off from a recruitment perspective if it was to invest
in educating its recruitment grounds: promoting schooling might raise the reserva-
tion wage of future recruits. Therefore, the colonial authorities may have preferred
not to invest more in education in their recruitment grounds.15 The responsibi-
lity for investments in primary education lay almost exclusively with the so-called
District Boards. Chaudhary (2010) reports that the District Boards accounted
for 18% of total spending on education, 85% of total primary education spending
and 93% of public spending on education in Punjab in 1912-1913. Chaudhary
provides historical evidence that suggests that revenues from land taxes were the
main determinant of public spending on education. Given that Punjab was subject
to the same land revenue system (in which land taxes were collected directly by
15Pasha (1998) links military recruitment in Pakistan to underdevelopment on these grounds.
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the British authorities and laid down in so-called “settlements”), the revenues and
total spending on education in Punjabi districts should be driven mainly by the
agricultural potential of the district and not by the intensity of recruitment. Also,
given the strong relationship between public spending and tax revenues, increasing
public spending on education would probably come at the cost of higher taxation.
Furthermore, Chaudhary’s evidence suggests that upper-caste elites had conside-
rable influence over the allocation of funds (Chaudhary, 2009). Nevertheless, it
remains possible that soldiers or the British authorities could influence district
boards to invest more in education in the recruitment grounds, both as an indi-
rect remuneration of its soldiers in response to their political pressure and in an
attempt to boost the skills of its future recruits.16
In sum, there are three main channels through which military recruitment could
affect literacy outcomes in their home communities: direct learning and demo-
bilisation, a demand shock for education due to higher earnings and preferential
spending on education by the district authorities. In an attempt to tease out the
mechanism underlying the main result, I rely on two approaches. First, I repeat
the main analysis for different age groups. If demobilised soldiers are driving the
results, the effects should be strongest for men of military age and they should be
visible immediately after the war. If, by contrast, the effect is driven by younger
age groups and is delayed, then the demand and supply channels for education
are more plausible. A second approach, which allows me to disentangle demand
and supply shocks to some extent, is an analysis of investment data on education.
Assuming that these reflect the independent decisions of the local authorities of
how much to fund education in a given district, higher investment in recruited
districts could reflect a supply shock. If investment does not change noticeably,
then a demand-driven change seems more likely.
16A specific provider of primary education which could be relevant to this study were the army
cantonment schools. These would be open to children of soldiers if they chose to have their
family stay at the cantonment. Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the number of mili-
tary families that lived in the cantonments and made use of these facilities. At one particular
WWI recruitment rally, free education up to the secondary school level was promised for the
children of deceased and disabled soldiers (Mazumder, 2003). Again, there is no direct evi-
dence on how many children made use of this system and whether it was actually implemented
at all.
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In my main analysis, I use military war casualties as proxies for military recruit-
ment. I collect data on the district of origin from a list of soldiers who died during
WWI, the “Debt of Honour Register”. This register is administered by the Com-
mon Wealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) and has the names of 74,260 Indian
military personnel who died in WWI. For virtually all soldiers, the name, the rank,
the regiment and the date of death are provided. For 68% of entries, the name
of the father and the district of birth have been recorded.17 This proxy approach
necessarily induces some measurement error and this issue will be addressed in
detail in section 2.5.
Based on the information in the register, the names of soldiers are used to assign
them to two religious groups: Hindu-Sikh or Muslim.18 The main results will be
presented using this distinction and including all soldiers and low-ranking officers
in the register (all higher ranking officers were British).19 Literacy and population
details for each of the three religious groups are collected at the district level
in Punjab for the four census years (1901, 1911, 1921 and 1931). Twenty-eight
districts provide literacy data for all four census years. Nominal expenditures on
education by the District Boards are also collected for each of the four census years
17This information was in principle recorded on all of the individual service records of each
soldier, but according to the CWGC there is no reason to expect missing entries to be
systematically different. Several hypotheses can be put forward as to why some entries are
incomplete. According to CWGC, the missing information is most likely the result of different
attitudes of the clerks who recorded the information of new recruits. These differences in
the punctuality of individual recruitment clerks are unlikely to produce a systematic bias.
The loss of service records and the ease with which they could be accessed by the Indian
administrators who prepared the information for the CWGC is another potential cause of
missing records. These hypotheses were put forward by Peter Holton, Records Supervisor at
the CWGC.
18The algorithm relies on the recognition of Muslim names (such as “Khan” and “Abdullah”)
or Hindu-Sikh Names (such as “Singh” and “Ram”) in either the name of the father or the
name of the casualty. While there is no theoretical ground not to further distinguish between
Hindus and Sikhs, some names (in particular the name “Singh”) are common to both religions.
Results not presented in the paper indicate that the main results are robust to a further
split-up between Hindus and Sikhs. However, in any such analysis ad hoc assumptions need
to be made about how to assign casualties called “Singh” to either the Hindu or the Sikh
community.
19The Indian army did not just employ soldiers, but hired personnel in a multitude of roles.
Approximately 10% of the Punjab casualties were employed as labourers or as part of the
transport corps. These are not included in my estimates, as their roles are not strictly military
and their recruitment may not have been driven by the same principles as the recruitment of
soldiers.
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at the district level.20 These data will be important to distinguish the channels
through which recruitment could affect literacy outcomes.
Figure 2.1: War deaths in colonial Punjab
Figure 2.1 maps the number of war deaths recorded in the CWGC register as a
20“Reports on the Progress of Education in the Punjab”, annual from 1892-1931.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics (district-religion level)
Sample Lightly
recruited
Heavily
recruited
P-value
Male literacy rate 1911 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.57
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
Male population 1911 187,428 176,058 207,893 0.30
(111,440) (114,369) (105,678)
Muslim dummy 0.50 0.58 0.35 0.10*
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Difference in literacy rate -0.003 -0.008 0.005 0.07*
(1921-1911) (0.004) (0.039) (0.015)
Difference in literacy rate 0.019 0.012 0.031 0.05*
(1931-1911) (0.036) (0.038) (0.031)
Casualty share 0.13 0.04 0.30 0.00***
(per 100 of the 1911 male
population)
(0.15) (0.04) (0.13)
Observations 56 36 20
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
28 districts. Heavily recruited communities have recruitment above the relevant sample
average (0.13 deaths per 100). The table records sample averages and standard deviations (in
parentheses). P-values are based on a t-test on the equality of means for Lightly and heavily
recruited communities. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
proportion of the 1911 population in colonial Punjab. The death rates per district
are shown separately for both religious communities (Muslim and Hindu-Sikh).
The non-coloured areas correspond to the so-called ’princely states’ which were
not directly governed by the British. As recruitment policies in these areas differed
and are less well documented and the availability of data (e.g. on public education
spending) is more limited for these areas, the princely states are not included in
the main analysis.21
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for all the key variables at the district-
religion level. The large standard deviations are indicative of the substantial diffe-
21Relying on the princely states would also give rise to serious comparability concerns, for
example because most of them are much smaller in size than British districts and were
different in several relevant dimensions. See Iyer (2006) for an in depth discussion. In the
appendix, I show that the main results are robust to the inclusion of the princely states.
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rences between the levels of these variables across communities.22 As my analysis
relies on the comparison of communities that were recruited with varying intensity,
I provide separate summary statistics for ‘heavily’ and ‘lightly recruited’ districts
(based on whether ratio of war casualties is above the sample mean). The share of
casualties in the 1911 population is approximately one per thousand at the sample
mean. While recruited communities tend to be less literate on average, this diffe-
rence is not significant. However, the increase in the male literacy rate (1911-31) is
significantly higher for the heavily recruited communities.23 This is the first piece
of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that military service promoted literacy.
In Table 2.2, summary statistics are provided at the district level. As several
variables of interest are only available for districts, part of the analysis will be
conducted at the district level. Most of the differences in baseline variables fail to
gain significance. One exception is the colony status of districts.24 These districts
were recipients of extensive irrigation projects and tended to be lightly recruited,
which also helps to explain why heavily recruited districts tend to have a larger
share of the population that is born in the census district of enumeration in 1911.
The potentially confounding effect of colony status and migration will be dealt with
explicitly in the robustness checks. Heavily recruited districts also have a higher
ratio of students in the male population. While the difference is small in economic
terms, it is precisely estimated and significant at the 10% level. Again, my analysis
will present findings where this baseline difference is explicitly controlled for.
22The econometric specification will take the large variation in average literacy between religious
communities into account by including fixed effects and religion-year-effects on the one hand
and by measuring outcomes in logarithms on the other hand.
23I focus on the male population because this group is most directly affected by military recruit-
ment and educational policies. Female literacy in Colonial Punjab was much lower than male
literacy and focusing on combined literacy measures would not change the results. Repeating
the analysis of this paper for female literacy suggests a negative but non-robust impact of
military recruitment on female literacy (appendix A.5.). The size of the male population will
also be used in all per capita measures in this paper.
24These are located in the band of lightly recruited districts existed in the South-West in
Figure 2.1.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics (district level)
Sample Lightly
recruited
Heavily
recruited
P-value
(3)-(2)
(1) (2) (3)
Male literacy rate 1911 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.76
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Male population 379,601 392,421 356,524 0.42
(125,758) (142,958) (89,001)
Casualty share (per 100) 0.15 0.06 0.30 0.00***
(0.14) (0.05) (0.11)
Primary education 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.90
spending 1911 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
(Rs per male)
Primary school students 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.07*
in 1914 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
(per male population)
Colony dummy 0.21 0.33 0.00 0.01***
(0.42) (0.49) (0.00)
Fraction of males born 0.87 0.83 0.93 0.05**
in district of enumeration (0.15) (0.18) (0.04)
Population density 149 142 161 0.56
(1911 male
population/ha)
(83.6) (87.2) (79.5)
Fraction of Muslims 0.56 0.59 0.51 0.50
(in 1911 male
population)
(0.27) (0.24) (0.33)
Fraction of Hindus 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.52
(in 1911 male
population)
(0.27) (0.20) (0.34)
Fraction of Sikhs 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.79
(in 1911 male
population)
(0.10) (0.08) (0.14)
Observations 28 18 10
Notes: District level observations in 28 districts. Heavily recruited districts have recruitment
above the sample average. The table records sample averages and standard deviations (in
parentheses). P-values are based on a t-test on the equality of means for lightly and heavily
recruited districts. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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While the census data used in this study are very rich in comparison to other
contemporary data sets, they still give rise to measurement concerns. First, the
definition of literacy has changed over the years. In the 1901 census, literates were
expected to be able to "both read and write” in any language (Kaul, 1912, p316).
In practice, it was often sufficient for respondents to be able to spell out words from
a book or to be able to sign with one’s name to be recorded as "literate" (Kaul,
1912). It is suggested in the census report that this would mostly affect people
who were able to read religious texts. From 1911 onwards, the definition became
more strict: "[a] person should not be entered as literate unless he can write a
letter to a friend and read the answer to it". While this change in definition makes
the literacy numbers not directly comparable, the inclusion of year-effects in my
econometric specification can account for the effect of this administrative change
that was common to all units of observation. While differences in enumerator
practices are unlikely to produce systematic measurement error, I choose not to
include 1901 in the sample for the main results. However, I use the 1901 data
to estimate pre-treatment effects.25 A second measurement concern relates to
border changes. Certain districts were subject to boundary changes over the census
years. Merging or dropping the affected districts limits the number of observations
severely. The main analysis will focus on the literacy rates of the nominal districts,
but the appendix presents results for merged districts with constant borders that
are quantitatively very similar (see Table 2.10).
2.5 Empirical strategy
2.5.1 Main specification
To account explicitly for the possibility that the recruited communities enjoyed dif-
ferent levels of literacy, the main identification strategy is based on the comparison
of literacy rates in years before and after the war, for heavily and lightly recruited
communities. This approach could be interpreted as a continuous difference-in-
25Chaudhary (2010) does not include 1901 in her sample on the grounds that the 1901 data
on literacy would suffer from substantial variation across provinces in the methods adopted.
Given that I am focusing on just one province (i.e. Punjab), I expect the 1901 data to be
comparable in the cross-section and I expect the definition change to have proportional effects
that do not bias my results.
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difference analysis. The corresponding econometric specification is:
Log(literacyr,d,t) =
∑
τ=1921,31
βτ∗(casualtiesr,d,1911)∗I(t = τ)+ϕr,t+θr,d+εr,d,t (2.1)
Log(literacyr,d,t) is the logarithm of the male literacy rate of religion r in district
d in year t (1911, 1921, 1931).26 β1921 and β1931 are the key parameters of interest.
They measure the impact of the intensity of military recruitment, as proxied by the
casualty share, on subsequent literacy rates. ϕ(r,d) and θ(r,t)are respectively district-
religion and religion-year fixed effects. This specification accounts for omitted
variables at the district-religion level that do not change over time and time-varying
determinants of literacy that are specific to each one of the religious groups.
In Log(literacyr,d,t), the use of the literacy rate raises the concern that effects could
be driven by both the denominator (the total male population) instead of the nu-
merator (the total number of literates). To account for this possibility, the main
specification is repeated with the logarithm of the size of the male population as
a dependent variable. Furthermore, the logarithmic specification is used to make
estimates less dependent on observations with high literacy rates. This specifica-
tion seems appropriate given the large differences in the level of the dependent
variable in various districts (which is reflected in the large standard deviations on
the literacy rate in Table 2.1). This specification also ensures the proportionality
of all estimated effects; on theoretical grounds, one can expect the process that is
driving the creation of more literates to be multiplicative to the existing stock of
literates.27
The impact of military recruitment is captured by the coefficients βτ on the number
of war deaths as a proportion of the 1911 male population for a religious group
casualtiesr,d,1911. The estimation of two separate coefficients allows me to interpret
the timing of the effect. Given that full demobilisation was only reached in the
mid-twenties, one could expect β1931 to be higher than β1921.
26As recruitment practices were set out at the district-religion level, this is also the most natural
unit of observation in this context. In the main tables, I use standard errors adjusted for
clusters at the district-religion level, but using district level clusters instead does not affect
the significance of most results.
27The findings are robust to alternative functional specifications of the dependent variable, in-
cluding the use of literacy rates as level, a log-odds specification (which ensures full support
of the dependent variable) and the logarithm of the number of male literates.
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The religion-time fixed effects θ(r,t) account for factors determining literacy of
all communities of the same religion in the whole of Punjab. The inclusion of
religion-year effects (rather than just year-effects) can be justified because Muslim
communities were characterised by larger proportional increases in literacy rates
than Hindu-Sikh communities during the period under study. The distinctive
literacy characteristics of different religious groups are well documented.28
The fixed effects ϕ(r,d) account for unobservable determinants of literacy that re-
main constant over time at the district-religion level. The inclusion of district-
religion fixed effects may alleviate concerns that recruitment grounds were selec-
ted or that recruits could choose to join the army on the basis of unobserved
determinants of literacy.
In the results section, variations on the main specification will be presented to
address specific endogeneity concerns or to tease out the relevant channel.
2.5.2 Endogeneity
For the above main specification to yield causal estimates of the treatment effects,
I rely on three assumptions:
1. The recruitment patterns of the Indian army did not change substantially
over the course of the First WorldWar and reflected the demand side constraints
imposed by the British recruiters.
2. The selection of recruitment grounds was unrelated to the potential for lite-
racy improvements between 1921 and 1931.
3. The measurement error induced by using war casualties as a proxy for re-
cruitment is non-systematic and small.
Regarding the first assumption, the historical context provides evidence of the
persistence of recruitment patterns. The recruitment policies in place during the
First World War had been established in the second half of the 19th century, when
recruitment shifted towards the so-called ‘martial races’. The 1857 Sepoy mutiny
had justified a shift in the recruitment patterns away from high-caste Hindus from
present-day UP, who had constituted the core of the pre-mutiny army. The suppo-
sedly superior fighting skills of the martial races, who were predominantly living
28The 1921 and 1931 census reports discuss the causes of these different patterns in detail
(Marten, 1921 and Khan, 1932).
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in North-West India, were deemed to be crucial for the Indian Army to withs-
tand a Russian invasion of India.29 Recruitment handbooks, commissioned by the
Quartermaster-General, provided religion-specific assessments of the ‘martialness’
of the population at the district or even village level.30 The recruitment policy
also shaped the organisational structure of the Indian army, in which most batta-
lions were composed of men of the same caste, religion and region. Recruitment
policies from the late 19th century onwards helped to entrench the composition
of the army, because the army mainly relied on serving soldiers to identify “good
recruits” in their home villages. The result of this policy was that recruitment
patterns did not change substantially during the First World War. Hence, the
main effect of increased military recruitment during WWI was a demand shock for
military labour in those groups that had already been identified as good military
recruitment grounds.31
In support of this hypothesis of entrenched recruitment patterns, Figure 2.2 plots
war deaths before and after 1916 for each district-religion. I expect casualty num-
bers in the beginning of the war to reflect the pre-existing recruitment patterns. In
contrast, the casualty numbers in a later stage of the war could reveal shifts in the
recruitment pattern during the war. The linear pattern in Figure 2.2 supports the
hypothesis that recruitment patterns at the district-religion level remained stable
over the course of the war.32
29According to Mazumder (2005, p 16-17), the rationale behind the martial races theory included:
(1) a further justification to stop recruiting from disloyal groups implicated in the 1857
mutiny; (2) the increased need for troops that could engage in guerrilla war fare, for which
men living the North West were supposed to be the best pick; (3) Quartermaster-General
Frederick Robert’s personal prejudice, as he had himself only served in the North of India;
and (4) the fashionable trend in European anthropology to explore and exploit the intrinsic
qualities of different races.
30Falcon (1892) and Bingley (1897a, 1897b, 1899).
31’The bulk of the army was drawn from those classes which had traditionally been recruited’
(Cohen, 1971, p.69) Even though the recruitment grounds could not be met entirely by these
so-called traditional classes, the Indian Army kept on restricting recruitment rigidly: ’Of the
seventy-five new classes which the army recruited, many were either closely related to classes
already on the army list [...] and many were formerly recruited classes[...]’ (Ibid., p.73).
32War deaths before 1916 account for approximately 22% of all recorded military casualties who
originated from Punjab. The correlation between the casualty shares is 0.89.
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Figure 2.2: Time pattern of casualty shares at the district-religion level
Notes: Observations are at the district-religion level, for 56 districts and 2 religious
groups (Hindu-Sikh and Muslim). Casualty shares are relative to the 1911 population.
The second assumption paraphrases the common trend assumption. There is no
historical evidence that the British targeted communities that had a higher poten-
tial for literacy improvements over the period 1911-31. Praising the fighting skills
of Jat Sikhs, Falcon writes (1892, p.107):
“Hardy, brave and of intelligence too slow to understand when he is
beaten, obedient to discipline, devotedly attached to his officers [...],
he is unsurpassed as a soldier in the East [. . . ]”
It is interesting to note that the criteria were not just limited to caste or religion,
but also took into account the regional characteristics of potential recruits:
“The value of Sikh recruits and the characteristics they are likely to
show themselves possessed of, depends more upon the districts they
come from than upon the tribe they belong to” (Bingley, 1897, p61)
"The cultivation of sugar cane to any great extent seems to me to give
a softer character to the cultivator" (Falcon, 1892, p.83)
These recruitment handbooks suggest that recruitment officers relied on a multi-
tude of selection criteria that have no obvious connection with the potential for
literacy improvement. Besides, the selection of recruitment grounds took place
well before the First World War. Therefore, the historical evidence seems to jus-
tify the interpretation of the observed recruitment surge as an exogenous shock.
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For this reason, I rely on a standard (continuous) difference-in-difference specifica-
tion to derive my results. However, it remains possible that a few selection criteria
(such as sugar cane production) are correlated with determinants of human capital
formation in the period of this study. My analysis deals with these concerns in
two ways. First, Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 fail to find significant differences between
heavily and lightly recruited communities/districts for most relevant variables. As
a robustness check of the main results, time-effects of these baseline controls are
included to account for the possibility that military recruitment is merely picking
up the effect of another variable. Second, direct evidence of the validity of the
common trend assumption is provided by the estimation of a ‘pre-treatment’ ef-
fect that relies on observations between 1901 and 1911.
The third identifying assumption is that the error resulting from my proxy ap-
proach is orthogonal to the regressors. As a first check of the validity of the proxy,
the casualty data can be compared to independent sources of information. Of the
six districts of which the 1931 Census Report suggests that demobilised soldiers
may be boosting literacy rates, five have a proportion of military war deaths in the
1911 population that is above the median and the mean at the district level. The
assumption that casualties are proportional to recruitment can also be examined
explicitly at the Province level. Out of 50,935 casualties for which the records
provide information on the father and place of birth, 19,073 casualties could be
matched to Punjabi districts. Under the assumption that all remaining casualties
originated from other Provinces, the implied percentage of Punjabi soldiers in the
Indian Army was 37%. This percentage should slightly underestimate the actual
percentage of Punjabi recruits, as I assigned imprecise Punjabi records that did
not allow for matching to the other Provinces. Independent sources put the actual
percentage of Punjabi soldiers in the Indian Army between 39% and 44% during
the First World War.33 Therefore, the casualties at the state level appear to be
largely proportional to the underlying number of recruits.34 The proportionality of
war casualties could have been a direct result of strategic considerations. Historical
33Figures drawn from Mazumder (2003, p.18) and the CWGC Debt of Honour Register.
34Jha andWilkinson (2010) can compare recruitment estimates from the CWGC casualty records
to actual recruitment numbers for certain provinces, including Punjab, during the Second
World War. They find that casualty data are “broadly reflective” of recruitment patterns.
Areas with an intermediate recruitment intensity were underrepresented in these casualty
numbers. Unfortunately, I cannot assess to which extent this conclusion carries through to
WWI. Nevertheless, the results presented in this paper are robust to a variety of alternative
specifications (including an analysis based on recruitment quantiles rather than a continuous
measure).
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evidence indicates that the Indian Army deliberately sent representative units on
its foreign missions.35 Based on its experience from the Sepoy mutiny, the Indian
army made regiments sufficiently heterogeneous to limit the risk of mutiny. Hence,
regiments would typically recruit from different districts (and sometimes even re-
ligions). In support of the idea that the Indian Government sent “representative”
units on its foreign missions, I find that the regiments for which I observe Punjabi
casualties recruited on average from at least 10 different Punjabi districts. A final
concern regarding the proxy approach is that literate soldiers faced different pro-
babilities of death. However, Indian soldiers could not typically rise to the rank
of officer during WWI (Mazumder, 2003). Therefore, literate soldiers should not
have faced dramatically different hazards in battle than illiterate soldiers.36 For
all these reasons, I rely on a proxy approach in the main results. However, in
recognition of the remaining concerns related to measurement error, I also present
IV results that should not suffer from bias due to measurement error. The IV
approach takes the early assessments of British officers seriously and uses these as
an instrument for the observed WWI casualty share. If the first two identifying
assumptions hold, the IV estimates will be unbiased. The IV estimates should also
remain unaffected by temporary economic conditions that could affect recruitment
during the World War.37
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main specification
The results from the baseline specification can be found in Table 2.3. Column (1)
shows that an increase in the casualty share by 0.1 per 100 of the male population
is associated with an increase in the literacy rate by 4.6 per cent (proportional).
Based on a back of the envelope calculation, this implies that for 1 additional
recruit per 100 of the male population, the literacy rate increases by 2.4 per cent
35This argument is put forward by Jha and Wilkinson (2011).
36See appendix for robustness checks based on rank.
37One final caveat to this identification strategy is that the selection of recruits within districts
(or religious communities in a given district) is not random. At the level of individuals,
recruitment was targeted at young and healthy men of particular castes. Similarly, within
the groups who qualified for recruitment, the poorest individuals were most likely to enlist.
While this within-group selection is relevant for the interpretation of the treatment effect, it
does not invalidate the identification strategy, which relies on the comparison between groups.
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in 1931.38 Evaluated at the sample mean, this corresponds to an increase of three
additional literate males per thousand of the male population.
Table 2.3 also provides the first piece of evidence on the mechanism. In columns
(2) and (3), the baseline regression is run for two age groups separately: over-
20-year-old males and under-20-year-old males.39 While military war deaths are
not associated with significant literacy improvements for the under-20-year-olds
(column 3), the over-20-year-olds in recruited communities improved their literacy
significantly relative to other communities (column 2). The fact that over-20-year-
olds are driving the main results supports the hypothesis that direct skill acqui-
sition is a key mechanism through which military recruitment improved literacy.
If the improvements in literacy are driven by the return of demobilised soldiers
to their home communities, then we should only expect literacy to improve for
men above military age and for the impact to be visible immediately after the
war (in 1921). If over-20-year olds would see their literacy improve in response
to higher earnings, one would expect to see a similar (if not a stronger) effect on
under-20-year olds, as they have the lowest opportunity cost of acquiring literacy
skills through education. The further increase in the literacy rate from 1921 to
1931 is consistent with the fact that complete demobilisation was only reached
after 1921. The estimated returns to military service are large in economic terms.
Chaudhary (2009, 2010) highlights the limited effectiveness and efficiency of the
public education system in terms of improving adult literacy. In this context, it is
particularly striking that military service was able to improve adult literacy.
The right-hand-side columns confirm that military recruitment did not have an
impact on the size of the population, which addresses the concern that the observed
effects on literacy rate are driven by changes in the denominator. One reason for
why war casualties had a limited direct impact on the aggregate population size
is that the casualty rate remained relatively low (on average, 1 out of 18 recruited
soldiers were recorded as a war casualty in the Debt of Honour Register).
38I assume an equal probability of dying and divide the number of Punjabi men recruited for
overseas service (app. 360,000) by the number of Punjabi war deaths (app. 19,000) to obtain
an estimate of the number of recruited soldiers corresponding to one war death (18.94).
39One caveat on the analysis of these numbers for different age groups is that a large proportion
of respondents would typically not know their age. The resulting measurement error is likely
to be classical (Chaudhary, 2010).
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Table 2.3: Baseline specification
Log(male literacy rate) Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.33** 0.40** 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.14
*1921 (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Casualty share 0.47* 0.50** 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.09
*1931 (0.24) (0.20) (0.33) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
28 districts, for three census years (1911-31). Casualty shares are expressed per 100 of the
1911 male population. All regressions include district-religion fixed effects and religion-year
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 2.4: Pre-treatment effect
Log(male literacy rate) Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.02 0.10 -0.13 -0.37*** -0.34** -0.41***
*1911 (0.11) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Casualty share 0.32* 0.47*** -0.09 -0.21 -0.18 -0.24
*1921 (0.17) (0.15) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
Casualty share 0.41 0.52** 0.07 -0.23 -0.21 -0.28
*1931 (0.26) (0.22) (0.40) (0.30) (0.28) (0.31)
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
26 districts, for four census years (1901-31). All regressions include district-religion fixed
effects and religion-year effects. Rawalpindi and Attock are omitted from this analysis because
of substantial border changes. Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In Table 2.4, the sample is restricted to allow for the estimation of a ‘pre-treatment
effect’ by including the first census years.40 While the use of the 1901 census data
gives rise to additional measurement concerns (as discussed in section 2.4), the
results are in line of earlier findings. Most importantly, the pre-treatment effect
on the male literacy rate is estimated to be insignificant and close to zero, which
addresses the concern that the casualty share could be picking up an existing trend.
The estimates in columns (4)-(6) show that higher war deaths are associated with
a significant decline in the male population relative to other districts. This effect is
due to the fact that none of the districts with canal colonies were heavily recruited
(as shown in Table 2.2), while these canal colonies attracted large numbers of
immigrants over the period 1901-11. This effect disappears as soon as year-effects
for the canal status of a district are included in the regression, while the results
on the literacy rate remain very similar.41 The absence of a pre-treatment effect
on literacy rates adds credibility to the common trend assumption that underlies
my identification strategy.
2.6.2 Public spending and education
To rule out the possibility that investments in education by the District Boards are
driving my results, this section analyses the extent to which education expenditures
can explain the observed literacy patterns. Three outcome variables are considered:
total primary school expenditures, the net expenditures on primary education, and
the number of native-language students enrolled in public and private schools. If
recruited districts were successful in attracting more educational investment by
the local authorities after the war, one would expect a positive effect on these
expenditures. If military service created a demand shock for education, this should
be reflected in the number of students.
As school expenditure and student data are only available at the district level,
the variables of interest were aggregated at the district level instead of at the
district-religion level.
40The complete version (including the year effects) of Table 2.3 is reported in appendix
subsection 2.9.2. The table clearly show that Muslims and Hindus enjoyed different lite-
racy patterns: while Hindu communities were on a decreasing literacy trend between 1911
and 1921 (which followed an existing decreasing trend between 1901 and 1911, results not
reported), Muslim literacy improved steadily over the sample period. The census reports offer
detailed explanations of these general trends (Kaul, 1912; Marten, 1921; and Khan, 1932).
41Results with inclusion of these controls are reported at the district level in Table 2.9.
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Table 2.5: Expenditures on education
Primary education
Log(Primary
expenditure rate)
Log(Net primary
expenditure rate)
Log(share of
primary students)
(1) (2) (3)
Casualty share*1921 -0.50* -0.44 -0.24
(0.27) (0.29) (0.28)
Casualty share*1931 (0.41) -0.41
(0.51) (0.54)
Observations 84 83 40
Notes: Observations are at the district level for three census years (1911-31) for column 1 and
2. Column (3) includes 20 districts that provide data on students for 2 years (1914-21).
Casualty shares are expressed per 100 of the 1911 male population. All regressions include
district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.5 relies on the main specification (now estimated at the district level) to
examine the association between military war deaths and primary education ex-
penditures.42 Column (1) of Table 2.5 uses total spending on primary education
at the district level as the dependent variable. This column shows that the evolu-
tion of spending on primary education bears little relationship to the proportion
of military war deaths to the 1911 population. If anything, heavily recruited dis-
tricts spent less on primary schooling after the war. This finding goes against the
hypothesis that the colonial authorities targeted education spending to heavily re-
cruited districts. To the contrary, the Government of India may have feared that
too much educational investment in the recruitment zones could undermine the
recruitment potential of these regions by improving the outside options of pros-
pective soldiers. The results on net expenditures on primary education (column 2)
remain close to those obtained in column (1), which reflects the fact that fees only
accounted for a small fraction of total spending on primary education. Column (3)
42Chaudhary (2009 and 2010) argues that literacy in colonial India mainly depended on the
availability of primary schools, which suggest that this category of expenditures is most
relevant. The results are robust to the use of total (net) education spending by the District
Boards instead of primary education spending.
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presents a difference-in-difference analysis of student enrolment between 1914 and
1921 and shows a negative but non-significant impact of military recruitment on
the number of students in vernacular primary schools (both in public and private
education).43
Table 2.6: Controlling for education at the district level
Log(male literacy rate)
All ages Over 20 Under 20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Casualty share 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.64*** 0.33* 0.26
*1921 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.25)
Casualty share 0.49* 0.51** 0.47* 0.54* 0.50* 0.45
*1931 (0.24) (0.28) (0.23) (0.27) (0.29) (0.36)
Log(Primary 0.02 -0.04 0.19*
expenditure
rate) (0.07) (0.06) (0.097)
1911 Primary
expenditures -
year effects Yes Yes Yes
1914 student
share - year
effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Notes: Observations are at the district level for three census years (1911-31). Casualty shares
are expressed per 100 of the 1911 male population. All regressions include district fixed effects
and year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
The hypothesis that public investment in education is not driving earlier findings is
further confirmed in Table 2.6. The findings from this specification are in line with
earlier results, even though the analysis is now conducted at the district level.44
43Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate student enrolment data for years after 1922.
Even for 1921, the information is incomplete. However, the main result on the relationship
between the casualty share and literacy holds for the districts included in column (3), i.e. the
subsample of 20 districts that provide enrolment data for 1921 (results not reported).
44As the control variables considered in this section only vary at the district level, I use the
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In the odd columns, contemporaneous spending on primary education is included
as a control in the main regression. This specification checks if the observed ef-
fects of war deaths can be explained by expenditures on public primary education.
The even columns allow for initial investment in education (in 1911) and student
enrolment rates (in 1914) to have a year-specific effect on literacy outcomes. This
specification addresses the concern that recruited districts had already attracted
preferential investments in education before the war. The interaction between ini-
tial spending on education and year dummies allows for a delayed impact of initial
investments on literacy rates. The main results are robust to the inclusion of
year effects for 1914 student enrolment. The positive relationship between educa-
tion spending and literacy in column (5) is consistent with Chaudhary’s evidence
(2010). In conclusion, the results on public expenditures on education indicate
that education expenditures are unlikely to drive the observed improvements in
the human capital stock of recruited communities relative to lightly recruited com-
munities.
In conclusion, the results presented in this section seem most consistent with direct
skill acquisition by serving soldiers. While the aggregate impact could include spill-
overs to wider community, the size of the effect is not larger than the total number
of recruits. Therefore, the results are consistent with the impact being limited
to soldiers. Further analysis suggested that recruited districts were not directly
targeted by investments in education. Nor is there evidence of stronger demand for
education in the recruited districts. The fact that military recruitment did not lead
to strong inter-generational spill-overs or to higher public spending on education
may have limited the long-run distributional impact of military recruitment in
Punjab.
2.7 Robustness
In this section I discuss the robustness of the results presented earlier in more
detail. First, I return to the identification of the main result and present an
alternative IV approach. Second, I go over confounding policies and alternative
explanations for the results presented earlier.
district-level average literacy rate as the dependent variable. However, the coefficients on
war casualties are similar (and more precisely estimated) when these regressions are run at
the District-Religion level.
80
2.7 Robustness
2.7.1 An IV approach
The historical evidence presented in section 2.5 and the insignificance of pre-
treatment effects justified an identification strategy based on raw proxies for mili-
tary recruitment. As a further robustness check, I present an instrumental variable
(IV) approach based on the classification of districts in terms of their recruitment
potential by British recruitment officers. My key source of information for this
exercise is a set of publications by Captain A. H. Bingley, who wrote detailed
handbooks for the recruitment of Sikhs and Dogras (Bingley, 1897, 1899).45 Ba-
sed on the qualification of districts in these publications, I construct an indicator
variable to measure “recruitment suitability”. For recruitment suitability to be a
valid instrument, it needs to be correlated with the proxy for military recruitment
and it cannot influence the observed literacy pattern through any other channel
than through military recruitment (as proxied by war deaths). Given that the
recruitment officers were led in the first place by a wish to identify the best figh-
ting races, regardless of their average willingness to enlist, one could expect the
classifications made by these officers to have no relationship with the determi-
nants of literacy in these Hindu-Sikh communities. Moreover, the assessments of
recruitment suitability were made well before the start of the First World War.
The information provided by Bingley differs for each publication. For Sikhs, Bin-
gley reports a ranking of tahsils (sub-districts) based on their suitability for mi-
litary recruitment (ranging from “very good” to “very bad”). I create a score for
each tahsil within a district, ranging from 0-1 (where 1 corresponds to “very good”)
and I use the average score. For Dogra recruits, information is only available on
which tahsils make the “best” recruitment grounds (without further distinction).
I assign a district “1” to each district containing a tahsil that was considered as
a top recruitment ground. Since Bingley’s detailed assessments are only available
for Hindu-Sikhs, I have to limit the IV analysis to this religious group.46
The set of instruments will include the levels of the recruitment suitability variables
for Hindus (hr,d) and Sikhs (sr,d). The relationship between “recruitment suita-
bility” and the observed casualty rate should depend on the relative size of each
religious group. As the casualty rate is measured relative to the entire Hindu-Sikh
population, the relevance of the classification of a given group for the district-level
45Both Dogras and Brahmins are Hindu castes.
46The average score for Sikhs is 0.34, the average score for Dogras is 0.11, the average Sikh
fraction in the Hindu-Sikh population is 0.27.
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casualty rate will depend on the relative size of the group. Therefore, I include
interactions of the suitability indicators with the fraction of Sikhs in the 1911
Hindu-Sikh population (fd,11). The set of instruments will consist of the suitabi-
lity variables and their interactions with the relative size of the Sikh population.
The resulting first stage regression is given by:
Casd,11 = λ0 +λ1fd,11 +λ2hd +λ3hd ∗ fd,11 +λ4sr,d +λ5sr,d ∗ fd,11 + εd,11 (2.2)
In this equation, the r subscript is dropped as I can only include Hindu-Sikhs. The
construction of the instrumental variables implies that the first stage equation has
to control for year effects of the 1911 Sikh fraction. Including this variable also
addresses concerns that the suitability variables are merely picking up the relative
size of one subgroup that was over-recruited. A 2SLS regression of the change in
literacy rates relative to 1911 is run separately for 1921 and 1931.
4y = ϕ+ {βτ ĉasd,11 + γτfd,11}+ vd (2.3)
Table 2.7 presents the results of the IV approach. The first stage in column (3)
confirms the relevance of the instrument. In the IV results, the coefficient on
the casualty share retains its significance and its magnitude is higher than in the
OLS results.47 These findings suggest that if the OLS estimate is biased, the bias
is downwards rather than upwards. Of course, the instrumentation approach is
only valid if the initial selection of recruitment grounds is exogenous. I cannot
fully rule out the possibility that recruitment officers selected communities on
criteria that led to subsequent literacy development. Hence, this robustness check
mainly addresses the endogeneity concerns that relate to the proxy approach and
endogeneous selection into the army due to time-varying factors during the First
World War. However, the IV results are consistent with attenuation bias being
the main endogeneity concern.
47Based on an overidentification test, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are
exogenous (the p-value on the Hansen J statistic is 0.26 for 1921 and 0.76 for 1931). The
substantially higher IV estimates could also capture a local average treatment effect or they
could be due to the instruments being insufficiently strong.
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Table 2.7: IV approach
4Log(MaleLiteracy) Casualty share
(per 100)
OLS
(1)
IV (2SLS)
(2)
First Stage
(3)
Casualty share*1921 0.60** 1.10***
(0.26) (0.34)
Casualty share*1931 0.78** 1.31*
(0.37) (0.72)
Hindu Suitability 0.19***
(0.05)
Hindu Suitability -0.28
* Sikh Fraction (0.30)
Sikh Suitability -0.11
(0.18)
Sikh Suitability 0.73*
* Sikh Fraction (0.42)
F-statistic 8.04
Observations 28 28 28
Notes: Observations include Hindu-Sikh communities in 28 districts. Coefficients are reported
for the change in log-literacy rates relative to 1911. The 1911 Sikh fraction is controlled for
columns (1) and (2), and (3). See text and Equation 2.2 for a description of the instruments.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. The IV results use 2SLS with a small sample
adjustment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.7.2 Further robustness checks
In this subsection, I go over certain alternative explanations of the observed effects
that are suggested by the historical literature. In response to these challenges, this
section also presents two alternative specifications of the main regressions which
help to counter these arguments.
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2.7.2.1 District level controls
Table 2.8: Baseline results with district-year effects
Log(male literacy rate) Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.26* 0.26* 0.21 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06
*1921 (0.15) (0.14) (0.21) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Casualty share 0.73*** 0.60*** 0.94*** -0.12 0.01 -0.26**
*1931 (0.24) (0.22) (0.32) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
District-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: Observations are at the district-religion level for three census years (1911-31). All
regressions include district-religion fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
One way to check if any policy that affected districts rather than religious commu-
nities can explain the observed pattern in literacy rates is to include district-year
effects in the main regression. These effects fully absorb the impact of all district-
level variables that affected both communities to the same extent. The availability
of transport and trade infrastructure could be one example of an omitted variable
that mainly operates at the district level.48 Of course, a key concern of this ap-
proach is that religious communities are affected differentially by these investments,
even though I estimate proportional effects by relying on a semi-log-specification.
48Given its strategic importance, Punjab received significant investments in its transport infra-
structure. Due to its geographical closeness to the North West Frontier, it was an area that
in itself was of great military importance. This was the primary motivation for the British to
invest strongly in roads, railways and cantonments. Lines of communication and supply were
essential in case of an emergency at the frontier. In 1931, the North Western Railway System
accounted for 23% of the total open mileage in India totalling 7,092 miles (Mazumder, 2003,
p.56). In contrast, Punjab and the North West Frontier province accounted for less than 12%
of India’s total area and population. More than one third of these lines were built out of
military needs. Similarly, Punjab benefited from major investments in its road network at the
end of the 19th century. These investments in infrastructure are not restricted to recruited
communities nor do they target these communities in particular: by 1911, all but two districts
were connected to the railroad network (Marten, 1911, Census Report). Therefore, it seems
unlikely that differential investment in transport infrastructure is driving my earlier findings.
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Another concern in my relatively small panel is that relevant variation is lost be-
cause those districts with similar recruitment intensities for both religions are no
longer used to identify the main effect. Subject to these caveats, the results pre-
sented in Table 2.8 are broadly consistent with earlier findings. One difference
with earlier findings is that the coefficient on the casualty ratio in 1931 gains
significance for under-20-year-olds. This result suggests that inter-generational
spill-overs could previously have been obscured by variables affecting literacy at
the district level. However, the immediate impact remains only significant for
over-20-year-olds. It should also be noted that the size of the population under-
20-years-old decreases significantly in column (6), which implies that the observed
increase in the literacy rate for under-20-year-olds could partly reflect a decrease
in the denominator.
85
Chapter 2 Military Service and Human Capital Accumulation
Table 2.9: District level controls
Log(male literacy rate)
All ages Over 20 Under 20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Casualty
share*1921 0.45** 0.41* 0.51** 0.46** 0.24 0.27
(0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.36) (0.37)
Casualty
share*1931 0.60*** 0.65*** 0.57* 0.60*** 0.67*** 0.75***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.17)
Baseline Controls-
year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration, area,
and population
controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Notes: observations are at the district level for three census years (1911-31). “Baseline
controls- year effects” include year effects of the 1911 value of proportion of the Hindus in the
male population, the proportion of Sikhs, the proportion of Muslims (with other religions
omitted), population density, colony status, primary education expenditures per capita,
primary fees per capita, primary school students per capita, and the fraction of the male
population born in the district of enumeration. Even columns includes contemporary values of
the logarithm of the district area, the logarithm of the size of the relevant age population, and
the fraction of the population born in the district. District fixed effects and year effects are
also included. See Table 2.2 for summary statistics. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 2.9, the main regression is presented at the district level with both year
effects for baseline controls (odd columns) and additional contemporary controls
(even columns). These results are remarkably similar to those obtained in Table 2.8.
This results address concerns that the significant baseline differences in district-
level variables (as reported in Table 2.2) can account for the positive coefficients
on the casualty share.
86
2.7 Robustness
2.7.2.2 Alternative explanations
Throughout the analysis, the potential impact of military recruitment on the total
size of the population was carefully examined. This analysis could not uncover
strong impacts, which makes it unlikely that the main effect of military recruitment
on literacy was through a demographic channel. Nevertheless, a very specific type
of demographic shocks could still affect the results.49 A first key source of concern is
the possibility that heavily recruited communities faced different survival rates for
literates versus illiterates. Unfortunately, the census category of over-20-year-olds
is too broad to distinguish between a higher survival rate of individuals who are
already literate or the growth in the number of new individuals who can both read
and write. However, all findings are robust to using the logarithm of the number
of literates instead of the literacy rates.50 This implies that military recruitment
should have a positive impact on the survival of literates to confound the main
results. Hence, the most likely drivers of differential demographic trends can be
ruled out, including higher mortality in recruited communities as a direct result of
military service or delayed demobilisation. Furthermore, any confounding factor
that has a positive impact on the size of the literate population should mainly
affect the recruited communities (even within the same district) and mainly affect
the population of male over-20-year-olds to be consistent with the results. Only if
an alternative shock satisfies this restrictive set of conditions, it can bias the main
results. A second differential demographic shock could be due to migration. If more
literates moved into recruited districts (perhaps in the hope of being recruited),
they could boost the number of literates in their new home districts. Again, this
would require only literates to immigrate. The regressions in Table 2.9 controlled
explicitly for migration movements.
A second set of alternative explanations for my findings relate to my interpretation
of the results in terms of the main mechanisms. It is possible that, on top of the
main channels on which my analysis has focused, other (more indirect) channels
were important. In his detailed historical account, Mazumder provides historical
evidence on a wide range of policies that were to some extent related to Punjab’s
status as a military recruitment ground. A first policy directly targeted recruited
49Epidemics (including the Spanish flu of 1918) hit Punjab at a regular basis throughout the
sample period.
50In the absence of significant effects on the aggregate population, this is not a key concern for
the main results and this robustness check is not reported. However, some results in the
appendix (A.1.) point at negative impacts on the size of the population. For these results,
the alternative specification using the number of literates is reported in the tables.
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soldiers. Soldiers were among the main beneficiaries of land grants in the so-called
canal colonies. These colonies contained newly created tracts of cultivable land
irrigated by canals. The primary aim of these projects was to generate more re-
venue by developing potentially fertile areas and moving some of the population
away from densely populated regions to the newly established colonies (Mazumder,
2003, p.66).51 Even though most canalisation projects were completed before the
war, Mazumder notes that soldiers were given preference in the allocation of new
tracts of land after WWI. This policy is unlikely to lead to an upward bias of our
estimates, as ex-soldiers who moved to the colonies would dampen the extent to
which recruited communities would have benefited from improvements in literacy.
A second policy that directly benefited recruited districts was taxation after the
war. The main source of income of the Raj came in the form of taxes on agri-
culture. These taxes were laid down in so-called revenue assessments. Descriptive
evidence suggests that, mainly after WWI, heavily recruited districts enjoyed more
favourable assessments. I do not think this policy is driving the results, given that
it was only implemented after the war and there is evidence of a positive impact
from 1921 onwards. However, this channel may have caused spill-overs of military
service on household incomes in the home communities. A third policy that may
have affected recruited communities is the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1901),
which protected agricultural castes (among whom mainly martial races) from in-
debtedness by outlawing land sales from agricultural to non-agricultural castes.52
While the families of recruited soldiers could have benefited from the Land Alie-
nation Act, the Act applied to a wider set of agricultural castes in the whole of
Punjab and not just to those that delivered recruits. Also, the Act was imple-
mented well before First World War. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the results
presented earlier are merely capturing a different human capital development path
for the communities that benefited most from the Land Alienation Act.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper exploited the exogenous increase in military recruitment during the
First World War to estimate the impact of recruitment on human capital accumu-
51By 1931, Punjab had 9,929,219 acres of land irrigated by government canals, which corresponds
to 46% of land irrigated by canals in the whole of British India.
52See Cassan (2011) for a detailed description of the Punjab Land Alienation Act and the
incentives it created to manipulate caste identity.
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lation. My results suggest that ten additional recruits per thousand of the 1911
male population were on average associated with three more literate males per
thousand in 1931. Further analysis suggests that this improvement in the human
capital stock was mainly driven by direct skill acquisition. There is weak evidence
that military recruitment also raised the literacy rate of children, in particular
in 1931, but this result is not robust across specifications. However, no evidence
could be found of preferential spending on primary education in heavily recruited
districts. These results on inter-generational spill-overs and on public investments
put bounds on the long-run distributional impact of military recruitment in this
context. While the proxy approach of this paper gave rise to certain econometric
concerns, it does have the interpretational benefit of highlighting a substantial cost
to the observed improvements in literacy. The estimates suggest that for every six
additional literates per thousand, one Punjabi soldier gave his life. The fact that
volunteer soldiers made this implicit trade-off is suggestive of the harsh economic
conditions that the Indian population faced during this period.
Earlier work on public education in colonial India has highlighted the failure of
the public education system to teach lasting literacy skills to its students. In
this context, it is striking that military service improved literacy outcomes for
adults. One interpretation of this result is that the military provided a unique
environment in which the personal returns to education (including the ability to
communicate with one’s family) were boosted and the costs of acquiring literacy
skills were strongly reduced. Obviously, this paper does not promote war-time
military service as an alternative to public education. However, the results of this
paper could inspire more peaceful adult literacy programmes. Such programmes
could offer non-traditional learning environments that strongly change both the
returns to literacy and the costs of acquiring these skills. In the light of the poor
quality of public education in many developing countries, non-traditional learning
environments could prove to be powerful complements to the public education
system, in particular for adult learners.
Finally, this paper is one of the first studies to confirm the long-standing hypo-
thesis that disadvantaged groups could benefit substantially from military service.
Such evidence on the returns to military service could be important for policy
makers who design military recruitment policies. It is interesting to note that
post-independence India has moved away from the old recruitment patterns, but
it only did so in the course of the 1970s. A simple archive search reveals that
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military recruitment policies are now regularly discussed in the Indian Lok Sabha.
This paper indicates that military recruitment policies could have important distri-
butional impacts. Therefore, the political salience of military recruitment policies
could be well justified.
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2.9 Appendix to Chapter 2
2.9.1 Further robustness checks
Robustness to border changes
Table 2.10: Baseline specification for merged districts
Log(male literacy
rate)
Log(male literates) Log(male
population)
Over 20
(1)
Under 20
(2)
Over 20
(3)
Under 20
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.60*** 0.38 0.45** 0.22 -0.15 -0.16*
*1921 (0.22) (0.35) (0.19) (0.35) (0.13) (0.09)
Casualty share 0.91*** 1.07*** 0.87*** 0.90*** -0.04 -0.18
*1931 (0.31) (0.37) (0.36) (0.39) (0.26) (0.25)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
16 merged districts, for three census years (1911-31). Standard errors are clustered at the
district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The districts analysed in this paper were subject to several border changes of the
period under consideration. While most of these border changes were small and
are not expected to affect the literacy rate systematically, this section explores the
robustness of the main findings to accounting more explicitly for border changes.
In Table 2.10, I conduct the analysis at the level of merged districts with stable
borders. The main results carry through, but there is some evidence in these
adjusted samples of negative impacts of military recruitment on the size of the
population. To address the concern that the impacts on literacy are reflecting
changes in the composition of the population, the main results are also shown
for the logarithm of the number of male literates rather than the corresponding
literacy rates in columns (3) and (4).
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Inclusion of Princely States
As reported in section 2.4, the Princely States were omitted from the main analy-
sis for reasons of comparability and data availability. In this section, I show that
the main results are robust to the inclusion of the princely states in the analysis.
Table 2.11 repeats the main analysis with the inclusion of all religion-districts in
Princely states (excluding the Simla Minor Hill States, of which the composition
changes over time). These results are quantitatively smaller and no longer signi-
ficant. However, it turns out that these results are sensitive to the inclusion of
outlying small communities (for which we expect the data to be particularly un-
reliable). Omitting those Princely State communities with a male population of
less than 4,000 individuals in 1911 (all British districts have substantially larger
communities), the results become very similar to earlier findings (Table 2.12).
Table 2.11: Baseline specification with Princely States
Log(male literacy
rate)
Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.19 0.26 -0.17 0.12 0.12 0.14
*1921 (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Casualty share 0.22 0.26 -0.10 0.05 0.04 0.05
*1921 (0.23) (0.19) (0.32) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
45 districts/Princely states, for three census years (1911-31). The regression includes
district-religion fixed effects and religion-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.12: Baseline specification with Princely States (2)
Log(male literacy
rate)
Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.29 0.35* -0.03 0.14 0.14 0.14
*1921 (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Casualty share 0.41* 0.42** 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.07
*1931 (0.22) (0.18) (0.29) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Observations 249 249 249 249 249 249
Notes: District-religion level observations for religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) of which
the male population exceeds 4,000 individuals, in 42 districts/Princely states, for three census
years (1911-31). The regression includes district-religion fixed effects and religion-year effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Rank Analysis
Table 2.13: Baseline specification for soldier rank casualties
Log(male literacy
rate)
Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.50** 0.60** 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.19
*1921 (0.24) (0.23) (0.32) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
Casualty share 0.68* 0.71** 0.48 0.12 0.13 0.10
*19231 (0.35) (0.30) (0.48) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
28 districts, for three census years (1911-31). All regressions include district-religion fixed
effects and religion-year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In the empirical strategy (section 2.5), it was argued that the proxying approach is
unlikely to assign higher “recruitment intensities” to communities with increasing
literacy rates. In particular, it was argued that literate soldiers should not have
faced a different casualty pattern than illiterate soldiers. In further support of
this hypothesis, I can distinguish between casualties from three categories of army
ranks: soldiers, above-soldier ranks and military personnel in supportive roles.
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between pure soldier casualties and casualties
among higher ranks at the district-religion level. This figure confirms that the
geographical pattern of casualties is similar across ranks. An alternative explana-
tion of the key results could have been that higher ranks were driving this impact.
This could be the case if higher ranks were recruited from regions with a higher
potential for literacy improvement and if they had different casualty patterns (at
the district-religion level) than the lower ranks. Under the latter scenario, the
proxy approach would lead to an upward bias of the impact of military recruit-
ment. However, the similarity of the recruitment patterns suggest that this is an
unlikely scenario. Table 2.13 further confirms that the key results are robust to
relying on casualty rates for strict soldier roles (excluding higher ranks and other
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groups).
Figure 2.3: Higher ranks versus soldier ranks
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Cohort Analysis
Table 2.14: Baseline specification for cohort changes
Log(male literacy rate over 20/male literacy ratet−110 to 20)
(1) (2)
Casualty share 0.49*** 0.50**
*1921 (0.17) (0.21)
Casualty share 0.37**
*1931 (0.17)
District FE Y
District-religion
FE Y
Religion-year
effects Y
Religion
dummy Y
Observations 56 166
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
28 districts, in 1921 (1) or for three census years 1911-31 (2). Standard errors are clustered at
the district-religion level in (3). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
It was argued in section 2.6 that the results are most consistent with the direct
acquisition of literacy skills by serving soldiers. Under this hypothesis, we should
observe that the cohort that served in the war gained additional literacy skills
during the war. It should be noticed that the earlier analysis did not correspond
to a cohort analysis, as I compared the same age groups at different points in
time (which allows the composition of these groups to change). The split up of
literacy rates provided in the census does not allow for a detailed cohort analysis
in different age categories. However, I can construct a variable that approximates
the literacy changes for the cohorts of 10-to-20-year-olds in 1901, 1911 and 1921:
yr,d,t = log(literacyover20r,d,t )− log(literacy10to20r,d,t−1)
This variable does not correspond to the actual cohort-specific change in literacy
rates, as I need to use the broader category of over-20- year-olds.
Table 2.14 examines whether the main results are confirmed in a cohort analysis.
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In column (1), district dummies are included to account for any determinants of the
cohort literacy gains that are district-specific. In column (2), I report difference-
in-difference estimates, which can account for time invariant determinants at the
district-religion level of the cohort-specific literacy gains. The results of the cohort
analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that military recruitment positively
affected the literacy of the cohort that served in the first world war.
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Female literacy
Table 2.15: Female literacy summary statistics
Sample Lightly
recruited
Heavily
recruited
P-value
Female literacy rate 1911 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.78
(0.018) (0.014) (0.024)
Observations 56 36 20
Notes: see Table 2.1.
The analysis presented here can also be applied to female literacy. In Table 2.15, I
present summary statistics for female literacy. The average level of female literacy
is very low, with certain communities virtually lacking any literate women. These
low literacy rates give rise to additional measurement concerns. Subject to this
caveat, Table 2.16 presents the baseline results for female literacy. The results in-
dicate that the impact of military recruitment on female literacy could have been
negative. This result could be consistent with the hypothesis that the loss of male
labour increases the opportunity cost of women in education, although the signi-
ficance of this negative coefficient is not robust to re-specifications. Furthermore,
the estimated impact of recruitment on female literacy evaluated at the sample
mean is neglegible from an economic perspective. Nevertheless, these negative co-
efficients are consistent with a scenario in which direct skill acquisition is the key
channel that explains improvements in male literacy in recruited communities.53
53While the results on female literacy could be interpreted as a “placebo” test of the direct skill
acquisition channel (which should only affect males), this interpretation should be subject
to an important caveat. Chaudhary (2010) finds that female literacy is less responsive to
educational investments than male literacy. Hence, the differential impact on male and female
literacy is not necessarily evidence against the income channel or supply-side channel. Besides,
the provision of a postal service to serving soldiers could in theory have spill-overs for women.
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Table 2.16: Female literacy baseline results
Log(female literacy
rate)
Log(female
population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share -0.60** -0.53** -0.74** 0.19 0.18 0.21
*1921 (0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
Casualty share 0.01 -0.08 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.13
*1931 (0.36) (0.32) (0.41) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
28 districts, for three census years (1911-31). All regressions include district-religion fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Heterogeneity
Table 2.17: Heterogeneity
Log(male literacy) Log(male population)
Over 20
(1)
Under 20
(2)
Over 20
(3)
Under 20
(4)
Casualty share 0.61** 0.37 0.15 0.14
*1921 (0.25) (0.32) (0.21) (0.22)
Casualty share 0.84** 0.75 0.09 0.07
*1931 (0.32) (0.49) (0.32) (0.34)
Casualty share -0.34 -0.53 -0.04 -0.00
*Muslim*1921 (0.31) (0.42) (0.33) (0.32)
Casualty share -0.59 -0.76 0.03 0.05
*Muslim*1931 (0.40) (0.66) (0.39) (0.42)
Observations 168 168 168 168
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or
Hindu-Sikh) in 28 districts, for three census years (1911-31). All regressions include
district-religion fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Given the data availability constraints, the district-religion level is the finest level
at which the analysis can be conducted. This approach also enables a comparison
between the treatment effects of Muslims and Hindu-Sikhs respectively.54 The
results presented in Table 2.17 suggest that the impact is largest for Hindu-Sikhs,
but the difference between the treatment effects is not statistically significant and,
for over-20-year-olds, the effect remains positive and large for Muslims.
54Chaudhary and Rubin (2010) highlight the importance of the proportion of Muslims in the
district to explain Muslim literacy levels in 1911 and 1921. The Punjabi districts under
consideration all have a Muslim population that is larger than 28% of the population and the
level effect of the share of Muslims reported by Chaudhary and Rubin should be captured by
the district(-religion) fixed effects in my approach.
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2.9.2 Complete baseline results
Table 2.18: Complete baseline results
Log(male literacy rate) Log(male population)
All ages
(1)
Over 20
(2)
Under 20
(3)
All ages
(4)
Over 20
(5)
Under 20
(6)
Casualty share 0.33** 0.40** 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.14
*1921 (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Casualty share 0.47* 0.50** 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.09
*1931 (0.24) (0.20) (0.33) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Muslim 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.15** 0.01 -0.00 0.02
*1921 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Muslim 0.37*** 0.32*** 0.47*** 0.07 0.06 0.07
*1931 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
1921 -0.08 -0.13*** 0.13** 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
1931 0.10 0.04 0.37*** 0.09 0.06 0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
Notes: District-religion level observations for two religious groups (Muslim or Hindu-Sikh) in
28 districts, for three census years (1911-31). Casualty shares are expressed per 100 of the
1911 male population. All regressions include district-religion fixed effects and religion-year
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district-religion level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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3 Coup-friendly Institutions and
Apolitical Militaries
A Theory of Optimal Military Influence
3.1 Introduction
Surprisingly, the civil-military institutions that historically governed the civil-
military relations of many countries simultaneously encouraged and discouraged
coups. In 1970, fourteen Latin American countries had constitutional clauses that
allowed the military to intervene in politics (Stepan, 1971). Also, the punishments
for the leaders of failed coups were (and are) often surprisingly low: the leader of
the failed 2000 coup in Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez, was allowed to run in the pres-
idential elections only three years later.1 Low punishments and institutionalised
legitimacy of coups seem to encourage political interventions of the military. These
coup-friendly institutions could reflect the view that the armed forces have a role
to play in controlling the executive power. At the same time, even in contexts in
which political institutions are "coup friendly", officers are typically not allowed
to openly engage in political debates. The latter institution clearly constrains the
political role of the military. This paper will explore the optimal design of civil-
military institutions, under the assumption that political elites or social planners
deem some control of the military over the executive power desirable.
This paper presents a model that rationalises observed civil-military institutions
such as the neutrality of the army and limited expected punishments for failed coup
leaders. The process of staging a coup will be modelled as a leader-follower game
between two different groups within the military. Both of these groups care about
1Shifter (2004).
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the quality of government in a general interest dimension, but they may differ on
a second, factional dimension (e.g. ethnic or ideological). Each group receives
an imperfect signal of the other group’s factional identity. The leader decides to
stage a coup attempt, but will only be successful if he is supported by the group
of followers. Hence, the gains from staging a coup will include the possibility
to oust a poorly performing government and the chance to promote a factional
agenda. These gains will be weighted against the expected costs of staging a failed
coup. By manipulating the expected costs associated with failed coup attempts,
civil-military institutions will be able to shape the military’s coup behaviour. The
welfare measure employed in this paper will assume that coups against poorly
performing governments should be encouraged, whereas coups targeting a well
performing government should be discouraged. According to this welfare criterion,
my model suggests that is never optimal to allow open political affiliations in the
military. Open affiliations will tend to promote coups driven by factional interests.
As a corollary, the military is expected to perform poorly if officers cannot hide
their political affiliations (e.g. in case of ethnic cleavages). However, the optimal
punishments for failed coup leaders vary. If the military is severely factionalised
in different political groups, then it may optimal to limit punishments for failed
coups to encourage the military to play its role as arbitrator in domestic politics.
In contrast, if political or ideological cleavages in the military are limited, then high
punishments for failed coup plotters are optimal. Further extensions of the baseline
model will account for endogenous communication, and the possibility of military
take-overs by an "extremist faction" (which is not preferred to a poorly performing
incumbent). This last extension highlights how a combination of factionalisation
and uncertainty about political views within the military can be an important
driver of the gradual demilitarisation of politics.
The paper contributes to a growing literature that models the influence of the mil-
itary over policy making. In a closely related contribution, Besley and Kudamatsu
(2007) focus on institutional design aimed at holding a government accountable for
its general interest policy in a divided "society". Whereas these authors compare
stylised autocracies with democracies, I focus specifically on the role of military
interventions and on normative implications for civil-military institutions. Sharing
my focus on military interventions, Besley and Robinson (2011) model the strate-
gic interaction between a civilian government and the military. In their set-up, the
size of the army and the decision to stage a coup are the key decision variables.
A central idea that my paper shares with these authors is the fact that the mili-
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tary is politicised, i.e. that the military does not just promote its own corporate
interests but is a mapping from society at large. A different model of military
interventions is developed by Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009). These au-
thors explore the moral hazard problem that arises when the elite empower the
military to repress democratisation attempts: a stronger military may want to
overthrow the elite. These authors assume that the military is always united and
driven by corporate interests (e.g. military spending), which is very different from
my assumption of a politicised and factionalised military. Leon (2009) focuses on
career options for a representative officer (in the army or in a military government)
and links coup behaviour to the frequency of wars.2 All these recent contributions
point at the rich interactions between coups and specific policy decisions, but they
mostly abstract from the mechanics of the coup process. This paper will anal-
yse the internal coup process within the military in more detail. A contribution
that shares my focus on the internal coup process is Sutter (2003). This author
models the coup process as a collective action problem, but he does not explore
the interaction between factionalisation, asymmetric information, and institutions.
The internal coup process is also the main focus of Geddes (2003), who models
coups as a simultaneous coordination problem between different factions in the
military. This author shares my focus on a factionalised military, but she does not
explore the impact of civil-military institutions and asymmetric information. In
contrast, Crescenzi (1999) highlights the importance of asymmetric information
in political transitions, although this author does not focus on military interven-
tions.3 While the existing literature has offered a rich insights on the factors that
could drive coup behaviour, including both internal characteristics of the army
and structural economic factors, it is striking that few models incorporate the idea
that the military is factionalised over political views. Nevertheless, a substantial
body of literature criticises the idea that the military can be considered as a uni-
tary actor.4 The information asymmetries that arise from hidden affiliations in
a factionalised military can easily account for (the risk of) failed coups, whereas
2Several authors have conducted empirical research on coups, but focusing on different questions
than mine. Such econometric analyses of coups can be found in Belkin and Schofer (2003),
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007), and Londregan and Poole (1990).
3This author models the decision to revolt by a domestic opposition who faces authoritarian
leaders of unknown types (hard-liner or soft-liner). Feaver (2003) models the agency prob-
lem that arises between a government and the military, but he does not focus on military
interventions.
4See for example Stepan (1971, p7), Finer (1962, p34-42), Fitch (1998, p109-110), Geddes
(2003), Loveman (1999, p207), and Philip (1974,p75-99 and 1985, p190).
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the existing literature tends to attribute failure to random events. This paper
places the politicised and factionalised nature of the armed forces at the heart of
its analysis. It explores the implications of this approach for the role and design
of civil-military institutions.
The paper is organised as follows. First, I will discuss certain stylized facts about
coup behaviour that the formal framework will incorporate. Second, I will infor-
mally describe the key assumptions, the mechanism and the main results of the
theoretical model. In a third section, the formal model will be introduced and its
results will be linked to relevant cases. The fourth section will present an extension
of the baseline model that offers a microfoundation of earlier assumptions. The
fifth section discusses two important extensions of the theoretical framework. The
sixth section offers further interpretations. In a final section, I will offer concluding
remarks.
3.2 Background
Most militaries do not allow officers to discuss politics: military officers are ex-
pected to remain "neutral" (Finer, 1962, p34).5 In several countries, this neutrality
is underlined by constitutional clauses. For instance, the 1982 Turkish constitution
does not only prevent military personnel from becoming elected deputies and be-
ing members of political parties, it also prohibits military personnel from voting at
all.6 This institutionalised neutrality makes it difficult for coup plotters to recog-
nise supporters. Hence, it discourages coups. While neutrality is the norm, there
are exceptions. Sometimes, political affiliations are difficult to hide, for instance
if the main political tensions are along ethnic lines (Luttwak, 1968, p59). There
is even one case in which political affiliations were deliberately open. In Brazil
during the 1950ies and 1960ies, military club elections were fought over political
issues and vote results were published in military journals (Stepan, 1971, p44).
Given that the neutrality of the military is common, it is surprising that a norm
for the military to abstain from intervening in politics was not wide-spread un-
til recently. In 1970, fourteen Latin American countries had constitutions that
implicitly allowed the military to intervene in politics (Stepan, 1971, p79). For
5Huntington (1981) also argues that civilian control over the army relies on an autonomous and
politically neutral army.
6Articles 67, 68 and 76 of the 1982 Turkish constitution.
106
3.2 Background
instance, the Brazilian constitution of 1946 stipulated the military to be "obedi-
ent" to the executive, but only "within the limits of the law". This clause was
interpreted to give the military the de jure power to intervene in politics as soon
as the government was considered to transgress "the limits of the law". In this
sense, the armed forces took on the role of a "Supreme Court". Surprisingly, the
clause was deliberately included in the Brazilian constitution by democratically
elected politicians because they considered the military to be a good custodian
of the state (Stepan, 1971, p79). These ideas may also explain the surprisingly
low punishments for failed coup leaders in several cases. The leaders of the failed
Brazilian coup of 1961 were the three generals who served as ministers of defence.
They were never prosecuted for their role in the coup and this mild punishment
was institutionalised, because their coup attempt could be considered as a lawful
"ministerial decision".7 Even if political institutions do not explicitly allow for mil-
itary control, military interventions often have a high degree of legitimacy. The
de facto role of the military as a "supreme court" could stem from a situation in
which political institutions are too weak to produce legitimate civilian arbitrators
in political conflicts. In line with this idea, a number of very recent military in-
terventions attracted strong popular support in Africa.8 However, the role of the
military in Latin America has clearly declined over the past decades. All Latin
American countries have now adopted new constitutions that curtail the role of
the military in politics (Einaudi, 1996).9 Similarly, Turkey has recently adopted
a package of constitutional amendments that increase executive control over the
army.10
The main aim of this paper is to investigate how these institutional settings affect
coup behaviour and which settings can be "optimal" from a social planner’s per-
spective. While the starting point of the paper will be that military control may
be desirable under certain conditions, the exercise will also highlight the tensions
that are inherent to the design of civil-military institutions. These tensions will
7Another example: Ramon Barquin, the Cuban colonel who staged a failed coup attempt
against president Battista in 1956, was sentenced to a mere six years in jail. (Bonachea et
al., 1974)
8In Madagascar the military installed president Rajoelina in 2009 in response to growing public
discontent (Ploch, 2009). In Egypt’s 2011 revolution, the army played a pivotal in ousting
Hosni Mubarak.
9In Peru, the 1993 constitution states explicitly that coups can never be legitimate: "Power
emanates from the people. [...] No person, organization, Armed Force [...] may arrogate to
themselves the exercise of such power. To do so constitutes rebellion or sedition." (Art.45)
10The Economist, "Erdogan wins again", 16 April 2010
(http://www.economist.com/node/17046653).
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be able to explain shifts away from legitimising military control over politics.
3.3 Theoretical framework
In this section, I will informally introduce the key assumptions, mechanism and
results of the theoretical model. The model’s set up will rely on three main as-
sumptions.
First, I propose a model in which coups can be "desirable". I assume that an
incumbent government has a default ideology (say, left wing). Moreover, govern-
ment can be "low quality" or "high quality" in a general interest dimension.11 The
quality of government in the general interest dimension will be taken as the wel-
fare measure, which is not sensitive to ideology in the baseline model. If a military
government replaces the incumbent, I assume that it has a higher expected quality
than a bad incumbent, but a lower expected quality than a good incumbent. Under
these assumptions, a coup against a bad incumbent is "desirable" in the general
interest dimension. It is not difficult to find examples of cases in which military
coups attracted strong popular support because the military ousted unpopular
leaders. For instance, the 1964 coup in Brazil was enthusiastically welcomed in
the editorials of all major newspapers (Stepan, 1971, p110-12). In contrast, a
coup against a well-performing incumbent is always "undesirable" according to
this welfare measure.12
The explanation for why "undesirable" coups ever occur builds on the second as-
sumption: the military consists of officers who care unanimously about the gov-
ernment’s quality, but who are factionalised along ideological lines. Hence, officers
either share the ideology of the incumbent (say, left-wing) or hold rivalling views
(say, right-wing). The idea that the military does not just narrowly promote its
corporate interests, but is factionalised along lines similar to those in society at
large is supported by a substantial body of literature.13 If coups are driven by
11The idea underlying coup friendly constitutions is exactly that, sometimes, coups can be
"desirable" in a general interest dimension. Following Besley and Kadumatsu (2007), "good"
governments might be thought of as being characterised by low child mortality, high economic
growth, high educational attainment and low corruption.
12In Nigeria, gen. Murtala Mohammed, who was widely acclaimed for his efforts to cut corrup-
tion, was killed in a coup in 1975. In this case, the interest of one particular faction within
the military seemed to have driven the coup (Alli, 2000).
13Stepan (1971, p7) writes for instance: "Descriptions of ideal military institutions which may
emphasise such features as military unity or national orientation often conceal more than they
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factional interests, rather than the general interest, they are undesirable.14 Once
these rivalling political affiliations are introduced in the military, staging a success-
ful coup becomes a leader-follower problem, possibly with two-sided asymmetric
information. Successful coup leaders need the support of a critical mass within
the military. However, if political affiliations are kept secret, the leader cannot be
certain that a coup will be supported: the officers who are critical for a coup to
succeed may be reluctant to lend their support to a coup leader of whom they do
not know the true ideology. They fear that, once in office, a coup leader will be in
an excellent position to promote factional interest policies. The importance of this
coordination problem may vary because of three main sources, which correspond
to the key parameters of the model: the strength of factionalisation, the openness
of political affiliation, the punishment for miscoordination (i.e. staging a failed
coup).
A third assumption of the model is that is impossible to condition punishments
for failed coups on the quality of the incumbent government. There are three
reasons for this assumption. First, if the incumbent government can decide on
the punishments it may not be optimal to make punishments conditional on its
quality.15 Second, the quality of the incumbent government may be incontractible,
for instance because it is observable to military officers, but not verifiable by a
court.16 Finally, the organisation that decides over punishments (e.g. the judiciary,
a military tribunal or the executive power) may be factionalised itself, which would
prevent tailored punishment. More generally, low punishments for failed coup
plotters will be considered as a symptom of institutions that grant legitimacy to
military interventions.
Based on the three key assumptions, I try to answer the question of which insti-
tutional set-up will sufficiently hold poorly performing governments accountable,
reveal about the interactions between the military and the political system". Authors who
emphasise the role of factionalisation within the military include Finer (1962, p34-42), Fitch
(1998, p109-110), Philip (1974,p75-99 and 1985, p190) and Loveman (1999, p207). Geddes
(2003) argues that the main reason why military regimes are relatively unstable is because
the armed forces are typically factionalised between opponents and proponents of military
rule. The latter view corresponds to a specific interpretation of the framework developed in
this paper.
14Finer (1962, p34-60) distinguishes between coups driven by "national interest" versus "sectional
interests".
15A government might implement high punishments to remain in power, regardless of its quality.
If government quality is not observable to the electorate, punishments can be a signal of
government quality and, in a simple voting game, a pooling equilibrium with low punishments
may arise.
16This is a standard assumption in the incomplete contracts literature (Hart , 1993).
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while preventing coups that are driven by factional interests only. This model
yields three key results.
First, high punishments and low political openness can achieve first best control
of the military over politics, which implies that a successful coup is staged if and
only if the incumbent is poorly performing. This outcome requires that ideology
does not dominate the utility function of officers. In particular, all factions within
the military must be willing to support a coup leader of unknown ideology against
a bad incumbent. The coup experiences of Peru (1948-1968) and Brazil (1948-
1964) are consistent with the positive results of this parameter range, although
Brazil’s culture of open political debate in the military is not consistent with the
"institution design optimum". In contrast, if ideology becomes more important, it
may be optimal to implement low punishments for failed coups, while adhering to
the neutrality of the army. This is a second best solution, which will see coups
by military leaders who share the ideology of the incumbent, at the expense of
allowing coups against well-performing governments. This equilibrium requires
that factionalisation within the military is sufficiently severe, so that left-wing
followers block a coup against a bad government out of fear that the initiators
might be right-wing. This parameter range is consistent with the recent coup
history of Venezuela (1992).
In an extension of the baseline framework, it can be shown that assumptions
on the information structure of the game can be rationalised as outcomes of a
communication game in which officers can choose to reveal their types or not.
In particular, leaders have an incentive to hide their political affiliation, while
followers would like to reveal their political affiliation. This result is important
because the incentive for followers to reveal their type implies that institutions
need to be put in place in order to keep the military neutral.
Third, there is a case in which institutions do not matter, because ideologies are
perfectly observable (for instance because they correspond to ethnicity). This yields
a unique equilibrium, characterised by high coup frequency and coup attempts
against both good and bad governments. This result is consistent with the case of
Nigeria (1966-2000).
Finally, relaxing the assumption that any military government has higher quality
than a bad incumbent government, the model can be altered to provide an account
of "extremist" factions within the military. This extension highlights that the
moderator pattern of civil-military relations, which relies on the willingness of
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military officers to support their leaders against poorly performing incumbents,
necessarily puts countries at risk of take-overs by an extremist faction. In this
set-up, it is optimal to prevent any type of coups under very weak assumptions.
This extension may explain the gradual move away from the institutional and
constitutional promotion of coups.
3.4 The baseline model
3.4.1 Set-up
Consider an incumbent government, indexed g, who is passive and has a left-
wing ideology (Ig = L) without loss of generality. The government can be high
quality ("good") or low quality ("bad"), which is indicated by a quality variable
Qg ∈ {−1, 1}. Qg is known to all players. To carry out welfare analysis, a prior
of the government being good is introduced: Pr(Qg = 1) = γ.
There are two players in the model: the leader and the follower, indexed i (for
initiator) and f (for follower) respectively.17 The leader moves first and decides
whether or not to stage a coup, the follower then decides whether or not to support
the coup. A coup succeeds if an only if the leader takes the initiative and the
follower supports the coup. Both officers are characterised by an ideology variable
Ij ∈ {L,R}, j = i, f . Every officer knows his own ideology, but cannot observe
the other player’s ideology directly. The priors are common knowledge and given
by:
Pr(Ii = L) = α
Pr(If = L) = β
The follower receives a private signal t ∈ {L,R} about the leader’s type, while the
leader receives a private signal s ∈ {L,R} about the follower’s type. The precision
17An example of an initiator would be the general in charge of the army division stationed in
the capital. We may think of the follower as the officer in charge of the main army division
outside the capital.
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of the signal is common knowledge and given by:
Pr(t = x|Ii = x) = µ = 12 , x ∈ {L,R}
Pr(s = x|If = x) = σ, x ∈ {L,R}
The signal about the leader’s type, t, is uninformative, i.e. µ = 12 , while the
precision of the signal about the follower’s type is in the range 12 6 σ 6 1.18 At
this stage, the openness of political affiliation is captured in a reduced form by the
signal precision σ.
If i stages a successful coup, his government is characterised by his quality in office,
Qi. Qi is ex ante unknown and E(Qi) = 0.19
Officers derive utility from the government’s quality, Q, and from its ideology,
through an indicator function ι which takes on value one if an officer shares the
ideology of the government. φ measures the importance of ideology. The assump-
tion that φ is the same for both left-wing and right-wing officers can be relaxed
without changing the key results. A leader staging a failed coup faces a punish-
ment P > 0, which is not conditional on the quality of the incumbent. As argued
above, P captures the institutional legitimacy of coups: countries that allow for
coups to occur under certain circumstances, will find it harder to credibly punish
the plotters of failed coups. It is assumed that there is no punishment in case of
a successful coup.20
The expected utility of a military officer of type j if a government of type k is in
office is given by:
Uj =
 −P +Qk + φι(Ij = Ik), if j = i and i stages a failed coupφι(Ij = Ik) +Qk, in all other cases , j ∈ {i, f}
The action to stage a coup attempt is given by a ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 stands for no
coup attempt and 1 stands for a coup attempt. The decision to back up a coup
18In section 3.5, an explicit microfoundation is provided for these parameter restrictions: in an
extended model, leaders want to hide their types, while followers would like reveal their types.
Importantly, this implies that institutionally restricting the openness of political affiliation
matters, since it will counter the incentive of followers to reveal their types.
19This assumption can be relaxed without affecting any of the (qualitative) results, as long as
−1 < E(Qi) < 1.
20There are several cases of coup leaders being put on trial after they have left government.
However, these trials often relate to crimes (such as human rights abuses) committed while
in office, rather than to the act of staging a coup in itself.
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attempt is given by b ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 stands for the decision to resist a coup
attempt and 1 for the decision to support a coup.
The timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws the quality of the government, Qg, the type of the leader, Ii,
and the type of the follower, If .
2. The leader i receives signal s and chooses a. If a = 0, the game ends.
3. If a = 1, the follower chooses b. If b = 1, i becomes the new government. If
b = 0, g remains in power and the coup fails.
4. Pay-offs (Ui, Uf ) are realised.
3.4.2 The first best solution
In the model described here, "first best" control of the military over politics would
imply that successful coups are staged if and only if the incumbent is poorly
performing. This outcome maximises the expected government quality (E(Q)),
which will be our welfare measure and is insensitive to ideology.21 It can be seen
straightaway that inefficiency could stem from two possible sources. First, by not
being able to condition punishments on government quality, there is a trade-off
between allowing the military to intervene when it is desirable and allowing the
military to intervene in case it is undesirable. For punishments to have a bite,
there needs to be uncertainty about the success of the coup, which is introduced
in this model by the uncertainty about the type of the followers. Second, even
if punishments could be made conditional on the quality of the incumbent, then
the followers may not support a coup against a poorly performing government
(out of fear that the new military government will be of the opposing ideology).
The first inefficiency may lead to either too many coups or too few coups, the
last inefficiency can lead to too few coups. The next section contains a detailed
description of how the welfare optima are affected by these potential inefficiencies.
3.4.3 Low factionalisation equilibria
This section deals with the case in which ideology is sufficiently weak. In this
case, both left-wing and right-wing officers may agree to oust a poorly-performing
incumbent, even if there is uncertainty about the type of the leader.
21This assumption will be relaxed in section 4.
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3.4.3.1 Positive results
The combination of signal precision σ, the strength of punishments P and the
importance of ideology φ will determine the optimal strategies for different types
of leaders and followers. A first result is almost trivial: if ideology is less important
than the quality of government (φ < 1), then the first best solution will always
be reached. Leaders will stage coup attempts if and only if incumbents are bad,
followers will support coup attempts if and only if leaders are bad.
Proposition 1 If φ < 1 perfect accountability is achieved for all parameters.
Proof 1 See appendix.
In the region 1 < φ < 11−α , ideology becomes more important than government
quality in the utility functions of military officers. As the followers do not have
certainty about the type of the leader, they do not necessarily want to support
a coup by a leader of unknown ideology, even if the government is bad. For the
R followers this is not important, because they are always glad to see a poorly
performing L government replaced, either by an "average" military L government
or by an "average" military R government. In contrast, the L followers are worried
that they may support a military leader of the R faction. The following condition
guarantees that the L followers prefer to support a random military leader (who
has a prior α of being L), against a poorly performing government:
φ− 1 < αφ⇒ φ < 11− α (3.1)
This condition states that the pay-off from the incumbent (on the left hand side)
is smaller than the expected pay-off of the military leader (on the right hand side),
which is the sum of the expected quality (0) and the expected ideology pay-off.
This latter component consists of the probability of facing an L leader (α) times
the strength of ideology (φ). Hence, under condition (3.1), both types of followers
can be united against a poorly performing government. The condition requires
that ideology is sufficiently weak, or the probability that the coup leader shares
the L followers is sufficiently strong.
The leaders can now anticipate the reaction of the followers, given that the latter
believe that both leaders always stage a coup (which made α the relevant prior).
114
3.4 The baseline model
Now, it can easily be seen that both the L leader and the R leader want to topple
the poorly performing incumbent if they would be supported in such attempts.
They know that, on average, their rule will be better in the general interest di-
mension than the rule of the incumbent. Also, they can anticipate the ideology
of their own regime. Hence, a Perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium in which both
types of leaders stage a coup attempt can always be supported. This reasoning
proves the first part of the following result:
Proposition 2 If 1 < φ < 11−α ("low factionalisation") and Qg = −1 ("bad in-
cumbent"), there exists a pooling equilibrium in which both L and R military leaders
stage coup attempts against poorly performing incumbents and both L and R fol-
lowers support such attempts. This pooling equilibrium Pareto dominates all other
equilibria.
Proof 2 See appendix.
The equilibrium in proposition 2 does not guarantee the first best solution, as R
leaders may want to stage coups against well-performing governments. This is
because ideology is more important than government quality. If the incumbent is
good, L followers will never support a coup, whereas R followers will always sup-
port a coup. L leaders will never want to stage a coup against a good government,
but R leaders may bet on the followers being R and attempt a coup against a good
incumbent. Given these incentives, any equilibrium with coup attempts against a
good government will be separating in the leader’s type.
Proposition 3 If 1 < φ < 11−α ("low factionalisation") and Qg = 1 ("good incum-
bent"), the only pure strategy equilibrium sees only R followers supporting coups,
while L followers never support any coups. The optimal strategy for the L leader
is to never stage coups. The optimal strategy of the R leader is determined by P
and σ, for which there exist thresholds P
¯
, σ¯R(P ) and σ¯L(P ) such that:
• P <P
¯
and σ < σ¯L(P ): R leader stages coup iff Qg = 1
• P >P
¯
and σ < σ¯R(P ): R leader never stages coup iff Qg = 1
• σ > max {σ¯R(P ), σ¯L(P ))}: R leader stages coup iff Qg = 1 and s = R
Proof 3 See appendix.
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3.4.3.2 Institution design
The positive results of proposition 3 allow us to identify the parameter region in
which the first best solution is achieved.
Corollary 1 If 1 < φ < 11−α ("low factionalisation"), there exists threshold P¯
,
σ¯R(P ) and σ¯L(P ) such that for P >P¯
and σ < σ¯R(P ), the first best is achieved.
Hence, low signal precision and high punishments support the first best solution.
This result can only partly rationalise the institutions I presented under the stylized
facts. While not allowing information on political affiliation to be revealed is
consistent with optimal control of the military over politics in my model, it also
prescribes punishments that are higher than those observed in reality.
3.4.3.3 Case studies
Both the cases of Chile (1971-1980) and Peru (1946-1970) fit into the "low fac-
tionalisation" parameter range, of which the crucial characteristic is that different
factions within the army can be united against a poorly performing incumbent.
In Peru, general Odria removed a mildly left-wing president from power in 1948,
on accusations of being too soft on violent militants. This latter position was
widely supported within the army. In 1962, the army briefly intervened to settle
an election with unclear results. It installed Belaunde as a president, a left-wing
populist who later sought a coalition with conservative politicians. In 1968, the
army ousted Beluande, over a deal with the International Copper Cooperation
of which the unfavourable clauses were kept secret. This deal was unacceptable
to most Peruvians, and the leading general, Velasco, could easily find sufficient
support for his coup. In all cases, the interventions of the military were widely
welcomed by the Peruvian public and Peru did not see any coups against govern-
ments that were perceived to be well-performing. Also, Peru did not see any failed
coup attempts within this period.22 These two elements are consistent with the
φ < 11−α parameter range described above. In further support of my approach,
Philip (1978) reports that the Peruvian army was factionalised between left-wing
radicals and right-wing conservatives. Nevertheless, these political affiliations were
effectively kept secret. The key to the success of the coup attempts against poorly
22This overview is based on Philip (1978).
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performing governments was the fact that both factions were willing to take the
risk of supporting a coup leader of ex ante unknown ideology. This was a relevant
trade-off, as is illustrated by the fact that General Velasco turned out to promote
radical policies which "[...] would have been too extreme for most officers who sup-
ported the coup".23 Thus the relevant parameter range seems to be 1 < φ < 11−α ,
in which the faction of the army that was ideologically closest to the incumbent
government prefers the incumbent to a new government of opposing ideology.
Chile seems to have found itself in a similar equilibrium when Pinochet took power
in 1973. His move was supported by a majority within the military (Philip, 1985,
p308). Historical sources suggests that the main division within the military was
between officers with Christian democratic sympathies and right wing conserva-
tives,24 but at the time these affiliations were strictly secret (Philip, 1985, p307).
The moderate Christian group seemed to have had the strongest support, but once
installed in power, Pinochet turned out to belong to the second group. As Philip
indicates, it is highly unlikely that Pinochet would have gained the support of the
military if his views were known before the coup. As in Peru, the relevant equilib-
rium range seems to have been 1 < φ < 11−α , where the faction ideologically closest
to the incumbent government would not support a coup from the opposing faction
in a complete information world, but is willing to take the risk of supporting a
"random officer" if a coup is staged against a poorly performing government.
In contrast to the secret affiliation in the Peruvian and Chilean military, the Brazil-
ian military had "[...] in fact institutionalized military debate over public and po-
litical issues" (Stepan, 1971, p44). The most important forum was the Military
Club in Rio de Janeiro, of which the biennial elections were traditionally fought
over political issues. The three coups that succeeded in the 1950-1970 period all
targeted a government with low legitimacy (Stepan, 1971, p108). However, Brazil
did also see failed coups in this period. The two failed coups both tried to prevent
a newly elected politician from assuming power. As these governments had not
revealed their quality yet, these coups are unlikely to have been staged in the gen-
eral interest. This suggests that Brazil was in an equilibrium with 1 < φ < 11−α ,
but its open political debate put σ in the range where σ > σ¯R. Therefore, factions
not sharing the government’s ideology (R) were willing to act upon a favourable
23Philip, 1978.
24Assuming that the Christian Democrats shared Allende’s ideology, as we implicitly do here,
is a simplification. However, Philip (1985) suggests they would have preferred Allende to
Pinochet, if they had known his agenda.
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signal (s = R) and stage coups against governments that were not poorly perform-
ing and had a high degree of legitimacy. This suggests that Brazil was not at its
institutional optimum and could have prevented these unsuccessful coup attempts
(and the risk of them being successful) by having less open political affiliation.
3.4.4 High factionalisation equilibria
In this section, ideology is so important that the military can no longer be united
against a bad government.
3.4.4.1 Positive results
φ > max( 11−α , 2) implies that the L follower is no longer willing to back a coup
attempt if both L and R types always try to oust the bad government. As a
consequence, there are no pure strategy Bayesian equilibria in which the L follower
supports a coup. The R follower, as before, will continue to support any coup.
Therefore, the parameters of the model will only affect the optimal strategies of the
leader. Deriving these optimal strategies boils down to an exercise of comparing
the expected costs and benefits of staging a coup. The set of possible equilibria
that can be attained by manipulating punishments and signal precision can be
represented in a diagram that delineates the optimal strategies for each type of
leader for each possible signal, the relevant quality of the incumbent and any
combination of P and σ.
The optimal strategy space of each type of leader in a particular situation is
delineated by a V-shaped curve in the (σ, P )-space. For example, the (σˆL, σˆR)
curves divide the strategy space in different optimal strategies for an L leader who
faces a bad government, upon receiving an L or R signal respectively. In the region
below the σˆL curve, signal precision and punishments are sufficiently low, so that
left-wing leaders are still willing to stage coups against bad incumbents regardless
of the signal (region A). As left-wing followers no longer support coups, the L
leaders count on the support of right-wing followers instead. Therefore, if signal
precision rises above the σˆL and σˆR curves (regions marked with a "∗"), the L
leader is only willing to stage coups if he receives a favourable signal, i.e. that the
followers are right-wing . Finally, if we move underneath the σˆR curve (the regions
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Figure 3.1: Optimal strategies for leaders under high factionalisation
119
Chapter 3 Coup-friendly Institutions and Apolitical Militaries
marked with "∗∗"), the L leader will never stage a coup as the signal has become
unreliable and the punishments for failure are too severe. Similarly the (σ¯L, σ¯R)
curves describe the optimal strategies of an R leader facing a good government.
Finally, the (σ˜L, σ˜R) curves describe the optimal strategies of an R leader facing
a bad government. In the graphical representation, the ordering of the (σˆL, σˆR),
(σ¯L, σ¯R) and (σ˜L, σ˜R) curves is intuitive: L officers (σˆL, σˆR) are less coup prone
than R leaders facing a good government (σ¯L, σ¯R), who are in turn less likely to
stage a coup than R leaders facing a bad incumbent (σ˜L, σ˜R).
3.4.4.2 Institution design
Figure 3.1 clearly demonstrates the trade-off between holding governments ac-
countable and overshooting by ousting good governments. The equilibria in which
the L leader stages a coup if and only if the incumbent is poorly performing (the
first best L strategy), imply necessarily that the R leader will stage coups against
good governments. This follows from the fact that the utility functions are domi-
nated by the ideology component when φ > max( 11−α , 2). Therefore, the first best
is no longer achievable. Comparing the properties of each possible equilibrium
with the first best benchmark, it can easily be established that the parameter
ranges in figure 3.1 can be ordered as follows in terms of the expected quality of
government (E(Q)):
A > A∗ > A∗∗
B∗ > B∗∗
B∗ > D∗
C∗∗ > B∗∗ > D∗∗
C∗∗ > E∗∗ > F ∗∗
This leaves three candidates for a welfare optimum. First, there is an equilibrium
with low punishments and low signal precision (A), in which the L leader stages a
coup if and only if the government is bad and the R leader always stages a coup
attempt. These attempts are successful whenever the follower is R. Second, there
is an equilibrium with intermediate punishments and high signal precision (B∗),
in which both L and R leaders condition their responses on the signal. Only if the
signal is favourable, the L leader attempts a coup against a bad government and the
R leader attempts a coup against the good government. Against a bad government,
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the R leader will still stage a coup attempt regardless of the signal. Finally, there
is an equilibrium with low signal precision and intermediate punishments (C∗∗),
in which only R leaders stage coups and they do so if and only if the incumbent
is bad. The following proposition states that only (A) or (C∗∗) can be optimal.
Proposition 4 If φ > 11−α , we can define thresholds Pˆ , P¯
, P¯ > 0 and σ˜L(P ) > 12 ,
such that the combinations of P and σ yielding pure strategy Bayesian equilibria
that (weakly) maximise E(Q) are given by:
1. If α 6 γ: P
¯
< P < P¯ , σ < min(σ˜L(P ), σ¯R(P )). In the corresponding equi-
librium an L leader never stages a coup attempt, an R leader stages a coup
attempt if and only if the incumbent is bad. An L follower never supports a
coup; an R follower supports any coup (Equilibrium C∗∗).
2. If α > γ: P < Pˆ and σ < σ¯L(P ) < σ˜L(P ). In the corresponding equilibrium
an R leader always stages a coup. An L leader stages a coup if and only if
the government is bad. An L follower never supports a coup; an R follower
supports any coup (Equilibrium A)
Proof 4 See appendix.
This proposition implies that it is never optimal to have open political debate if
both punishments and signal precision can be manipulated. Note that the level of
punishments does not affect the welfare function directly (it only affects the equi-
librium chosen), whereas the signal precision has a direct impact by determining
the likelihood of correct recognition of the followers (and, hence, the probability
of successful coups). Given that signal precision directly enters the probability
of certain equilibria, its effect should be monotonic. This means that either the
highest signal precision or the lowest signal precision consistent with this equilib-
rium must be optimal. However, in terms of the equilibrium outcome, B∗ with
σ = 1 is equivalent to A. This means that A is weakly preferred to B∗, and strictly
preferred, as soon as we rule out the cut-off case of perfect precision (σ = 1)). It is
shown in the appendix that limiting σ is only optimal within equilibrium B∗ if it is
better to discourage coups. But if coups need to be discouraged, than equilibrium
C∗∗ beats B∗.
Comparing the remaining candidates (A and C∗∗), the advantage of the equilib-
rium C∗∗ (intermediate punishments) is that a good government is never ousted.
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The precision of the signal is sufficiently low and punishments are sufficiently high,
so that the R leader only stages a coup attempt against a bad incumbent, regard-
less of the signal. The disadvantage is that a leader of the same ideology of the
government will never challenge a bad government. He will find the punishments
too high and the information he has about the followers’ political stance too scarce
to ever attempt a coup. In equilibrium A (low punishments) the L leader is willing
to act against a bad government. However, this also implies that the R leader is
willing to oust a good government under any signal. Which equilibrium dominates
depends on whether γ < α. If γ < α, the probability of the government being good
is smaller than the probability of the leaders being of type L. Hence, the optimal
equilibrium has coups against bad governments staged by the L leader at the cost
of introducing R-led coups against good governments. If γ > α, the probability of
the government being good (γ) is higher than the probability of the leader being
of the L type (α). Hence, the optimal equilibrium will have no coups against the
good government at the cost of not having any coups by L leaders against the bad
government.
These results are consistent with some of the stylized facts. Armies should be
politically neutral, and there could be a case for limiting the expected punish-
ments. The result on political neutrality is the most robust finding, as a best
case for open political affiliation was made. Also, comparing the expected quality
of government under low and high factionalisation equilibria, the optimum under
low factionalisation clearly dominates the optimum under high factionalisation.
Therefore, institution design could in theory address the degree of factionalisa-
tion within the military. For instance, military training places emphasis on the
development of a "military identity" that complements and possibly replaces any
identities previously held by officers (Philip, 1985, p177-200). Also, recruitment
policies may aim at attracting a homogenous set of candidates. While I focus on
the neutrality of the army at the level of individual officers, the neutrality of the
military as an institution may be seen an institutional arrangement that makes
it easier for soldiers to identify with "military values" and weaken their factional
affiliations.
3.4.4.3 Case studies
The case of Venezuela (1992) can illustrate these results. In the late eighties the
Venezuelan economy was severely hit by a decline in oil prices. Carlos Andres
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Perez’s government was alleged to be highly corrupt and had reneged on campaign
pledges to push through a series of unpopular reforms (Norden, 2001). Against
this background, Hugo Chavez staged a coup attempt in 1992. Chavez’ coup
failed because he did not have the support of key players within the army. Im-
portantly, political affiliations other than links with the leading AD party (Acción
Democrática) were not allowed to be shown within the military (Norden, 2001,
p121). Gott (2005, p64) indicates that Chavez only knew that he had the support
of about 10% of the army. He did not have any clues about the views of the
remaining 90%. In terms of this model, it may have been that some conserva-
tive officers would actually have liked to oust Andres Perez as well. The failure
could then be explained by the fact that Venezuela was in the high factionalisa-
tion range ( 11−α < φ). In this range, the majority of the army, which proved to
be of the same ideology as the government, chose not to back a coup leader of ex
ante unknown political affiliation: Hugo Chavez. In the aftermath of the failed
coup, Hugo Chavez was put on trial and given a long prison sentence, but the
wide-ranging amnesty powers of the president allowed the successor of President
Perez to set him free after only two years (Gott, 2005, p119).
Evaluating the military institutions of Venezuela, the condition γ > α may have
been satisfied in Venezuela, implying that the average quality of incumbents is
sufficiently high relative to the probability of the coup leader sharing the ideology
of the incumbent. As indicated in proposition 4, it is optimal to have an equilibrium
with political neutrality in this range. Also, the expected punishments for a failed
coup may have been sufficiently low to induce a coup attempt, assuming that
Chavez anticipated his relatively mild punishment. The failure of this coup, which
was due to the strong position of conservatives in the army, could not have been
prevented by changing either P or σ.
3.5 A theory of political affiliation
This section develops a theory of the disclosure (or hiding) of political affiliations.
This analysis endogenises "talking politics" in the army. It provides a microfoun-
dation of earlier assumptions and suggests a specific institutional framework which
can implement the equilibria found before. The proposed game boils down to an
application of a standard communication game, in which I introduce a cost to
eliminate cheap talk results.
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3.5.1 Model
The model builds on the one introduced in section 1. The signals are now aban-
doned and replaced by a message from the leader. To this aim, a stage is added to
the game in which the leader can send a message about his type: Iˆi ∈ {R,L,N} .
The option to announce N has to be interpreted as remaining neutral. This option
can be attractive for officers if there is a cost to lying about one’s type. This cost
of lying is captured by ξ, satisfying 0 < ξ < φ− 1. The utility function of i is:
Ui =
 −P +Qk, if i stages a failed coupφι(Ii = Ik) +Qk − ι(Iˆi 6= Ii&Iˆi 6= N)ξ, in all other cases
The follower can also reveal his type Iˆf ∈ {R,L,N}. For the follower, no cost of
lying is assumed (as this would only strengthen the results). The utility function
of f is:
Uf = φι(If = Ik) +Qk, in all other cases
This game is now the same as before, augmented with a communication stage.
The timing of the game is now:
1. Nature draws the type of the leader, Ii, and the type of the follower, If .
2. The leader announces his type Iˆi and the follower announces Iˆf simultane-
ously.
3. Nature draws the quality of the government, Qg
4. The leader i receives signal s and chooses a. If a = 0, the game ends.
5. If a = 1, the follower f chooses b. If b = 1, i becomes the new government.
If b = 0, g remains in power and the coup fails.
6. Pay-offs (Ui, Uf ) are realised.
Solving this problem by backward induction, officers in the communication stage
anticipate the positive results derived earlier. The following proposition states
that followers prefer to reveal their ideology.
Proposition 5 For φ > 1, the only pure strategy equilibrium communication is
separating in the follower’s type.
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Proof 5 See appendix.
Turning to the communication strategy of the leader, it is intuitive that all mes-
sages will be uninformative in a pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose there is an
equilibrium in which Iˆi(Ii) = Ii. Then an R leader is never supported by L fol-
lowers if the incumbent is bad. The L leader is always supported by L followers if
the government is bad. Therefore, the R leader is strictly better off by deviating
and announcing Iˆi(R) = L. Therefore Iˆi(Ii) = Ii cannot be an equilibrium. This
result holds regardless of the communication strategy of the followers: even if the
followers reveal their types, the leader cannot rule out the followers being L when
they decide to show their affiliation or not.25
Proposition 6 For 1 < φ < 11−α , the only pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria
that satisfy the intuitive criterion have Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) ∈ {L,N}.
For φ > {2, 11−α}, the only pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium has Iˆi(R) =
Iˆi(L) = N .
Proof 6 See appendix.
This proposition explicitly states an insight used in the previous section: the
leaders have an incentive to conceal their true types. For φ < 11−α , coups against
a bad incumbent are always supported by any type of followers in this parameter
range. This equilibrium relies on the secrecy of political affiliation. The cost of
lying (in combination with the intuitive criterion) makes sure that leaders pool by
both claiming to be L or to be neutral. From an equilibrium in which both types
of leaders claim to be R, only an L leader would strictly prefer to deviate under the
belief that he is L. For φ > 11−α , ideology is so important that L followers are not
willing to support a coup from an unknown type. Again, the cost of lying allows us
to rule out certain messages, in this case only viable equilibrium is characterised
by Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) = N . In this case, the equilibrium of both officers claiming to
be left-wing is not sustainable. As the R leader is not supported by L followers
anyway in equilibrium, he would deviate to claim to be neutral or R in order to
prevent the cost of lying under any out-of-equilibrium belief.26
25This argument relies on the assumption of simultaneous announcements. The condition ξ <
φ+ 1 guarantees that the cost of lying is not too large to prevent leaders of type R to lie.
26All these results hold for an arbitrarily small ξ > 0.
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3.5.2 Case studies
The insight that coup plotters should refrain from having open political affilia-
tions is emphasized in Luttwak’s (1968) practical coup manual. An illustration
of this theory can be found in the biographies of generals Pinochet, Velasco and
Chavez. None of these coup leaders revealed their affiliations before they success-
fully assumed power. Velasco had clear links with the conservative elements in
society and concealed his radical left wing sympathies (Philip, 1978, p43). He
could have found himself in the pooling equilibrium where leaders claim to be of
the incumbent government’s ideology. Chile’s general Pinochet concealed his right
wing ideology as well and kept a neutral profile (Philip, 1985). Hugo Chavez did
not have an openly left wing agenda either when he staged his 1992 coup (Nor-
den, 1992). In line with the earlier hypothesis that Venezuela is best described
by the φ > 11−α region, Chavez was neutral and did not associate himself with
conservative ideologies.
The communication game also justifies my so far implicit assumption that insti-
tutions can alter the actual openness of political affiliation (i.e. changing σ). As
followers have an incentive to reveal their types, only appropriate institutions will
prevent them from doing so. In principle, these institutions could be developed
entirely within the armed forces, in line with Huntington’s ideal of a professional,
autonomous military (Huntington, 1981). However, the analysis in this section
points at the tension between an independent army and the incentives that shape
political communication within the army. This may call for targeted civilian con-
trol over the military. For instance, purging powers can be granted to a government
that aims to prevent coups. As coups are more likely if the followers show their affil-
iation, a government that wants to avoid coups will have an incentive to discourage
officers from revealing their (diverging) political views. As indicated earlier, the
military in Brazil (1950-1970) and Venezuela (1980-2002) differed strongly with
regard to their openness of political affiliation. One can compare the promotion
structures of both militaries to illustrate the hypothesis that different degrees of
open political affiliation can be implemented by varying the government’s control
over promotions. Throughout the period 1958-1998, Venezuelan officers were ex-
pected to be of the leading political parties’ ideology or not to hold any political
views at all. The Congress had strong powers over military appointments, which
was seen as an explicit strategy to reduce the armies’ threat to intervene (Norden,
2001, p126; Trinkunas, 2001, p171). In this context, Chavez’ activities, which
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are reported to have started in the late seventies, had to remain secret (Norden,
2001, p122). Chavez had little information about his overall support within the
army and Norden ascribes the failure of the coup partly to the unwillingness of the
coup plotters to approach extra officers (Norden, p120). In contrast, at least until
1962, the Brazilian army had a largely independent promotion structure mainly
based on achievement in the military academy (Stepan, 1971, p51). The limited
direct influence of the government on army promotions was necessary to sustain
an equilibrium in which officers were willing to share their political views.
3.6 Extensions
3.6.1 Perfectly observable types
In a first extension, I present the positive results of this model for the case in which
institutions do not matter because types are directly observable. This seems an
appropriate assumption if ethnicity or regional origins form the most important
political dimension, as these types cannot be concealed. Going back to the full
model of section 1 and reintroducing the drawing of Ii, this implies: µ = σ = 1.
Proposition 7 If φ < 1, then there is a coup attempt if and only if Qg = −1 and
followers always support this coup. If φ > 1, then there is a coup attempt from an
R leader whenever the follower is observed to be R. There is an attempt from an
L leader whenever Qg = −1. The L follower only supports a coup by the L leader.
The R follower supports any coup.
This proposition is a direct corollary of earlier results. To summarise, in countries
where the main conflict is along ethnic lines, military coup attempts are expected:
(1) to target both well-performing and poorly performing governments; (2) to be
frequent, possibly in spite of severe punishments; and (3) not to fail.
An illustration of this case is Nigeria. Nigerian politics have been dominated by
ethnic conflicts ever since its independence. The Nigerian military recruited in all
regions and, as is clear from the account of Alli (2000), the regional affiliations of
military officers were easily observable. Typically, Northern officers dominated the
army and used this position to block the South to gain more influence in politics
(Luckham, 1974). First, as predicted by my model, Nigeria saw coups both against
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poorly performing governments and well-performing governments.27 For instance,
Nigeria’s first coup, in 1966, was entirely driven by the sectional interests of Ibo
officers who aimed to overthrow a government which was dominated by Muslim
leaders. However, Northern officers also removed the Northern General Gowon
from office in 1975, because he did not deal effectively with the economic crisis. A
second prediction of our model is a high frequency of coup attempts. Nigeria faced
nine coup attempts in the period 1966-2000, even though the leaders of the two (out
of equilibrium) failed coups were all executed. Also, of these nine coup attempts,
only two failed. Therefore, the case of Nigeria closely fits the predictions of our
model. Also, the analysis may explain the empirical result of Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2007) that ethnic dominance, in the sense that one ethnic group accounts for more
than 45% of the population, leads to significantly higher coup risk. The authors
do not provide an explanation for this result, but their variable ethnic dominance
can be expected to be correlated with ethnic polarisation, as I discussed here.
In conclusion, the case of observable types yields several benchmark predictions
that naturally lend themselves to empirical testing. However, the scope for insti-
tution design is extremely limited in this case, as political affiliations are open by
default.
3.6.2 Introducing an extremist faction
Relaxing the parametric assumptions in earlier sections, coups can be undesirable
for two main reasons: (1) coups could target a well-performing government, or
(2) coups could replace any government with a regime that is even worse.28 The
assumption that a military government is always better than a bad incumbent
means that I discarded the latter possibility earlier. The welfare function that was
proposed was not sensitive to ideology. However, it is conceivable that a faction
of the army does not promote the general interest and less so than the incumbent
government. Such factions can be thought of as "extremists", who prefer policies
that are unacceptable to society at large.
27The coup attempts I consider are: January 1966, July 1966, 1975, 1976, 1983, 1990, 1993,
1995. Of these attempts the 1976 and 1995 attempts failed. (Alli, 2000, p.211-224)
28The strong economic growth of Chile under Pinochet contrasted sharply with the economic
crisis during the Allende regime. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to adopt a social
welfare function that gives more weight to the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime
than to Chile’s economic growth experience.
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The model can now be re-interpreted by assuming that the military consists of left-
wing moderates and right-wing extremists, whereas the government is moderately
left-wing. The positive results derived earlier will carry through. However, a new
welfare function will now assign a positive value to the ideology of the incumbent,
for instance by including φ (φ > 1). Under this assumption, the institutions that
maximise expected government quality will promote coups by moderate officers if
and only if the incumbent is bad, but discourage coups by right-wing officers. This
means that the first best is no longer achievable, even if factionalisation within the
military is low.29 In this parameter range, high punishments and low political
openness will now be the second best optimum, as no other institutional setting
prevents coups more effectively in the case of low factionalisation. Nevertheless,
this equilibrium will continue to see coups by R leaders, as the followers are willing
to take the risk of supporting an extremist leader if that strengthens accountabil-
ity. If extremism enters the welfare function, the high factionalisation range will
have a different optimal solution in comparison to the earlier results. It can be
seen straightaway that it may no longer be optimal to limit punishments, as an
equilibrium with high punishments and political neutrality has no coup attempts
by right-wing officers and beats an optimum with limited punishments in which a
right wing leader stages a coup if and only if the incumbent is poorly performing.
As an illustration, Brazil was characterised by repeated take-overs (in 1945 and
1956) initiated by moderate factions within the military who quickly organised
a return to democracy until the 1964 coup saw the military taking over govern-
ment for the next 21 years. The military government of Brazil was responsible
for at least 339 disappearances and assassinations, on top of wide-spread torturing
and jailing of political opponents. While the initial coup leader, General Castello
Branco was moderate and committed to democratisation (Stepan, 1971, p234),
his position in the army was too weak to prevent hard-line officers to influence
his policies and eventually replace him in 1968. It can be argued that Brazil’s
policies did not consider a welfare improvement over the Goulart government the
military replaced in 1964. My anaysis suggests that this outcome could result
from the same equilibrium that underlay the relatively benign "moderator role" of
29The concept of "extremism" may appear to be at odds with the notion of "low factionalisation"
( φ < 11−α ). Nevertheless, ideological views within the army could be close to each other, in
particular if the military’s corporate interests are taken into account. Furthermore, the "low
factionalisation" parameter range could be consistent with substantial ideological differences
(high φ) in combination with a sufficiently low ex ante probability of an extremist coup leader
(low 1− α). In a richer game, followers could gradually learn about the distribution of φ in
the universe of coup plotters.
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the military in earlier years. If the L faction is interpreted as prodemocratic ele-
ments within the military and the R faction as officers with antidemocratic ideals
and a repressive agenda, then my model suggests that any equilibrium in which
L followers are willing to oust bad governments, also allows R followers to oust
bad governments. Therefore, the break-down of the "moderator pattern", in which
the military intervenes for short periods without fundamentally changing demo-
cratic institutions can be understood an inevitable consequence of the equilibrium
underlying interventions of a moderate faction of the military. Once "moderate"
officers learn about the distribution of "extremist ideologies", they may no longer
be willing to support any coup leader. This may shift the equilibrium to the high-
factionalisation range, in which coups are rarer and more effectively prevented by
institutionalising high punishments and low political openness. In this context,
fractionalisation could contribute to the demilitarisation of politics by making it
harder to stage successful coups.
3.7 Interpretation
3.7.1 Ordering political institutions
An important limitation of the theoretical framework introduced in this paper is its
seemingly paradoxical assumptions about the strength of political institutions. It
was argued that the military could be a de facto moderator if political institutions
are sufficiently weak. However, the subsequent analysis argued that for the military
to be an effective arbitrator, political institutions must be sufficiently strong to
generate credible civil military institutions. Such institutions can both ban open
political affiliations and credibly implement punishments for failed coup plotters.
Given that the incumbent could have an obvious incentive to severely punish failed
coup plotters, restraint in punishment could be a sign of relatively strong political
institutions. In the example of Nigeria discussed earlier, all failed coup plotters
were executed. Therefore, the poor coup performance of Nigeria could partially be
due to poor political institutions as well. As a corollary, the military will be a poor
arbitrator of domestic politics if political institutions are very weak. Hence, my
theoretical framework suggests an ordering of political institutions. The analysis
in this paper is most relevant if political institutions are in an intermediate range,
sufficiently strong to constrain the behaviour of the military, but sufficiently weak
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to legitimise military interventions in politics. These institutional capabilities may
change over time and the next subsection considers the recent break-down of the
moderator pattern in more detail.
3.7.2 The breakdown of the "moderator pattern"
It seems appropriate to revisit the central idea that military coups can effectively
hold governments accountable. I argued that this idea was widely spread and de
facto military influence over domestic politics remains strong. Therefore, I believe
that this is an adequate assumption to make in modelling coup behaviour and
understanding the evolution of civil-military institutions. Policy makers have re-
cently become more sceptical about the beneficial effects of military intervention,
as exemplified by the increasing constraints to the legitimacy of military power
over politics. While a wide range of factors, including the end of the Cold War
could have contributed to this trend, my framework incorporates three explana-
tions for such a shift in ideas. First, my model implicitly assumed a failure in
holding governments accountable by other means than coups. If democracies have
become more effective, then military coups may have become superfluous. Second,
it may be that political elites or social planners have overestimated the expected
quality of military interventions in the past. The experience of the brutal military
regimes in Latin America or, more recently, in Burma, may have lowered the ex-
pectations about military rule. Finally, my model also suggests that the so-called
"moderator pattern of civil military relations", in which the military intervenes
for short periods without fundamentally changing democratic institutions, is only
one possible outcome of the underlying equilibrium. Once officers are willing to
support a leader of unknown quality against a bad government, they take the
risk of supporting a leader with a hidden extremist agenda. The coup experiences
of Brazil and Chile demonstrated how relevant this risk is. Ultimately, this risk
is weighed against the cost of a poorly performing government. For this reason,
coups may become less attractive as societies become more prosperous and mod-
erate officers are no longer willing to bet on the ideology (or quality) of a military
coup leader.
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3.8 Conclusion
This paper analyses the circumstances under which coups are aligned with the
general interest. The analysis is based on three crucial assumptions. First, a
military leader is assumed to be of average quality, so that a military intervention
leads to higher government quality if the government is poorly performing. Second,
it is assumed that the military is factionalised and politicised. Third, punishments
are not conditional on government quality.
The main results are derived under the assumption that political affiliation is not
directly observable. Focusing on the expected government quality as the objective
function, the military is best in performing its role as a check on the government if
ideological cleavages within the military are sufficiently limited and coup plotters
are sufficiently likely to share the government’s ideology. Once ideology becomes
more important, the optimal institutional set-up has low or intermediate levels of
punishments and no open political affiliation. This setting prevents coups against
good governments that are driven by the factional interests of the opposition, while
the sufficiently low punishments can induce the army to intervene if the government
is poorly performing. In the special case of perfectly observable political affiliation,
the model yields an equilibrium with high government turnover, in which coups
are staged both against well performing and poorly performing governments.
The most important limitation of the current paper is probably its strong assump-
tion on the form that punishments can take. It would be interesting to collect
systematic data on how leaders of failed coups are punished and to develop a
model that endogenises punishment and explains empirical patterns. The frame-
work developed in this paper could provide a useful starting point for this analysis.
A second, very natural extension would be to endogenise the quality of government
(e.g. as a moral hazard problem). Nevertheless, the results of such an exercise can
be expected to be qualitatively similar to the ones derived here.
The analysis in this paper can help to understand the factors that contribute to
civilian control over the army. It was argued that the risk that is inherent to the
moderator pattern of civil-military relations can explain the breakdown of this
pattern. It also highlights how a combination of factionalisation and uncertainty
about political views within the military can be an important driver of gradual
demilitarisation of politics.
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Proof of proposition 1
Write Ui(a, Ii, s, Qg) and Uf (b, If , Ii, Qg|a = 1) = Uf (b, If , Ii, Qg).
Solve by backward induction by first deriving the strategy of the follower.
E [Uf (1, L, L,Qi)] = φ,
Uf (0, L, L,−1) = φ− 1, Uf (0, L, L, 1) = φ+ 1.
E [Uf (1, R, L,Qi)] = 0,
Uf (0, R, L,−1) = −1, Uf (0, R, L, 1) = 1.
Therefore both types of followers support a coup attempt by L iffQg = −1. Anticipating
this, the L leader has:
Ui(1, L, L,−1) = Ui(1, L,R,−1) = φ,
Ui(0, L,R,−1) = Ui(0, L, L,−1) = φ− 1,
Ui(0, L,R, 1) = Ui(0, L, L, 1) = φ+ 1.
For the R leader this becomes:
Ui(1, R, L,−1) = Ui(1, R,R,−1) = φ,
Ui(0, R,R,−1) = Ui(0, R, L,−1) = φ− 1,
Ui(0, R,R, 1) = Ui(0, R, L, 1) = 1.
Therefore both R and L leaders stage a coup attempt if and only if Qg = −1.
Proof of proposition 2
See main text for a proof of the existence of the pooling equilibrium. Note that this equi-
librium holds for any out-of-equilibrium belief. There is also a pure strategy separating
equilibrium in which only the R type stages a coup attempt and only R type followers
support coups, and there can also a mixed strategy equilibrium. These equilibria are
all Pareto dominated by the pooling equilibrium from the perspective of the military
leaders and followers. In the pooling equilibrium bad governments are always ousted by
both L and R leaders, whereas in the separating equilibrium only R leaders will attempt
a coup if Qg = −1, which only succeeds if they are supported by R followers. It is clear
that both L and R leaders are worse of in this equilibrium. The same reasoning can be
applied to prove that mixed strategy equilibria are dominated. Also, the mixed strategy
equilibria break down for lower values of φ than the pooling equilibrium, as they imply
a probability of a coup leader being L which is smaller than α.
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Proof of proposition 3
If Qg = 1, only R followers will support a coup. Anticipating these reactions, the
optimal strategy of the leader can be derived.
Write Ui(a, Ii, s, Qg) and Uf (b, If , Ii, Qg|a = 1) = Uf (b, If , t, Qg). Ii = L is fixed
here. Staging a coup against a good incumbent following an L signal is optimal if:
E [Ui(1, R, L, 1)]> U i(0, R, L, 1)
⇔ σβ
σβ+(1−σ)(1−β)(−P + 1)+ (1−σ)(1−β)σβ+(1−σ)(1−β)(φ) > 1
⇒ σ < (1−β)(φ−1)
βP+(1−β)(φ−1) ≡ σ¯L(P )
Staging a coup against a good incumbent following an R−signal is optimal if:
E [Ui(1, R,R, 1)]> U i,R(0, R,R, 1)⇔
(1−σ)β
σ(1−β)+(1−σ)β (−P + 1)+ σ(1−β)σ(1−β)+(1−σ)β (φ+ 2κ− 1) > 1
⇒ σ > βP
βP+(1−β)(φ−1) ≡ σ¯R(P )
Define P
¯
≡ (1−β)(φ−1)
β
. P
¯
> 0 for φ > 1. The following results can be derived:
P < P
¯
⇒ σ¯R(P ) < 12 < σ¯L(P )
P >P
¯
⇒ σ¯L(P ) < 12 < σ¯R(P )
Proposition follows from here.
Proof of proposition 4
φ > 11−α implies that the L follower never supports any coup attempt in equilibrium.
For a pooling equilibrium, this result follows from the proof of proposition 3. We can
rule out separating equilibria as well for φ > 11−α . If the L follower only supports a coup
with some probability as to make the L−initiator indifferent for s = R(L), then the R
leader will always stage a coup for s = R(L) (as the R follower has a stronger incentive
to stage a coup) and the expected utility of supporting a coup for an L follower will be
even lower than in the case where both types always stage a coup. If the L follower tries
to make R indifferent at s = R(L), then L will no longer stage coups at this signal as
L’s outside option is better than R′s. This implies that the expected pay-off for the L
follower from supporting a coup is lower than in the case where both types always stage
a coup.
Knowing that L followers will never support a coup and R followers will support any
coup, I derive the optimal strategy for the leaders. I focus on the R leader first. Write
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Ui(a, Ii, s, Qg) and Uf (b, If , Ii, Qg|a = 1) = Uf (b, If , t, Qg). The optimal strategy of
the follower is described by:
• E [Ui(1, R, L,−1)]> U i(0, R, L,−1)⇔ σ < (1−β)(φ+1)βP+(1−β)(φ+1)≡ σ˜L(P )
• E [Ui(1, R,R,−1)]> U i(0, R,R,−1)⇔ σ > βPβP+(1−β)(φ+1)≡ σ˜R(P )
• E [Ui(1, R, L, 1)] > Ui(0, R, L, 1) ⇔ σ < (1−β)(φ−1)βP+(1−β)(φ−1) ≡ σ¯L(P )
• E [Ui(1, R,R, 1)]> U i,R(0, R,R, 1)⇔ σ > βPβP+(1−β)(φ−1)≡ σ¯R(P )
Define P
¯
≡ (1−β)(φ−1)
β
, P¯ ≡ (1−β)(φ+1)
β
and P˚ ≡ (1−β)
β
√
(φ− 1)(φ+ 1) (forφ > 1).
It follows that P
¯
< P˚ < P¯ for φ > 1. The following results can be derived:
• P < P
¯
⇒ σ˜R < σ¯R < 12 < σ¯L < σ˜L
• P > P¯ ⇒ σ¯L < σ˜L < 12 < σ˜R < σ¯R
• P˚ < P < P¯ ⇒ σ¯L < σ˜R < 12 < σ˜L < σ¯R
• P
¯
< P < P˚⇒ σ˜R < σ¯L < 12 < σ¯R < σ˜L.
Similar thresholds can be derived for the L leader, for the case in which the L follower
does not support any coup attempt:
• E [Ui(1, L, L,−1)]> U i(0, L, L,−1)⇔ σ < (1−β)βP+(1−β)≡ σˆL(P )
• E [Ui(1, L,R,−1)]> U i(0, L,R,−1)⇔ σ > βPβP+(1−β)≡ σˆR(P )
Define Pˆ = (1−β)
β
, it can now be shown that:
• P < Pˆ ⇒ σˆR<12< σˆL
• P > Pˆ ⇒ σˆL<12< σˆR
A number of results restricting the set of possible parameter combinations can be derived
by comparing the relevant expressions:
• P¯ > Pˆ ,∀φ
• σˆL < σ¯L ⇔ φ > 2,∀P > 0
• σˆL< σ˜L,∀φ, P > 0
• σˆR > σ¯R ⇔ φ > 2, ∀P
• σˆR > σ˜L ⇔ P > (1−β)β
√
φ+ 1 ≡ P¨
• σˆR > σ¯L ⇔ P > (1−β)β
√
φ− 1 ≡ ...P
135
Chapter 3 Coup-friendly Institutions and Apolitical Militaries
• Pˆ < ...P ⇔ φ > 2
I will now derive the optimal strategies for each player in all parameter ranges for
max{2, 11−α} < φ.30 Using the parameter restrictions derived above, it can be shown
that this parameter range has: Pˆ <
...
P < min(P¨ ,P )< max(P¨ , P ) <P˚ < P¯ . We now
have ten relevant equilibria. These equilibria are shown in figure 3.1.
1. P < Pˆ and σ < σ¯L :
L always stages a coup iff incumbent is bad. R always stages a coup. (A)
2. P <
...
P and max(σˆL, σˆR) < σ < σ¯L:
L always stages a coup iff incumbent is bad and s = R. R always stages a coup.
(A∗)
3. Pˆ < P <P
¯
, σ < min(σ¯L, σˆR) :
L never stages a coup. R always stages a coup. (A∗∗)
4. P < P¨ and max(σ¯L, σ̂R) < σ < σ˜L:
L always stages a coup iff incumbent is bad and s = R. R stages a coup if
incumbent is bad or if s = R. (B∗)
5.
...
P < P < P˚ , max(σ¯L, σ¯R) < σ < min(σˆR, σ˜L):
L never stages a coup, R stages a coup iff incumbent is bad or s = R. (B∗∗)
6. P
¯
< P < P¯ , σ < min(σ˜L, σ¯R):
L never stages a coup, R iff incumbent is bad. (C∗∗)
7. σ >max {σ˜L, σˆR} ,∀P
L stages a coup iff the government is bad and s = R. R stages a coup iff s = R.
(D∗)
8. P¨ < P , max(σ˜L, σ¯R) < σ < σˆR:
L never stages a coup, R stages a coup iff s = R. (D∗∗)
9. P˚ < P , max(σ˜L, σ˜R) < σ < σ¯R:
L never stages a coup, R stages a coup iff incumbent is bad and s = R. (E∗∗)
30I do not consider the parameter range 11−α < φ < 2 in the main section. This range has
P
¯
< Pˆ < P˚ < P¯ . Perfect accountability is no longer achievable. 11−α < φ implies that
there can be no equilibrium in which the L follower supports a coup attempt. The
optimum will have both R and L leaders staging coups if and only if the government
is bad. This requires P
¯
< P < Pˆ and σ < min{σˆL, σ¯R, σ˜L}. The last result rules out
the following parameter range: σˆR < σ˜L < σ¯R.
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10. P
¯
< P , σ < σ˜R:
L and R never stage a coup. (F ∗∗)
It can be seen easily that the following ranking must hold between these equilibria if we
focus on expected government quality E(Q): A > A∗ > A∗∗, B∗ > B∗∗, B∗ > D∗,
C∗∗ > B∗∗ > D∗∗, C∗∗ > E∗∗ > F ∗∗. We can now focus on equilibria (A), (B∗) and
(C∗∗):
E(Q|A) = γ(1− (1− β)(1− α)) + (1− γ)(−β)
E(Q|B∗) = γ(1− (1− β)(1− α)σ) + (1− γ)(−β − (1− β)α(1− σ))
dE(Q|B∗)
dσ
= (1− β) (α− γ)
E(Q|C∗∗) = γ+ (1− γ) (−α− β (1− α))
Comparing (A) and (B∗), we find that both equilibria are equivalent for σ = 1. This is
intuitive, as under perfect information coups will only take place if the leader observes
that the follower is of type R and all coups that are attempted will succeed. Therefore,
an equilibrium in which L always stages a coup if the government is bad and R always
stages a coup becomes equivalent in terms of the outcome to an equilibrium in which L
always stages a coup if the government is bad and the followers are R and the R leader
always stages a coup if the followers are R. As soon as the precision of the signal becomes
weaker in equilibrium (B∗), there are two effects. First, the weaker signal decreases the
number of coups that the R leader attempts against the good government. On the other
hand, the weaker signal also decreases the number coups that the L leader stages against
the bad government. If it is optimal in equilibrium (B∗) to have low signal precision
(because dE(Q)
dσ
< 0 ), then we can look at the extreme case of σ = 12 , even though it is
inconsistent with this equilibrium. It can be verified that equilibrium (C∗∗) is preferred
to the hypothetical equilibrium (B∗) with σ = 12 if and only if γ > α. As a consequence,
the same will hold for the best possible equilibrium (B∗). It can now be derived that:
• (B∗)>(A)⇐⇒ α < γ
• (C∗∗)>(A)⇐⇒ α < γ
• (C∗∗)>(B∗)⇐⇒ α < γ
This implies that either (C∗∗) or (A) are optimal. (C∗∗) is optimal for γ > α, (A) is
optimal for α > γ.
Proof of proposition 5 and 6
The R follower would like to reveal his type in order to attract coup attempts against
the incumbent. The L follower can always block a coup attempt so has no strategic
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incentives in the communication stage. As soon as the L follower chooses a pure strategy
message, there is an separating equilibrium in which the R follower chooses a different
pure strategy message. This result holds regardless of the communication strategy of
the leader.
First consider φ < 11−α . It follows from the analysis in the main text that pure strategy
equilibria can only take the form of pooling equilibria, in which Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) = ω
where ω ∈ {L,R,N} and appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs are specified. Of these
equilibria, ω = R fails to meet the intuitive criterion (Cho, Kreps, 1987). Suppose we
have an equilibrium with Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) = R , supported by the out-of-equilibrium
belief of the L follower Pr(Ii = L | Iˆi = L) = 0. Then L receives a strictly higher
utility from announcing L if the belief would be be Pr(Ii = L | Iˆi = L) = 1, as L does
no longer pay cost ξ. R would not receive higher utility from announcing L under the
same belief Pr(Ii = L | Iˆi = L) = 1, as his coup attempt is supported anyway in the
original equilibrium and he has to pay a cost ξ for lying. Now consider φ > 11−α . In this
parameter range, it is never optimal for the L follower to support a coup attempt against
a bad leader if both L and R types stage such coups in equilibrium. Therefore, the only
incentive for the leader to hide his affiliation comes from the cost of lying. Suppose
we have an equilibrium with Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) = R. Then L can save ξ by deviating to
announcing L. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the L follower cannot prevent L from
taking such an action, as the L follower does not support a coup against the bad leader
in equilibrium. The same holds for R in an equilibrium where Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) = L.
Therefore, the only pure strategy pooling equilibrium has Iˆi(R) = Iˆi(L) = N . Finally,
the equilibria described in proposition 6 need to be supported by appropriate out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. The belief that the probability of the deviator being L is α supports
all equilibria.
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